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The following work extends the breakpoint literature regarding annual attendance 
and the impact of outcome uncertainty at the aggregate level to the National Basketball 
Association, National Football League, and National Hockey League as well as at the 
team level in these three leagues and Major League Baseball.  Attendance series for each 
league under consideration are not stationary overall but are stationary with breakpoints.  
However, evidence for the presence of a unit root—with or without breaks—is mixed 
across teams within and between North American leagues.  Break points correspond in 
believable ways to historical occurrences in these leagues and the cities in which many of 
the franchises reside.  Ultimately, the impact of competitive balance varies across both 
leagues and teams with respect to the time path of stadium attendance, with mixed 
evidence for Rottenberg’s uncertainty of outcome hypothesis.  I present implications of 
breaks and balance effects and suggest future research on attendance estimation in North 
American professional sports, including further econometric treatment for a fully 







1.1 Background, Objectives and Overview of Relevant Literature 
 In understanding determinants of attendance in North American professional 
sports, the bulk of work in Sports Economics and Sport Management has largely 
evaluated balance effects on attendance at the league-level (Schmidt and Berri, 2001, 
2002, 2004; Coates and Harrison, 2005; Fort and Lee, 2006; Lee and Fort, 2008).  Further 
work in this area has been limited to short-term competitive balance and attendance 
demand issues for Major League Baseball (MLB) franchises (Meehan, Nelson and 
Richardson, 2007; Tainsky and Winfree, 2010a).  Thus, very little is understood about the 
long-term behavior of game attendance of individual teams and its relationship to 
competitive balance.  Though short term snapshots in time are informative, a full 
treatment of complete individual team attendance series may help to inform league-level 
policy in which owners have varying objectives in diverse markets that change 
dramatically over time.  In addition, previous empirical work investigating Simon 
Rottenberg’s Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH, 1956) in North America has 
overwhelmingly involved analysis of baseball attendance. 1  Although there have been 
                                                          
1 Siegfried and Eisenberg, 1980 (MiLB); Baade and Tiehen, 1990; Domazlicky and Kerr, 1990; Knowles 
and Sherony, 1992; Bruggink and Eaton, 1996; Coffin, 1996; Kahane and Shmanske, 1997; Schmidt and 




some attendance demand studies involving other North American sports leagues (Jones 
and Ferguson, 1988; Paul, 2003; Schmidt and Berri, 2004; Leadley and Zygmont, 2006; 
Coates and Humphreys, 2007; Winfree and Fort, 2008), much of the attendance research 
in the National Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League (NFL) and 
National Hockey League (NHL) has focused on fan substitution, stadium honeymoon 
effects, discrimination, and impacts of labor disputes.  However, few studies have 
attempted to directly estimate the impacts of each of the multiple dimensions of 
uncertainty on league and team attendance, as well as track these attendance levels and 
their relationship to league policies and other events.   
Overall, empirical research has disagreed on the influence of the UOH in practice.  
Szymanski (2003) reviews the findings of a number of studies, many of which find 
conflicting results with respect to fan interest and the UOH.  As Lee and Fort (2008) note, 
there is a possibility that leagues have managed balance well enough that there is not a 
discernible effect on demand as represented by gate attendance numbers.  This leaves 
room for further empirical research, and more recent investigations have found some 
evidence for interest in certain types of competitive balance (Lee and Fort, 2008; 
Meehan, Nelson & Richardson, 2007; Rascher & Solmes (2007); Soebbing (2008)). 
 Gauging determinants of demand for attendance at the league level is a valuable 
endeavor in and of itself for evaluating league policy and choice variables for team 
managers, but the variability in preferences for uncertainty of outcome at the team level 
is another important aspect of league survival (Lee & Fort, 2008).  Understanding how 
fans respond to this balance on an individual team basis can shed light on where the net 




uncertainty of outcome—may be derived.  The primary purpose of this work, however, is 
to fill the gaps in the baseball, football, basketball, and hockey literature with a full time 
series treatment of league attendance in order to evaluate large shocks in attendance 
through long-term tracking, and secondarily to assess the validity of the predictions by 
UOH and its multifaceted nature. 
Uncertainty itself is often discussed in terms of a direct causal factor in fan interest, 
when much of its effect (if indeed there is any effect) could in fact be a mediating factor 
in aggregate fan hope for each home team.  Knowledge of the effects of UOH at the team 
level can help to inform practitioners both how uncertainty mediates this “fan hope” and 
how it may directly influence interest and excitement for a league with teams in 
heterogeneous markets.  Measuring these effects separately is a difficult (if not 
impossible) task without survey research, but a team-level treatment of the different 
realizations of competitive balance and uncertainty may inform ticket pricing—holding 
constant these variables—and provide further knowledge of the preferences of fans 
toward winning and uncertainty within each market.  Of course, attendance is only one 
aspect of demand for baseball and I do not evaluate the full revenue function for each 
franchise in this analysis.  Certainly, the effects of balance on television contracts and 
viewership are also an important and continually evolving aspect in the demand for North 
American professional sports leagues.  Nevertheless, the information regarding trends in 
attendance contained in this work is an important precursor to understanding 
determinants of a full sports league demand function for team managers and executives 
within their own respective market.  In addition, empirical understanding of the varying 




decision making, where these owners with different objective functions must agree on 
league policies while balancing self-interest based on their own market conditions.  
Finally, the econometric considerations here inform further panel and cross-sectional 
analyses at the league and team level.  These additional considerations are pivotal to 
understanding demand for attendance in the leagues considered here, as the limited 
treatment of dependent variable complications—for example, sellouts result in censored 
data—ultimately call for further analysis accounting for the properties exhibited here. 
The following work extends the previously cited literature with a long-term time 
series analysis of league attendance in the NBA, NFL and NHL, and franchise attendance 
in MLB, and in these three mentioned leagues.  The empirical process allows for an 
estimation of attendance shocks that may be related to league policy or other historical 
events and qualitative evaluation of the relationship of these shocks to any sudden 
changes in competitive balance.  Qualitative evaluation of attendance shocks for shared-
market sports teams may additionally shed light on the possibility of fan substitution and 
fixed sports entertainment demand within individual regions.  Knowledge of possible 
sport substitutes is an important yet mostly uncharted area of sports economics and sport 
management research.  Winfree et al. (2004), Winfree and Fort (2008), Winfree (2009a) 
and Rascher et al. (2009) have performed informative analyses investigating this topic, 
but only provide some empirical estimation of substitution between two sports (NBA and 
NHL).  Winfree (2009b) follows this line of literature with a further empirical 
investigation of competition between same-owner teams within the same market for all 
four major North American leagues.  As this latest research emphasizes, understanding 




implications not only for team managers, but also antitrust.  This issue will be discussed 
in more detail later. 
 
1.2 A Brief Description of the North American Sports League 
 A background of the theory and literature regarding professional sports leagues in 
North America and assumptions behind the study of sports leagues as profit-maximizing 
firms should prove instructive before assessing the influences that uncertainty may have 
on these objectives and policies over such a long period.  The bulk of economic modeling 
of professional sports—and ultimately its influence on demand and attendance 
estimation—stems from Simon Rottenberg’s seminal piece “The Baseball Players’ Labor 
Market” (1956).  Professional sport in North America is likely best described as a profit-
maximizing business, but both Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964) highlight how the 
unique nature of sporting competition requires its own development within the economic 
modeling literature.  The work of Rottenberg (1956) describes the landscape of the 
market for baseball playing talent in a world of the reserve clause, which at that time 
subjected players to monopsony exploitation by binding a player to a single team for the 
entirety of his career.  However, for the purposes of this work, the effects of the reserve 
rule itself are of less interest than the reason owners claim that it was instituted in the first 
place: to preserve competitive balance.  El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) follow this path, 
developing some of the early economic models of pro sports following the original 
institution of the MLB draft.  Much of the resulting work has aimed at describing how 
sports leagues function as independent franchises with specific needs for collaboration—




(Fort and Quirk, 2011; 2010).  The uniqueness of sport described by Neale (1964) is of 
great interest to the majority of those involved in the relatively young fields of Sports 
Economics and Sport Management.    
 The defense of the reserve rule, and one reason for the unique antitrust treatment 
extended to baseball in the earlier part of the 20th Century, is the idea that league survival 
relies heavily on an equal distribution of talent among teams in the league: a key topic 
within the following empirical attendance estimation.  It seems inevitable that some 
franchises will be placed in “better” markets than others and, combined with exclusive 
territory rights to bar entry by other teams, will have more resources to purchase talent 
and dominate the league for sustained periods.  While “better market” can often mean a 
larger population, Rottenberg is careful to note that a number of factors go into the 
demand for baseball (or sports in general), including population, income, team rank, ease 
of travel to the stadium, and closeness of substitutes within that market.  Competitive 
balance can play an important role in league survival, but Rottenberg explains that the 
reserve clause and special antitrust treatment are likely unnecessary due to the ability for 
teams to reassign property rights of players within the league.  Ultimately, these policies 
redistribute revenues from player cost to the owners’ bank accounts.  Fort and Quirk 
(1995) reiterate Rottenberg’s conclusions in a more modern light with respect to the true 
objectives of owners and specific league policies that claim to be in place to preserve 
balance.  Whether or not the antitrust treatment is necessary, understanding the influences 
of uncertainty and balance on attendance demand is an important part of managing both 




 This supposed need for a reasonably equal distribution of talent across these 
variable markets stems from the required cooperation among independent franchises in 
order to produce a sporting event, and the need for each of the teams in the league to 
survive in order to be able to continue to produce competitive games.  If a single team 
dominates a league, it could be detrimental to the survival of the smaller market teams, 
ultimately forcing these teams out of business.  Neale (1964) offers an additional 
understanding of the differences between the economics of a standard firm and those that 
face sports team owners and league organizers.  He presents an anecdote about the need 
for exciting competition in order for all firms to survive, using an entertaining example 
referring to the historically dominant New York Yankees, “’Oh Lord, make us good, but 
not that good,’ must be their prayer” (pp. 2).  Neale describes professional sports leagues 
as a special case of the multi-firm plant—with all firms providing the same inputs 
(talent)—with an ultimate joint product: the true World Champion.  Given the similar 
inputs, but joint production resulting in a reduction in costs for both, Neale ultimately 
views sports leagues as cartels.  As a whole, this characterization tends to overstate the 
cartelization of the major leagues in North America, as not all aspects of league 
organization and behavior can be characterized in this way.  However, it is useful to 
discuss this in the context of demand for attendance, as variable market demand can 
influence the policies that leagues implement to ensure survival.  These issues can mask 
the true motivations of team owners, as described in the literature on Rottenberg’s 
Invariance Principle.  I more formally revisit this motivation in Section 1.5. 
 As Neale describes, the centralization of sports leagues can have the expected 




supply and demand intersect at a point where a monopoly league produces the most 
universal championship: something that could only be produced through a cooperative 
effort among multiple franchises within the sport.  Although cooperation can be useful in 
producing sport—and is likely more efficient with respect to the production of games and 
rules structures—the idea that sports are natural monopolies that require centralization in 
all aspects of the sports business (restricting the talent market, apparel and television 
rights, etc.) has been challenged in a number of instances (the most recent prominent 
court case being American Needle vs. NFL (2010)).  Much of the formal economic 
modeling stemming from these issues has investigated claims with respect to cooperative 
league behavior for on-field competition, the appropriateness of collusive single-entity 
business activities, and the unique antitrust treatment extended toward professional sports 
leagues (namely, Major League Baseball) in North America. 
 The unique requirement that each team in a league maintain a high enough level 
of talent to stay in business and attract fans leads us to an important subject of 
Rottenberg’s seminal work—and a core theory in the analyses presented here—known as 
the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis.  As the theory goes, fans prefer to see their home 
team win games, but also have interest in uncertainty (closeness of competition) for both 
the game and season outcomes.  Under the UOH, we expect that not knowing the 
outcome of a sporting contest or season is positively related to fan demand and overall 
league interest.  But the mediating role of uncertainty in team-level fan interest is also in 
play, as it allows more fans to have hope for a favorite teams’ success.  Therefore, the 
UOH is twofold in that it notes the immediate importance of uncertainty itself (suspense) 




as determined by their home fans—to keep from going under and ultimately causing the 
disbandment of a league.   
Through the distribution of talent, the UOH plays an important role in modeling 
the North American Sports League and the behavior by individual teams under league 
surveillance.  This distribution of talent is not only important with respect to individual 
game outcomes, but also the uncertainty of pennant races and championship races within 
seasons.  Neale (1964) coins this latter non-game-level interest in uncertainty the 
“League Standing Effect” and explains how the pennant race itself can result in 
excitement for fans in addition to the game.  This idea comes into play in the empirical 
analysis presented here and introduces the multi-faceted nature of uncertainty in 
professional sports.  More recent analysis has extended the UOH to dynasties and the 
propensity for certain teams to win year after year (Butler, 1995).  I consider this 
realization of balance within this work, but it is important to note that Rottenberg did not 
address this in his initial development of the UOH. 
 In the first year of the new millennium, Major League Baseball’s Blue Ribbon 
Panel reported that competitive imbalance would be detrimental to the survival of the 
league, echoing some of Rottenberg’s early thoughts regarding uncertainty of outcome.  
The Blue Ribbon Panel Report eventually led to the new revenue sharing structures 
agreed upon in 2002, including what is now deemed “The Yankee Tax” (Levin, Mitchell, 
Volcker & Will, 2000).  Though some of the conclusions in the Blue Ribbon Panel have 
met skepticism, the idea that “chronic competitive imbalance” could cause a league to fail 
(Levin et al., 2000, pp. 1) may have merit with respect to Rottenberg’s UOH.  If fan 




us to believe that those teams that are unable to compete on the field may also no longer 
be able to sustain a profitable business.  Thanks to the unique nature of professional 
sports, this can affect the larger market franchises as well, as their own survival is 
dependent upon the survival of their opponents (competitors). 
 While MLB attendance has thrived over the decade and a half since the 1994-95 
work stoppage—and a multitude of teams (22) have been successful at reaching the 
World Series since 1990—grumblings of Yankee dominance have not ceased in recent 
years, as fans and small market owners alike have demanded policies to mitigate the 
perceived decreasing balance in MLB.  The concern for Major League Baseball is not a 
particularly new one, as former Cleveland Indians owner—and soon to be Chicago White 
Sox owner—Bill Veeck stated in 1958, “The symptoms of near disaster are plain enough: 
The Yankees make an almost annual farce of the AL pennant race…Interest in big-league 
baseball is on the downgrade.  So is attendance, generally, in spite of glowing Yankee, 
Brave, and Dodger figures,” (Fort, 2006).  American League attendance actually was in 
slight decline at this point, but National League attendance was gradually increasing after 
a massive rebound following the end of World War II in 1945 (Lee & Fort, 2008).  There 
is, therefore, some validity in Veeck’s claims at the time; however, the decreasing 
attendance in the American League shortly recovered and began increasing steeply in 
1962.  Additionally, despite Veeck’s implication regarding the league’s balance, Lee and 
Fort (2005) find that the competitive balance in MLB has continued its gradual 
improvement over the history of both the National and American Leagues.  It is also 
worth noting that during Veeck’s short tenure as owner—1946 through 1949—his 




more after his sale of the team.  And, despite his statements above, Veeck led a group of 
investors that purchased the American League’s Chicago White Sox in 1959.  It suffices 
to say that public claims by team owners should be taken with caution and investigated 
empirically before making rash conclusions regarding league policy.  If revenues and 
attendance were so terrible, what would motivate Veeck to purchase one of these teams 
less than a year later? 
 The NFL experienced similar—and possibly even more—success with respect to 
revenues and attendance since 1990, but unlike MLB the league has been praised for its 
ability to create balance and standings turnover.  Further work by Fort and Lee (2007) 
finds improvements in balance for NFL and NHL during the history of the league from 
trends and structural changes in balance; however, the NBA has gone against the grain 
and has experienced decreasing balance trends recently.  This brings up an interesting 
dichotomy for sports leagues and the possibility of differing preferences for balance 
levels across leagues.  Understanding how these differences affect attendance in each 
league will help to inform both league managers—in informing league policy—and team 
managers, who may use the information regarding UOH to both optimize performance on 
the field (ice; court) and maximize profits in the front office. 
 
1.3 Fan Preferences in Professional Sport 
 In addition to his work in uncertainty of outcome, Rottenberg (1956) made some 
of the first contributions to the literature in the area of demand for professional sport as 
well (Fort, 2005).  Other early works on demand include Demmert (1973) and Noll 




aspect of Sports Management and Economics using a number of methods for short-term 
analysis.2  Longer term treatments of attendance demand have been limited.3  However, a 
full time series treatment of all leagues at both the league and team level is lacking from 
the literature. 
 Fan interest in sport is commonly modeled as demand for attendance dependent 
on a number of factors including—but not limited to—ticket/concession price, income, 
population, availability and closeness of substitutes, convenience and travel costs, and 
tastes and preferences.  Interestingly, studies have shown that teams price tickets in the 
inelastic portion of demand (see Fort (2004) and Krautmann and Berri (2007) for a full 
review of this literature), but this is likely a result of maximization of profits through joint 
determination of concessions and tickets prices.  Tastes and preferences themselves are 
made up of a number of factors and are likely extremely heterogeneous across fans.  
These factors may include home team quality, visiting team quality, interest in the 
entertainment experience (stadium novelty, alternative game entertainment and 
promotions, on-field entertainment and athleticism), and outcome uncertainty.  It is 
important to highlight that the UOH considers preferences of fans, leaving this portion of 
work less informed by formal economic theory.  Ultimately, the idea that outcome 
uncertainty is positively related to demand for attendance—as originally posited by 
Rottenberg—is a hypothesis that should be further empirically tested.  It is a unique 
aspect of demand not found in other places, as the creation of uncertainty is a joint 
                                                          
2 Baade and Tiehen, 1990; Domazlicky and Kerr, 1990; Knowles, Sherony and Haupert, 1992; Paul, 2003; 
Coates and Harrison, 2005; Coates and Humphreys, 2007; Meehan, Nelson and Richardson, 2007; Paul and 
Weinbach, 2007; Rascher and Solmnes, 2007; Soebbing, 2008; Lee, 2009; Davis, 2009; Lemke, Leonard 
and Tlhokwane, 2010; Tainsky, 2010; Tainsky and Winfree, 2010a, 2010b) 
3 Schmidt and Berri, 2001, 2004; Krautman and Hadley, 2006; Matheson, 2006; Lee and Fort, 2008; 




product on the field of play (and likely influenced in certain respects from the front office 
of the league).  
Uncertainty of outcome is ultimately realized through the competitive balance of 
a league; however, the reader must keep in mind that although the distribution of talent 
itself (balance) and the UOH are inseparable, there is an important distinction between 
the two individual concepts in practice (Fort & Maxcy, 2003).  Research under the 
umbrella of the UOH has a foundation in fan response to balance, while those involved in 
pure competitive balance research are focused on measurement and influences on the 
actual distribution of talent.  These are of course complementary to one another, but the 
distinction is important in defining the goals of the research at hand.  The secondary 
purpose of this dissertation falls under the former characterization, evaluating balance 
impacts on attendance for sports leagues.  The primary purpose here is understand long-
term behavior of, and large shocks in, attendance at different levels of aggregation and 
their relationship to significant historical and league policy events. 
 At present, there seems to be little agreement on the strength of the UOH in North 
American Professional Sports.  As noted earlier, Szymanski (2003) finds mixed results 
with respect to the influence of UOH, and ultimately concludes that it has little, if any, 
effect on interest in sports.  However, work up to this point has not investigated all 
aspects of uncertainty in all leagues, and a majority of study has been performed at the 
aggregate league level.  Understanding the full scope of the UOH calls for investigation 
at both the league and team level of attendance in order to understand the heterogeneous 
preferences for uncertainty and how this uncertainty and individual team quality interact 




evaluation, a more formal model of the North American league is presented in order to 
explicitly describe the mechanisms behind balance and Rottenberg’s predictions with 
respect to uncertainty of outcome and league policy. 
 
1.4 Formal Modeling of the North American Professional Sports League 
In this section, I present a simple model of a league of profit-maximizing sport 
franchises, much of which is adapted from Fort and Quirk (2007; 1995) and El-Hodiri 
and Quirk (1971).  For North American Leagues, the majority of the modeling literature 
assumes that owners are profit-maximizing with respect to their own individual team, 
with gate revenues related to team quality and the market size of each team (in contrast to 
the view that European sports franchise owners are utility/win maximizing subject to 
some constraints, one important aspect differentiating model assumptions across 
continental leagues).  In other words, gate revenues are increasing in the probability of a 
home team win and the market size of that team.  The team quality is determined by a 
stock of playing skill units, with some relationship between units of talent and overall 
team strength.  In the absence of revenue sharing or other league restrictions, the simplest 
single team gate revenue function for a single game with respect to home team quality is 
defined by, 
 
𝑅𝑖𝐺 =  𝑅𝑖𝐺�𝑤𝑖(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡𝑗)�, 
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 In this notation, gate revenues for team i are the total of all single game gate 
revenue for team i’s home games against all other teams.  Each single game’s gate 
revenue is a function of the quality (with win percent as a proxy for quality) of the home 
team (𝑤𝑖) and the market size of the home team.  Team quality is increasing in t, talent on 
the home team, and home gate revenues increase in 𝑤𝑖 with decreasing marginal returns 
for investment in winning. 
 It is important to note here that the cost of talent, c, does not imply a constant 
marginal cost model.  While not formally exhibited in this work, the cost of talent is 
determined by the standard tatonement process.  Prices are “announced” and talent 
purchase decisions are made at the margin for both teams.  The endogenous 
determination of cost of talent may also be exhibited through Figure 1.1.  Here, assume 
that the two teams end up at points B and C.  If so, then there is an incentive for the small 
market team to sell talent to the larger market team (as long as there is nothing to inhibit 
the flow from one team to another).  This exchange will happen until both teams reach 
the equilibrium at point A.  The process ultimately determines c as in any standard 
economic model, and this result is treated as given throughout the modeling process here. 
The subsequent notation, 𝑃𝑖𝑗, is taken from El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), and 
represents the production function (contest success function, CSF) with respect to talent 
levels of both teams (i.e. the probability of the home team winning a single matchup, 










 At this juncture, the imposition of different CSFs can complicate the model, and I 
proceed with a more simple one-to-one interpretation that is the standard in the literature 
as follows (Fort & Winfree, 2009).  In the characterization of NALs as “closed leagues”, 
when one team adds talent, it can only come at the expense of another team in the league.  
This will be important in more specific equilibrium models that look at the distribution of 
talent and results of league policies like revenue sharing, salary caps, and luxury taxes.  
In this case, win percent is determined by the proportion of talent on each team relative to 
the rest of the league, therefore normalizing total talent to 1.  By first imposing the 
“adding up constraint” in professional sports, or the idea that the on-field competitive 
outcome is inevitably zero-sum, we find:  
 













The zero-sum result for a league simplified to two teams—a method popularized 
by Quirk and Fort (1992) and Fort and Quirk (1995)—is that 𝑤𝑖 = 1 − 𝑤𝑗, directly 
implying our Pij from before, and includes relative quality only within the model 
(Marburger (1997) and Kesenne (2000) consider further absolute quality specifications).  
The closed league characterization differs from that of many European or other 




If a team in League A contracts talent from another League B, the talent available to the 
other teams in League A is not affected (though, the absolute level of talent is increased 
and the win percentages can be altered if a single team increases its talent level).  In this 
case, a league may be defined as having an elastic supply of talent.  Because of the closed 
nature of the majority of NALs, the talent supply in leagues analyzed here is defined as 
perfectly inelastic, and the modeling comes under the assumption that each talent choice 









a natural result of the normalization of the sum of league talent to 1.  I proceed with the 
above assumption, following the general model specified in previous literature.  With this 
specification, the logit contest success function is formally assumed away, and owners 
buy win percent in best response to the rest of the league in the static case.  To show this, 
first take the derivative of Pij (or simply the derivative of win percent with respect to 















Substituting from above for 
𝑑𝑡𝑗
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= 1 . 
 
 In other words, there are no scale effects in the relationship between talent and 
winning.  Of course, any sort of more complex relationship between talent investment 
and win percent is an important issue related to the production function in sports, which 
has been of interest in more recent literature (Fort and Winfree, 2009).  Here, I begin by 
considering the purchase of win percents by franchise owners as in the classical literature 
in order to provide a smooth transition from the characterization above.  The cost of 
talent is treated as given and constant for the classical models of NALs, with equilibrium 
at a point where the marginal revenues of adding talent equal the marginal cost of adding 
talent for all teams.  This can be seen from a simple, two-team case with profits denoted 
(with Team i as the large-market team from here on), 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝐺 �𝑤𝑖(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡𝑗)� − 𝑐𝑤𝑖 , and,𝜋𝑗 = 𝑅𝑗𝑖𝐺�𝑤𝑗(𝑡𝑗 , 𝑡𝑖)� − 𝑐𝑤𝑗,  
 
 Where—with our simplifying assumptions about talent and winning—first order 




− 𝑐 = 0 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑,
𝜕𝑅𝑗
𝜕𝑤𝑗
− 𝑐 = 0 . 
 
 As expected from theories of profit maximization, teams choose the winning 




marginal cost of buying one more unit of talent.  Therefore, marginal revenues are equal 
at c* for both teams at equilibrium.  Because we assume that demand is greater in the 
larger market, Team i buys more talent than Team j, and the league is unbalanced.  The 
unbalanced notion implies that 𝑤𝑖 > 𝑤𝑗, which can be further exacerbated by local 
television markets and the demand for non-shared luxury box revenues becoming more 
prominent in new stadium deals. 
 This model will lay the foundation for the empirical evaluations presented 
throughout this dissertation, as well as for further exhibitions regarding the effectiveness 
of policy in controlling balance.  It is important to note that the work here discusses only 
North American leagues.  Further applications to European and other sports leagues 
require further considerations to talent in a league.  For more formal exhibition of these 
league models, the reader is referred to the excellent work by Kesenne (2000a; 2000b; 
2001; 2006), Szymanski (2003; 2004; 2006) and Szymanski and Kesenne (2004). 
 
1.5 Owners’ Defense of League Policies and the Invariance Principle 
 Team owners and league managers often proclaim that policies such as the 
amateur draft and gate revenue sharing are implemented in order to preserve competitive 
balance and fan interest in the league.  However, another important insight in 
Rottenberg’s piece is the Invariance Principle (IP).  Before the publication of the Coase 
Theorem (Coase, 1960), Rottenberg recognized the difficulty in defending the reserve 
rule as a way to ensure equal talent distribution and preserve uncertainty-of-outcome.  
The rule and its defense, it turns out, was likely to be nothing more than an excuse to 




right to a player’s talent can be exchanged, then there is little to keep that talent from 
flowing to its most highly valued use, irrespective of who owns the rights.  In the end, 
teams will facilitate this flow as long as it is profitable for them to do so.  Rottenberg 
notes that the IP is not restricted to the reserve clause, as the Amateur Player Draft should 
have similar results: once players are drafted and bargaining takes place between the 
drafting team and the draftee, these contracts are ultimately sold from a smaller market 
team to a larger market team with a constraint of decreasing marginal returns to talent 
investment for the purchasing team (i.e. not all of the talent will end up in the larger 
market). 
 The ultimate result of the IP, and an important conclusion with respect to the 
antitrust treatment extended to MLB, is that talent would be similarly distributed with or 
without the reserve clause (free agency) or draft.  Of course, this hypothesis is subject to 
the restriction that transactions costs are the same—or negligibly different—in either case 
(Daly and Moore (1981) provide an alternative view of this proposition).  Therefore, the 
talent distribution does not depend on who holds the rights to the player talent (player or 
team), as long as these rights can be sold.  The true motivation behind the reserve clause 
seems to have been ensuring monopsony exploitation of baseball players, rather than a 
more equal distribution of talent across the league that team owners insisted on using as a 
defense of the rule.  Most economists would recognize this as the weak version of the 
Coase Theorem, but Fort (2005) and Sanderson and Siegfried Sanderson (2006) give 
Rottenberg the due that is oft ignored within the Sports (and more general) Economics 
literature, despite the publication of “The Baseball Players’ Labor Market” a full four 




is not to discredit Coase and his immeasurable contributions to the field of Economics 
with the additions regarding efficient allocation through these exchanges without 
transactions costs (and of course the importance of considering them), but Rottenberg 
was the first to imply the final outcome.  As Fort (2005) describes, the IP itself leads to 
the need for an interesting test as to the magnitude of transactions costs in NALs.  If little 
changed after free agency began its reign with respect to the distribution and movement 
of talent, then it may be that the magnitude of the transactions costs within professional 
sport are not large enough to inhibit the hypothesized consequences of the IP.  Depending 
on fan preferences, player movement may or may not have impacts on attendance 
differentially across sports markets.  Of course, evaluating the magnitude and influence 
of these costs on player movement and its impact on fan interest would be an interesting 
addition to the following empirical evaluation; however, I do not specifically visit these 
issues empirically in this work. 
 Before continuing on to the formal NAL modeling with regards to the IP, it is 
important to note that Rottenberg ends his piece by offering his thoughts on pooled 
revenue sharing and salary caps in a free talent market.  His thoughts foreshadow much 
of the discussion in the following modeling literature such as El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), 
Fort and Quirk (1995), Vrooman (1995), Szymanski (2003; 2004), and Fort and Quirk 
(2007), and Winfree and Fort (2012) in developing formal economic theories about talent 
and revenue (re)distribution, enforceability of salary caps and alternative methods of 
compensation, and the importance of both absolute and relative quality to fans.  The 
importance of Rottenberg’s work stretches beyond the UOH and IP, much of which is 




the abundant observations of the father of sports economics, Simon Rottenberg—and the 
later additions of Walter Neale and others—have built a broad foundation for popular 
topics throughout the history of the field of Sports Economics. The next sections follow 
from this traditional economic model of sports leagues presented in Section 1.3 and its 
application to the Invariance Principle. 
 
1.5.1 League Policies and the Invariance Principle 
 El-Hodiri and Quirk (EQ, 1971) present one of the early formal models of 
professional sports in order to investigate the legitimacy of baseball’s unique treatment 
with respect to United States antitrust laws.  The authors consider any tendencies for 
baseball toward more equal playing strengths with both the player draft and the reserve 
clause under the direction of Rottenberg’s seminal piece.  This work incorporates 
Rottenberg’s UOH within the revenue specification, claiming that, “As the probability of 
either team winning approaches one, gate receipts fall substantially,” (pp. 1306).  
Therefore, as exemplified in the previous section, each team has the incentive to become 
better than their opponents, but not too much better.   
 EQ discusses gate revenues in the context of Rottenberg’s UOH, or that visiting 
team quality is also of interest, and the model for home gate revenues in an n-team league 
are specified as, 
 








 In this description, each single game’s gate revenue is a function of the relative 
quality of the home and visiting team and the market size of the home team, as presented 
in Section 1.3.  Revenues are increasing in the quality of the home team and profits are 
maximized at some optimal probability of the home team winning, 𝑃𝑖𝑗∗ > 0.5, subject to 
the CSF mentioned earlier (the logit most commonly used in the literature). 
 Because the purpose of this section is to review the most pertinent elements of 
prior modeling, the reader is referred to El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) for the specifics of 
their calculations of the time-path of competitive balance under different league policies.  
Rather, I summarize the pertinent findings with respect to the impositions on the 
decisions model facing franchise owners according to the authors.  The most important 
conclusion reached from this model is that, under conditions where teams in a league 
have varying returns to winning and the ability to purchase contracts from competing 
teams, a league will not converge on an equal distribution of talent over time.  This is in 
support of Rottenberg’s IP, in which individual teams will have an incentive to buy talent 
from others if ownership of the player in question would disproportionately increase 
profits for the buying team.  The result under the reserve clause: a continued unequal 
distribution of talent across the league. 
 EQ go further to state that, in a situation where the returns to talent investment for 
all teams are (roughly) equal, the league would converge to a place where the teams are 
of generally equal playing strength.  Of course this result would rely on the league 
allowing more than a single team in markets that could sustain them, which to this day 
has not been the case (for example, MLB placing only two teams in New York when it 




talent and varying market sizes, the league should be of relatively equal playing strength 
under the reserve rule only if contract sales are forbidden (and talent comes from a 
reverse order draft).  This would reduce the ability to move players for profit, for large-
market teams to sign players first (due to the draft), and ultimately result in teams being 
mostly of equal strength across time.  The authors conclude that, while professional 
sports may require antitrust exemption for certain activities, the antitrust exemption of 
MLB up to that point would have done little to push the league toward equal playing 
strength among teams.  This would lay the foundation for much of the modeling within 
the proceeding literature as league policies changed substantially with respect to the 
reserve rule in the coming years. 
 Fort and Quirk (FQ, 1995) and Vrooman (1995) echo EQ’s results with a static 
approach to the problem that is more easily interpreted.  Using the standard two-team 
model from FQ, we see in Figure 1.1 that there is a divergence from equilibrium (B and 
C) under the reserve rule when contract sales are not permitted.  In this case, the smaller 
market team would prefer to sell contracts to the larger market team and the talent level 
competitive balance would converge on A, while the price of talent would fall to c*.  
Therefore, in the case where contract sales are permitted, the small market team will 
continue to sell talent to the large market team up to A.  The result is as predicted in EQ: 
the cost of talent is reduced from c to c* in Figure 1.1 and players are exploited.  Note 
that in the figure, the cost of talent is horizontal at c and c*, and equilibrium occurs when 
MR=c* as standard profit-maximization conditions would suggest. 
 Following the presentations of EQ in 1971—and preceding FQ and Vrooman in 




the Coasian world without transaction costs inferred by Rottenberg in professional sports.  
Daly and Moore question the validity of the assumption that individual decision makers 
(team owners) do not consider the external effects in resource allocation when making 
decisions.  They also suggest that there are additional costs to selling rights of players 
from team to team that may have effects on the application of the Invariance Principle.  
The authors propose that these owners will be overseen by a league entity that would 
cooperate to do what is best for the league.  In other words, the league as a whole would 
encourage a distribution of talent that would be most beneficial for all owners, rather than 
a single owner.  The point is further made that fan confidence—referred to as “contest 
legitimacy” (Daly, 1992)—relies on balance and rational owners should consider 
continued fan interest when making profit-maximizing decisions. This seems like a 
reasonable criticism and is related to the UOH, as league collaboration exists in order to 
ensure the survival of all teams. 
 
1.5.2 Gate Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance 
 In addition to modeling the ultimate consequences of the reserve clause from the 
perspective of the Invariance Principle, EQ also specifically consider gate revenue 
sharing in their work in order to incorporate it into their final conclusions.  Below, EQ 
represent the percentage of gate receipts collected by the home team with the α 
parameter: 
 













 Here, we can see that a proportion each team’s revenue function also depends on 
the receipts from games played at other teams’ parks.  FQ follow with an updated view of 
competitive balance in a more modern world of free agency in professional baseball and 
adapt this revenue function for local (Li) and national (N) television revenues in the static 
case.  With this, we return to a variant of our original basic revenue function from above, 
 

















 Where, 𝑍𝑖𝑗  defines the simplified version of 𝑃𝑖𝑗 from earlier as the difference 
between the win percents of the competing teams, Ai indicates the drawing potential of 
each market, and each owner chooses 𝑍𝑖𝑗∗ (𝑤𝑖∗,𝑤𝑗∗)  given c* in equilibrium to maximize 
profits based on their own market conditions.  National revenue is shared equally among 
teams and its value determined exogenously.  Local television revenue is considered 
unshared with its value determined by the market of each team and the closeness of 
competition between teams i (strong-drawing) and j (weak-drawing).  FQ simplify the 
above using a two-team league first without local television revenues.  I use a simplified 
version here; first define, 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝐺𝑖 =  Game Revenue from Team i′s home park and, 
𝑅𝑗𝑖





We find that the profit functions for teams i and j are given by: 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝛼𝑅𝑖𝑗
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 It follows that the sharing coefficients drop out of the equation, MRi = c* = MRj, 
(c* < c) in equilibrium, and players receive lower salaries (Figure 1.2).  This result 
hinges on the idea that revenue sharing equally affects the marginal revenue for each of 
the teams, resulting in a shift downward in Figure 1.2, and reducing the demand for talent 
(and ultimately the price of it).  The fall in talent cost is due to the disincentive to invest 
in winning because a proportion of the revenue function of each team relies on the 
success of the other team in drawing fans.   
 FQ extend this to an n-team league with the full specification of revenues above 
(non-shared local TV revenue).  Ultimately, the idea that the distribution of talent will 
remain the same does not necessarily hold depending on the way that local television 




small market teams substantially, given the systematic responsiveness of local television 
revenue to the market size and quality of the home team.  The net revenue implications 
for the league—as well as the distribution of profits—depend on the nature of the sharing 
rules of gate and television (National and Local) revenue sharing and incentives for 
owners to reinvest in the competitive market for talent.  When local TV and gate 
revenues are subject to the same sharing rules, league-wide profits are larger, as it would 
lower salary costs while pushing the league toward a distribution of talent that would 
maximize revenues (pp. 1289). 
Szymanski (2003; 2004) argues that past literature has not correctly interpreted 𝑡𝑖
𝑡𝑗
, 
implying that it cannot be consistent with a Nash (equal to zero) and representative of the 
implication that for every unit of talent that Team i invests in, it comes directly from 
Team j (equal to -1) in a non-cooperative environment.  He suggests that using an 
additional specification for investment in talent, 𝑧𝑖, is needed in what is deemed to be a 
non-cooperative talent market game.  The claim is that the IP may no longer hold under 
gate revenue sharing.  This defines the exchange between Szymanski (2003; 2004; 2006), 
Szymanski and Kesenne (2004), Eckard (2006), Fort and Winfree (2009), Quirk and Fort 
(2007).  Winfree and Fort (2012) reconcile the model in order to conform with Nash 
conjectures by including an additional choice variable—investment in talent—in the 
modeling of team decision-making.  Ultimately this specification exhibits that the IP can 
still hold under certain conditions for closed leagues.  Winfree and Fort (2012) introduce 
a third dimension into the model—remaining with the two team simplification.  With this 
specification, the authors let 𝑡1 = 𝑡1(𝑧1, 𝑧2), where 𝑧𝑖 denotes the investment made in 




remain at a general level for the modeling under these specifications, with the CSF and 
team profit functions, respectively, defined as: 
 






 determines the Nash equilibrium along with the adding up 
constraint, 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 = 1 from before.  This model allows the characterization of talent 













.  For the complete details of reaching this result, the reader is referred 
to Winfree and Fort (2012).  Ultimately, it can be shown that the IP does not necessarily 









, which holds if the marginal product of talent investment across owners equates 




) the model above collapses to the original FQ 
model (1995), and the IP holds.  Of course, the validity of these assumptions is an 
empirical matter, eliciting further disagreement from Szymanski (2012).  In the end, the 
purpose of this work is not to confirm or reject the IP, but to lay out the foundation and 
justification for the empirical work presented here. 
 
1.5.3 Salary (Payroll) Caps, Luxury Taxes and Competitive Balance 
 Unlike gate revenue sharing, FQ and Vrooman disagree on the impact of payroll 




balance, Vrooman views it simply as a preconceived approach to control player costs 
with little effect on balance.  The assumptions behind the cap discussed in FQ come from 
the NBA payroll cap which allows a certain percentage of overall revenues to be spent on 
player salaries and bonuses.  There is a simple assumption here in which the total profits 
are greater under the cap than under free agency—something that seems reasonable for a 
profit-maximizing group.  Assuming that the cap is set in a way that all teams spend 
exactly the cap, we end up with Figure 1.3 as the result.  In this case, the weak drawing 
team gains the triangle ABDE in profits, whose area exceeds that of DFG.  Similarly, the 
strong drawing team gives up the triangle AHI, but this is offset by the rectangle cc*HG 
from the lowered cost of talent.  Therefore, all teams can gain in this situation.  However, 
enforcement could be an issue (FQ, 1995)—and this has been the story in the NBA, 
where certain loopholes have allowed many teams to spend above a “soft” cap.  Other 
ways of circumventing a cap could simply be due to amenities available for players in 
larger markets, which are not directly accounted for in a cap of payrolls.  From Figure 
1.3, we can see the reason: larger market teams have more revenue generating potential 
from the talent on the small-market team and have the incentive to push balance back 
toward the equilibrium point. 
 Vrooman, on the other hand, suspects that caps would have little effect on balance 
even if they were enforceable.  Under his scenario, the entire league contributes the same 
amount of payroll, resulting in zero marginal costs of winning, and ultimately leading to a 
revenue-maximizing league.  Vrooman asserts that with the entire league acting as a 
single firm, the best players will simply end up in markets where the non-sports salary 




imbalance than without the cap since there are not decreasing profits with talent 
investment for a cap set well below MR=MC.  If the additional non-salary income is not 
paid by the franchises, they are not subject to these increasing costs to hire more 
superstars than would otherwise come to the large market team.  The extent to which this 
would be the case is likely better suited for empirical investigation about the preferences 
of players to play in markets like New York and Los Angeles.  Using NFL as a very 
simple observational example (which does use a relatively hard cap among other policies 
for revenue redistribution), we see top players like Peyton Manning making significant 
non-sports income in smaller markets, raising questions about the latter conclusion that 
an enforceable cap would actually make balance worse.  Even with this observational 
example, there still seems to be plenty of reason to believe that larger markets would 
produce more sponsorship and endorsement opportunities on average and at least attract 
more superstars at the margin. 
 However, Vrooman’s original assertion that balance would not change under the 
cap may possibly hold in a case where improving balance would not increase revenues 
for the entire league.  Under the assumption that a more balance league would increase 
revenues, even a collusive firm would seem to want to maximize these revenues by 
ensuring the policy is developed to do so.  If the league is already at a revenue-
maximizing balance point, then Vrooman’s theory as to the ultimate result makes more 
sense, as the cap is instituted in a way that does not change balance, but simply lowers 
costs across the league.  This is again left up to empirical analysis, and optimal balance in 
specific leagues is considered theoretically in Fort and Quirk (2010; 2011) from the 




seems that the caps in the NBA have done little to promote balance to date (Fort and Lee, 
2007), either due to enforceability or by poor design.  The overwhelming consensus on 
the institution of an enforceable salary cap in the context of most North American 
leagues seems to be a path toward more balanced play. 
 An interesting variant of the payroll cap is the current luxury tax imposed in 
MLB, referred to as the “competitive balance tax”.  Figure 1.4 shows the change in 
balance from A to B, along with a reduced cost of talent similar to that of the payroll cap 
and revenue sharing policies.  While FQ does not explicitly model the payroll tax, 
Vrooman considers this possibility in a footnote, and Marburger (1997) directly considers 
the luxury tax.  The first theoretical result here is that the slope of the marginal revenue 
curve for the large market team is reduced, leading to more competitive balance than we 
would otherwise expect.  This is because the larger market team has its marginal revenue 
function become (1 − 𝑠)𝑀𝑅𝑖, and therefore the marginal revenue from investing in talent 
is lowered for this owner.  The additional result is again a lowered cost of talent, since the 
demand for talent within the league is lowered due to the tax on the large-market team.   
 The extent to which balance is affected depends largely on the number of teams 
affected by the tax and the rate of the tax.  The tax rate and level at which payroll must 
exceed to be subject to the tax must be chosen carefully.  If the threshold or tax rate are 
set too high or too low, the new policy may have very little effect on the demand for 
talent and ultimately not significantly change balance.  In addition, the lower wages to 
players could reward small market teams for having less talent than before depending on 
how the taxes are redistributed (Marburger, 1997).  MLB has a loose league requirement 




teams aren’t necessarily incented to reinvest in talent based on their own MR curves).  
The league has recently chastised the Florida Marlins for not reinvesting revenue sharing 
into the talent market, but the enforcement of this request is as questionable as proposed 
by FQ under a standard NBA-type salary cap. 
In MLB’s most recent collective bargaining agreement, this tax has been applied 
to the amateur draft and its growing signing bonuses as well.  The impact that the tax 
would have on competitive balance seems rather small, though does seem to reduce the 
incentive for amateurs to “hold out” for larger signing bonuses.  This new league policy 
is not considered here, though economic models of impacts of the newest collective 
bargaining agreement would be quite interesting, as much of the agreement addresses pay 
schemes for amateur players negotiated by a labor union (MLBPA) which does not 
necessarily represent their interests. 
 
1.6 Summary of Following Work 
The rest of this dissertation uses the lessons provided in the theory of sports 
leagues above, and continues as follows.  In the following chapter, I discuss past work in 
the time series treatment of professional sports attendance and the UOH.  Chapter 3 
describes the general methodology for the work presented in this dissertation. Chapter 4 
presents a full empirical analysis for each of the leagues (NBA, NFL and NHL) while 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 present the franchise level investigations (MLB, NBA, NFL and 
NHL, respectively).  Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes implications and limitations of the 






























































































Time Series Analysis in Professional Sport 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Here, it is important to first revisit the distinction between time series tracking of 
competitive balance, and time series treatment of attendance demand and its relationship 
to balance and uncertainty, as in Fort and Maxcy (2003).  There is a large collection of 
past work that tracks the time series of competitive balance over the long term (Fort and 
Quirk, 1995; Humphreys, 2002; Schmidt and Berri, 2004b; Lee and Fort, 2005; Fort and 
Lee, 2007; Fort and Lee, forthcoming).  Understanding the time path of balance is 
important in and of itself with respect to policy considerations; however, its relationship 
to attendance allows for further analysis of the appropriate level of balance for a league.   
 Further work with respect to competitive balance and attendance has used 
approaches such as first differences and autoregressive techniques (AR, ARIMA, ARCH, 
GARCH, VAR) in order to estimate influences of variables from population and income 
to taste and preferences on attendance.  However, these models may be limited.  The 
work by Bai and Perron described in the following section allows for level data analysis 
for those series that are stationary with breaks (henceforth, the BP Method) and to clearly 




Davis (2009) shows that GARCH or OLS may be a reasonable specification for a model 
of attendance demand; however, a purely linear model may not correctly account for 
exogenous shocks in attendance found through the BP Method, especially in longer 
attendance series.  This added ability to estimate breaks in both levels and trends may 
affect not only coefficient estimates for uncertainty variables, but may also provide more 
information about impacts of historical events or policy implementations by leagues that 
is not accounted for in a standard ARCH model.  The BP approach has only been used for 
a single league (MLB) at the league aggregate level of attendance and the UOH, leaving 
unexplored areas of the time series properties of the NBA, NFL and NHL at the league 
level.  In addition, further application of the BP Method at the franchise level should help 
to inform each of the four league-level analyses and enhance the understanding of 
attendance demand, league decision making and the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis. 
 
2.2 Preliminary Treatment and Recent Advances 
 When working with time series data, there are a number of important issues to 
account for in order to appropriately estimate regression coefficients over the time path of 
a dependent variable.  Fort and Lee (2006) lay out a schematic for this process for 
baseball attendance (Figure 2.1).  This schematic allows the researcher to follow a logical 
path in the time series procedure to ensure that the maximum amount of information can 
be extracted from modeling the data series.  Each of the steps in the schematic is 





The standard first step in time series analysis is to test for a unit root in the data, 
usually using one or a combination of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-
Perron (PP) or Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares test (DFGLS; Elliot, 
Rothenberg, and Stock, 1996).  If the presence of a unit root is rejected, one may proceed 
with treating the series as stationary and apply one of many time series modeling 
approaches.  However, if data are found to be non-stationary, then first differences will 
likely result in analysis on a stationary series once second-order serial correlations are 
accounted for.  Unfortunately, first differences and some traditional autoregressive 
modeling techniques can limit the analysis and straightforward interpretation of 
regression coefficients, as I will briefly discuss in the following section. 
 Standard unit root tests assume that data are distributed around a mean (level) 
throughout the time series data (allowing a trend), which can limit the power of these 
tests in the presence of a one-time structural change (Perron, 1989).  However, recent 
advances have allowed for the testing of stationarity with one or two breaks (Zivot and 
Andrews, 1992; Lee and Strazicich 2001, 2003, 2004) using the Zivot Andrews (ZA) or 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM-1 and LM-2) tests.  These tests detect structural change(s) in 
the data over time and segment the series into regimes for which stationarity is assessed.  
The latter (LM-1 and LM-2) are shown to have more appropriate size and power 
properties and are the best choice for this analysis.  Breaks may be found in either levels 
or trends with the tests, and methodology follows in the footsteps of Perron in 
establishing a solution to the previously commonly held belief that macroeconomic time 




As a relatively simple example, we can use a white noise series at 300 equally 
spaced time points in order to visualize the occurrence of mean-shift structural change.  
For the first 100 time points, the data vary around a mean of zero with normal errors.  
However, at time point 101, the data abruptly jumps up—an “exogenous shock” as 
described in Perron (1989)—but continues to follow the same path at this higher level 
(see Figure 2.2).  This would suggest that the data generating mechanism is the same, 
while the shift was created by an exogenous factor.  Standard tests, such as the ADF test, 
may not detect the fact that the data are stationary within each of the regimes around this 
shock.  However, the LM-2 test would likely find this series to be stationary with two 
exogenous level shifts at time points 100 and 200.  The idea behind these tests is to assess 
stationarity by separating these shocks from the noise function around the mean.  Perron 
(1989) exhibits this issue using the Great Crash of 1929 and the Oil Price Shock of 
1973—both considered exogenous—and quarterly GNP data.  The ability to model the 
data as stationary with breaks is advantageous for any series that may be broken into 
stationary regimes due to structural change or for stationary data with breaks that must be 
accounted for before estimating standard linear models.  Of course, modeling the actual 
location and size of the break is an important part of properly estimating the coefficients 
and their respective statistical significance.  However, while these tests roughly estimate 
break dates, the breaks must be more precisely estimated in a subsequent step in the 
analysis. 
 Perron (1989) first discusses the modeling of data with breakpoints, and Bai and 
Perron (1998; 2003) take the structural change analysis one step further, developing a 




in both level and trend simultaneously (BP Method).  Lee and Fort (2005; 2006; 2007; 
2008) pioneer the BP Method in sports research for both the tracking of competitive 
balance for the four major North American leagues, as well as testing the Uncertainty of 
Outcome Hypothesis and its relationship to attendance at the Major League Baseball 
league-level aggregate.  The BP Method applied to stationary data or break-stationary 
data allows for up to five break dates in level and/or trend along with the ability to 
separately estimate covariate coefficients across regimes (and ultimately the stationary 
process occurring between breaks).  Allowing only some predictors (in this case, level 
and trend) to change across regimes is particularly important for shorter series with 
multiple structural changes to preserve degrees of freedom in the modeling procedure.  I 
follow the Fort and Lee schematic for the analysis of data for those series found to be 
stationary with breaks (Steps 1, 2.1, 2.1A, and 2.2 in Figure 2.1) in the remaining 
chapters.  Those series found to be nonstationary are left for further analysis beyond the 
scope of this work. 
 
2.3 Attendance Series as Stationary Processes 
 I begin the analysis by evaluating the unit-root properties of each series at the 
league and franchise levels as shown in Figure 2.2.  Analyzing stationarity is a useful 
exercise in itself for a few reasons.  First, if attendance is non-stationary, then the use of 
level data (e.g., demand estimation using panel data) may lead to biased estimates and the 
direction of the bias is unknown.  Using European football, Davies, Downward, and 
Jackson (1995) were the first to show that ignoring time series behavior in sports data 




policy prescriptions.  Jones, Schofield, and Giles (2000) extended these observations.  In 
addition, a technique such as taking first differences of the elements of a time series is a 
useful but limited approach to a non-stationary series (e.g., no elasticity estimates can be 
had from first differences).  However, as noted in Fort and Lee (2006), if the data are 
stationary then standard regression applications to level data are appropriate (for 
example, taking logs gives direct elasticity estimates).  For this reason, the authors 
suggest first testing the attendance series for significant breaks—or shocks—and 
determining if the data are stationary between these breaks. 
If this subsequent unit-root test with endogenously specified break points rejects 
non-stationary behavior, level-data analysis is restricted by the limits of stationarity—that 
is, to the data between specific break points in the time series.  Lee and Fort (2008) take 
the analysis of annual league-aggregate MLB attendance in this direction.  Finally, if the 
unit-root test with endogenously specified break points fails to reject non-stationary 
behavior, data transformation such as taking first differences may be required in order to 
perform additional regression analysis. 
Following this line of reasoning, each league and team-level attendance series will 
be tested against the null of a unit-root using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron tests with both a constant and a trend variable.  The numbers of lags are 
determined by minimization of the Schwartz-Bayesian criterion for the ADF test, and by 
the truncation suggested by Newey and West (1994) for the PP test.  Unit-roots are 
further verified using the generalized least squares Dickey-Fuller test as described in 




Leybourne, Mills and Newbold (1998) highlight the possibility of spurious 
rejections with standard unit-root tests when breaks occur near the ends of a non-
stationary series.  Therefore, I employ the two-break minimum LM unit-root test to 
support any result from the ADF and PP tests (Lee and Strazicich, 2001; 2003; 2004) 
using GAUSS code generously provided by Professor Junsoo Lee.  The results are further 
confirmed using the test in Zivot and Andrews (1992), but are not reported here. 
As in Lee and Fort (2008), the LM unit-root test statistic with exogenously 
specified break points is obtained from the regression: 
 
 




t˜ S = ty − x˜ ψ − tZ ˜ δ + tε , t = 2,…, T; 
 
˜ δ  are the coefficients in the regression of 
 
∆ ty  
on 
 
∆ tZ , with Zt representing a vector of exogenous variables; 
 
x
˜ ψ  is given by 
 
1y − 1Z ˜ δ ; 
and y1 and Z1 denote the first observations of yt and Zt.  εt is the error term, assumed N(0, 
σ2).  As in Perron (1989), in the most general model (changes in level and trend) with two 
breaks, Zt is described by [1, t D1t, D2t, DT1t, DT2t]', where Djt = 1 for TBj  TBj + 1 for j 
= {1, 2}, and zero otherwise, DTjt = 1 for t  TBj + 1 for j = {1, 2}, and zero otherwise, 
and TBj stands for the time period of the breaks (Lee and Strazicich, 2003).  Following 
results from this procedure, I employ a one-break minimum LM unit-root test (Lee and 
Strazicich, 2001) for series that are not rejected at the highest level with the two-break 
test.  This is advisable given that the two-break test can adversely affect the power to 




This last step clearly identifies those team-level attendance time series that remain to be 
treated under (for example) first differences in subsequent regression analysis.   
From this stage of the analysis, one may discern whether strike years have an 
impact on the underlying assessment of stationarity of team-level attendance time series.  
Ultimately, unit root tests are performed for both the original data and this adjusted 
version for all leagues and teams to evaluate the differences between real data and the 
“counterfactual” data in which the effects of a labor dispute are minimal.  I note that, of 
course, this does not necessarily mirror a league in which labor disputes were non-
existent, as impacts from these disputes may have been experienced both before and after 
the actual work stoppage event.  While break dates are roughly estimated in the unit root 
with breaks procedure, the subsequent BP Method is needed in order to more accurately 
assess the breaks present in the attendance series (Figure 2.2). 
 
2.4 Structural Change and Demand for Attendance 
 Due to limitations within the empirical estimation procedures proposed, 
breakpoint estimation is not employed for current franchises with less than 40 years of 
existence, as the statistical power of the model is significantly reduced with shorter series 
(Bai and Perron, 2006).  However, I do assess the presence of a unit root for shorter 
franchise level series.  For those league and team series of appropriate length in which a 
unit-root is rejected, or rejected with breakpoints, I apply the approach of Bai and Perron 
(1998, 2003; I thank the authors for making their GAUSS code available online) allowing 
changes in both levels and trends as first described in Perron (1989).  This model 




procedure, Bai and Perron (2003) consider the following regression model with m breaks 
(and m + 1 regimes): 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝑥𝑡′𝛼 + 𝑧𝑡′𝛽𝑗 +  𝑢𝑡, t = Tt-j + 1,…, Tj, j = 1,…, m+1. 
 
 In the above model, the dependent variable at time t is yt with disturbance ut, 
while 𝑥𝑡(𝑝 × 1) and 𝑧𝑡(𝑞 × 1) are vectors of covariates and α and βj are the 
corresponding vectors of coefficients.  The indices (T1,…, Tm) are treated as the unknown 
breakpoints.  The model above indicates a partial model when 𝑝 > 0, and a pure 
structural change model when 𝑝 = 0.  Under the partial model, only the coefficients for 
zt are allowed to vary, while the coefficients for xt remain constant across regimes (Bai 
and Perron, 2003). 
 The dependent variable of interest is Team or League Average Per-Game 
Attendance.  I again note that although attendance is often used as a demand proxy, it 
does not capture the full demand for sport in an age of mass media and large television 
contracts.  Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that these simplistic models estimate 
attendance and are not necessarily demand estimations for the team or league’s entire 
“sports product”.  There are other issues that allow limited information from these 
simplistic models.  In particular, the BP Method cannot account for censored data 
(sellouts).  These issues have recently been theoretically considered by Qu and Perron 
(2007).  In addition, important demand covariates like ticket prices are subsumed in a 




are available will prove enlightening and complementary to the current empirical 
analysis. 
 In Chapter 3, I address more specific issues with the data used within this work, 
including sample size, variance estimation, and covariate considerations.  Additionally, I 
discuss the treatment of labor stoppages and franchise moves throughout the histories of 
each data set.  Finally, I will expand further on some of the econometric issues that I have 
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3.1 Predictor Variables and Measurement Issues 
 Uncertainty of outcome is realized in the form of competitive balance measures 
when considered in attendance estimation for professional sports.  This notion of league 
balance and uncertainty may be manifested in multiple ways, including game uncertainty, 
playoff uncertainty, and consecutive season uncertainty (Cairns, 1987; Sloane, 1976).  
Game uncertainty (GU) refers to the closeness of games, while playoff uncertainty (PU) 
refers to the closeness of pennant/championship races.  Finally, consecutive season 
uncertainty (CSU) refers to the occurrence of dynasties in a given league (Butler, 1995; 
Lee & Fort, 2005).  Although there have been calls for (Zimbalist, 2002) and attempts at 
capturing (Humphreys, 2002) these constructs in a single form, each of these measures of 
balance may prove vital to league success and cater to fan preferences for balance in 
different ways if the UOH holds in sporting competition (Fort, 2003; Fort & Maxcy, 
2003).  For this reason, I will consider all three realizations of uncertainty as separate 
measures within each league and franchise attendance model constructed. 
 The attendance models employ the GU measure “Tail Likelihood” (TL) from Fort 
and Quirk (1995) and Lee (2004; 2006) using data regarding teams in the upper and 




assumes fans are more responsive to changes in the extremes of the distribution and 
measures the frequency of teams in these tails.  As TL increases, this indicates a tighter 
distribution of win percent, and GU has increased in the given season (see Appendix E 
for the specifics of its calculation).  The UOH would imply that an increase in TL would 
be related to an increase in attendance.  This measure has been used extensively in the 
literature on sports economics across a number of leagues; however, Owen (2011) 
describes the disagreement over using a binomial-based idealized standard deviation of 
win percent in leagues with a non-zero possibility of a draw.  In this analysis, the NHL 
falls into a category of leagues in which ties are a common occurrence (I assume that the 
probability of a tie in the NFL is essentially zero, despite the technically non-zero 
possibility).  Despite some small changes in the measure, I proceed with the standard 
binomial approach to TL using win percent for the NHL, as Owen shows that quantitative 
differences in using this estimation approach are minimal.  In addition, the interest of this 
demand analysis regards the changes in balance across seasons for the same sport league, 
rather than a comparison of the value of the measure itself across leagues. 
 Measures for PU (WinDiff) and CSU (Corr) are also included in the attendance 
demand regression models.  The calculation of WinDiff is outlined in Lee and Fort 
(2008), and is made up of the average difference in winning percentages between division 
winners and runners-up in each season, as well as the difference between the “last team 
in” and the “first team out” for each league or division (see Appendices F through I for 
the specifics of calculation of WinDiff for each league).  As WinDiff decreases, the 
division races between the winner and first team out of the playoffs is closer, and PU has 




decrease in the WinDiff measure.  It is important to note that given the changing rule 
structures for each league over the course of the attendance series, the calculation of 
WinDiff varies throughout the analysis.  Again, although there are minor issues with 
using win percent for calculating WinDiff in the NHL, they likely have little to no effect 
on the outcome of the model estimations here (Owen, 2011).  I also employ an alternative 
analysis using the number of points back for the NHL, but the results (available upon 
request) do not differ substantially from the win percent metric.  Therefore, I proceed 
with using one half win for ties in the WinDiff measure for the NHL for the remainder of 
this work. 
 The CSU measure (Corr) consists of the correlation between each team’s winning 
percentage in the current season and its own average winning percentage over the 
previous three seasons, similar to that of Butler (1995) and Lee and Fort (2008).  Higher 
Corr, indicates that same teams are dominant over time, and CSU from year-to-year is 
declining (the full calculation of Corr is exhibited in Appendix E).  Based on UOH, we 
would expect a decrease in the Corr measure to be associated with an increase in league 
attendance.  While there is some correlation between these three measures of competitive 
balance, calculation of the variable inflation factor for the breakpoint models indicates 
that multicollinearity is of little concern (league balance variable inflation factors were 
below five, a suggested threshold implying multicollinearity).  Therefore, I continue with 
including all variables within each regression. 
 The last competitive balance measure considered, coined the Competitive Balance 
Ratio (CBR), comes from Humphreys (2002).  This measure combines within and across 




Consecutive Season Uncertainty.  This measure is included only in the breakpoint 
estimation for MLB franchises.  After further consideration, the conflation of across and 
within season balance in this measure makes it more suitable for balance comparisons 
across leagues than attendance estimation for a single league across seasons.  Therefore, I 
do not proceed with CBR for any models involving the NBA, NFL or NHL.  For more 
information on the calculation of this measure, the reader is referred to Appendix E and 
Humphreys (2002). 
 Finally, I include each team’s seasonal winning percentage (W%) as an additional 
input variable for the franchise level regressions.  While fans may be directly responsive 
to competitive balance and uncertainty at the league level, fans likely care about their 
own team quality first with overall balance as a secondary component to individual team 
interest.  Under this assumption, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) first discuss the idea that the 
optimal probability of a home team win would be between 0.5 and 1.  Of course, the 
coefficient estimate from the team quality variable must be approached with significant 
caution, as the direction of its causality can become convoluted in interpretations.  Teams 
likely choose their quality in the long run (Fort & Quirk, 1995), rather than respond to 
short-term attendance shocks.  Davis (2008), however, finds a significant relationship 
between team quality and team attendance, with the direction of causation going from the 
former to the latter using a VAR model.  I assume W% is well-suited to control for the 
expected fan interest in individual teams, as the balance measures control for the changes 
along the time path of balance in each league when estimating attendance.  Because the 
primary interest of this investigation is the historical tracking of attendance given the 




quality in each respective season.  Since attendees early in a season have little to 
benchmark the current year’s success, it is likely that the previous season’s success will 
have a stronger effect than the current one at these points.  However, the current season 
success is likely more influential later in the season.  Therefore, ancillary regression 
models are also estimated, which include a one-year lagged win percent variable.  A 
detailed description of the calculation of all of the variables included in this dissertation 
can be found in Appendices E through I. 
 Because there is some variation in home games played over seasons, Team and 
League Average Per-Game Attendance is used as the dependent variable of interest 
(TAPG and LAPG, respectively) by dividing the total attendance for the season by the 
number of games hosted by each franchise in each year.  At the annual league and team 
level, strike years are included in the eventual analysis of the determinants of attendance.  
Each league has had a work stoppage or labor dispute at some point in its respective 
history.  Therefore, I make use of both the raw attendance per game (APG, used as a 
generalization to both TAPG and LAPG from here on) and an adjusted version of each 
series in which years containing labor disputes or work stoppages are imputed using a 
simple local linear regression approach (LLR).  In this approach, APG for those years in 
which a labor dispute occurred consists of a weighted average APG of the seasons just 
before and just following the year in question, as well as those games played within the 
year in question, if in fact games were played in that season (this is not the case for the 
2004-2005 NHL season).  While previous literature has made use of indicator variables to 
denote strike years (Schmidt and Berri, 2002, 2004; Coates and Harrison, 2005), this can 




series may be partitioned into short subsamples by the indicator variables (Lee and Fort, 
2007).  The subsamples generated may be so short that endogenously specified break 
points cannot be determined.  This also ensures that later breakpoint estimation is not 
falsely influenced by the short-term shocks that may result from a work stoppage, as 
previous research has found short-term effects of strikes, rather than long-term, and the 
interest of the current research lies more with the long-term structural changes.  However, 
I use both the adjusted and unadjusted APG in order to assure robustness of results from 
the BP procedure.  Only the results of the adjusted data are presented here, with the 
ancillary analysis on the raw data available upon request.  For the team level regressions, 
further considerations were needed for data imputation.  These further considerations are 
discussed more thoroughly in the respective section for each league and team in Chapter 
6 (NBA), Chapter 7 (NFL) and Chapter 8 (NHL). 
 Given that the NBA, NHL and some teams from MLB and NFL in this analysis 
have relatively short attendance series (limited to no less than 40 years), I account for size 
and power issues using a trimming parameter that restricts regimes between breaks to a 
minimum length Bai and Perron, 2006). In estimating attendance models using the BP 
Method, care must be taken with respect to the choice to account for changes in variance 
across regimes.  The failure to reject the presence of a unit root without accounting for 
breaks may be related to both a change in mean and variance across time.  
Heteroskedasticity can play a role in error variance estimation and ultimately statistical 
inference if not properly accounted for.  In the series analyzed here, I first employ the BP 
approach without accounting for the possibility of changing error distributions across 




Perron, 2006), the significance of the sequential tests could be affected by changing 
variance across regimes.  Some of the models show evidence of time-dependent variance 
in the errors, suggesting that a more robust model—allowing for heterogeneous error 
estimates—may be more appropriate. 
 Additionally, some models are sensitive to the imputation of years in which work 
stoppages took place.  Large spikes or troughs in covariates that are concurrent with 
strike years or estimated structural changes tend to adversely affect coefficient estimates 
in the league-level regressions.  Both sign and significance of coefficients on balance 
measures in the regression tend to be influenced due to small changes in the data at the 
league level.  Ultimately, both homogeneous and heterogeneous error variance estimation 
models are reported at the league and team levels, but the majority of discussion will 
involve only the latter. 
 I follow by estimating each of the models, allowing for heterogeneity of errors 
across regimes for the sequential tests for structural change.  This resolves most of the 
issues with respect to time-dependent errors in the regression estimates, as there do not 
seem to be systematic errors within each of the regimes for each of the models.  Given 
the multiple variance estimates, I set the trimming parameter to allow no less than 10 
observations per regime for the heterogeneous models.  For example, if a break is 
detected in an attendance series (with a length of 40 years) in 1970, then the procedure 
will not allow a new break anywhere in the interval from 1960 through 1980.  This 
ensures that the procedure does not estimate the variance of a regime with very few data 
points.  For those teams with attendance series longer than 100 data points (MLB only)—




Series with considerably fewer observations have the parameter set to 𝜀 = 0.20 𝑜𝑟 𝜀 =
0.25 in the heterogeneous model estimation.  This specification also means that the 
maximum number of estimated breaks for the shorter series is 2 or 3, while the procedure 
allows up to a maximum of 5 breaks for the longer series and in the homogeneous error 
variance models.  Bai and Perron (2006) discuss this issue in more detail.  An additional 
consequence of specifying multiple variance estimations is that breaks may not be 
estimated as closely together as with the homogeneous models.  However, this may be 
advantageous in that the model does not attempt to over-fit such short series by 
estimating spurious breaks because of the limited information about mean reversion of 
the data.  The BP approach could run into this difficulty if the process is modeled as 
changing structurally, when in fact it would have reverted to the original mean (level) 
without a break in the shorter series. 
 
3.2 Further Econometric Issues 
 Along with issues in variance estimation and sellout (censoring) problems, there 
are other econometric limitations with the breakpoint regression estimations in their 
current form.  In the league-level regressions for NBA, NFL and NHL, there is some 
concern of correlated errors with respect to Game Uncertainty as measured by Tail 
Likelihood.  Because the BP procedure is a simultaneous estimation of breaks and 
regression coefficients, using errors robust to heteroskedasticity is a complicated 
programming issue beyond the scope of the current empirical analysis (as is the difficulty 
with sellouts and censoring of attendance data for some teams).  In fact, Bai and Perron 




 It is important to also note that using a trend in the long-term regressions is not a 
replacement for attempting to understand influences of economic factors like ticket prices 
and general wealth in a given market.  Teams could be adjusting ticket prices based on 
the included variables (like team quality and outcome uncertainty/balance) and this 
would not be accounted for in the simplistic approach described here.  The fact that 
tickets could be priced based on these covariates could reduce the amount of information 
gathered through a simplistic model, as any attendance variation that may have occurred 
due to changes in competitive balance and uncertainty could be mitigated by team 
managers attempting to maximize profits under these changing conditions.  Therefore, I 
emphasize that the following analysis is not a demand estimation per se, but a look at 
attendance over time controlling for the changing characteristics of the league. 
 Finally, while qualitatively evaluating structural change is a useful endeavor 
itself, this sort of speculation can only reach so far.  Further “quasi-experimental” 
methods that include more economic variables—such as discontinuity designs using 
panel data—would be complementary to the work proposed here.  However, the 
structural changes found using the BP Method can inform future work regarding policy 
implications in professional sports leagues in North America. 
 As an overview, the methodology explained in this section will first be applied to 
the remaining leagues at the aggregate level: NBA, NFL and NHL.  From there, each of 
the four major North American Leagues will undergo franchise level breakpoint analysis 
with the considerations listed here.  While aggregate information is important for the 
league, the latter will help to understand underlying influences of both breaks and interest 





NBA, NFL and NHL League Aggregates 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Following previous work at the league aggregate level for Major League Baseball 
(Lee and Fort, 2008), I proceed with modeling demand for attendance and test the UOH 
for the National Basketball Association, National Football League and National Hockey 
League.  These three leagues have largely been ignored in the attendance tracking 
literature due to the immediate availability of baseball data in many cases, as well as the 
relative stability of MLB franchises when compared to these other leagues.  Additionally, 
the importance of understanding differences between leagues and preferences of fans of 
these leagues can lend support for both UOH and fan substitution.  Finally, because 
balance is a league level concern—and owners posit that policies are implemented 
through league agreement—it is important to understand the aggregate effects of 
uncertainty of outcome on league revenues.  Once these are established, further 
understanding of these effects at the individual franchise level will be complementary to 
this initial empirical analysis, shedding light on the collective decisions made by owners 




4.2 Data Collection 
 The availability of NBA, NFL and NHL data varies, and attendance is not as well-
recorded as that of Major League Baseball.  The data used here come from Sports 
Business Data (2010) and the ESPN league-specific coverage websites (2010), along with 
the respective Sports Reference (2010) websites for each league.  In addition, there is 
some disagreement of available data sources for NHL attendance in certain years.  
Therefore, for the NHL, I average three sources of game attendance for years in which 
multiple estimates are available, including Sports Business Data (2010), Hockey Zone 
Plus (2010), and Andrew’s Dallas Stars Page (2010).  For the league-level analysis, the 
attendance series are specified as the league average per-game attendance (LAPG), rather 
than raw attendance, as the number of games and teams have changed substantially 
throughout the history of each respective league.  LAPG is calculated by dividing the 
total league attendance by the total number of league games played for each year within 
the series.  The number of games for each season was recorded from Sports Business 
Data (2010) and cross-referenced with historical league standings at the respective league 
web pages at Sports Reference (2010) to ensure accuracy.  The length of each series is 
subject to the availability of attendance data.  The NBA series spans from 1955-56 
through the 2009-10 season; NFL attendance data span from 1934 through the 2009 
season; and the NHL series spans from 1960-61 through the 2009-10 season.   
 The NHL is a special case for the unadjusted data.  The 2004-05 NHL lockout 
caused the cancellation of the entire NHL season.  Therefore, both the unadjusted and 




measure would otherwise be undefined for that season.  The adjusted NHL data contain 
an additional imputation for the 1994-95 NHL work stoppage. 
 The National Football League attendance series has a few anomalies.  First, while 
the NFL labor dispute in 1987 ultimately resulted in a player strike, owners continued the 
season with replacement players.  Given the likely difference in the absolute quality of 
play (total league talent) during these games, it seems reasonable that attendance would 
not be at the same levels as it would have otherwise been with NFL regulars on the field.  
In addition, the league only played 15 of the scheduled 16 games in the regular season—
though this alone should not affect attendance on a per game basis outside (leaving aside 
effects of known reduced supply on the demand for attendance at the games that were 
held).  For this reason, the NFL adjusted data include an imputed LAPG data point for the 
1987 season.  For unknown reasons, attendance data for the 1992 NFL season are 
universally unavailable.  Therefore both the adjusted and unadjusted data contain an 
imputed data point for the 1992 season using the same LLR approach as described 
earlier.  Finally, the 1982 work stoppage for the NFL resulted in a shorter season, with 
teams playing only nine regular season games.  I use raw LAPG in the unadjusted data 
for these nine games, with an imputed LAPG for the adjusted series for 1982.  Because 
the playoff format for 1982 differed—with an 8 game first round format—PU was 
calculated similarly to that of more recent NFL seasons: including the Wild Card races as 
the difference in Win Percent between the 8th and 9th place teams in the AFC and NFC.  
The final adjustment relates to 2008 and 2009 NFL attendance availability.  While data 
for the majority of NFL games were available for the 2008 and 2009 season, a few teams 




each excluded game is equal to that team’s average attendance for those games reported, 
and take the overall per-game attendance for the NFL using these totals.  At the team 
level, current teams that played in any of the AAFC, AFL or NFL in its respective history 
include the full attendance series available only for those years in which they played in 
the post-merger NFL. 
 Lastly, the NBA included some data issues to be addressed.  The NBA attendance 
series spans from the 1955-56 season through 2009-10, but it is important to note that the 
NBA did not merge with the ABA until 1976.  Therefore, any LAPG reported for those 
years before the merger includes only teams in the NBA at that time.  In addition, for the 
NBA work stoppage in the 1998-99 season—in which 428 games were cancelled—I 
include an imputed value for the adjusted NBA series similar to the other two leagues.  
Table 4.1 presents decade averages of each of LAPG for each league along with balance 
measures calculated as in Appendices F through I (and Appendix J for Major League 
Baseball).  Figure 4.1 shows the behavior of each of the variables over time for these 
three leagues. 
 
4.3 Unit Root Results 
 For all league attendance series—both adjusted and unadjusted—ADF and PP 
tests fail to reject the presence of a unit root with or without a trend (Table 4.2).  I follow 
with using the Lagrange Multiplier tests for stationarity with breakpoints from Lee and 
Strazicich (2001, 2004).  Beginning with the two-break test, there is evidence to reject the 
presence of a unit root at the 95% critical level for both the adjusted and unadjusted series 




series are stationary with only a single break, the power of the two-break test may be 
reduced.  Therefore, I apply the one-break test for all leagues to ensure thoroughness, as 
none of the attendance series were rejected at the highest critical level (99%).  Using the 
one-break test, we can reject the presence of a unit root with breaks at the 99% critical 
level for both the NBA adjusted and unadjusted series (Table 4.4).  The only other 
change in significance from the two-break to one-break test is the NFL adjusted series, 
for which there was not enough evidence to reject the presence of a unit root with only a 
single break.  However, unit root presence was rejected with the two-break test, 
indicating that proceeding to the BP Method is still reasonable for this series.  From here, 
I proceed under the assumption that all attendance series are stationary with at least one 
break. 
 
4.4 The BP Method and Structural Change in Attendance 
 Each of the league attendance series are subjected to the BP Method.  The league-
level attendance regressions and estimated breaks come from the following model: 
 
LAPG’lt = zltβli + xltγ + εlt, t = Ti-1 + 1, …, Ti, i = 1, …, m+1. 
 
LAPGlt is league average attendance per game in year t for league l, i indexes the 
ith regime, and the indices (T1,…, Tm) are treated as the unknown breakpoints.  While the 
notation above could indicate the use of a panel model, in this case the BP procedure is 
performed separately for each league due to programming constraints.  The error 




not consistent throughout the entire series.  Therefore, both heterogeneous and 
homogeneous models are evaluated for each league.  For the league-level analysis with 
heterogeneous error variance across regimes, the BP specification is described as: 
 
zt = {1, t}, xt = {TL, WinDiff, Corr}, and (q=2; p=3) 
 
for all leagues, with up to two (NBA and NHL) or three (NFL) breaks allowed in the 
model.  In the models with homogeneous error variance across regimes the specification 
is the same, but these allow up to five breaks to be estimated within the data for each 
league. 
In Table 4.5, I report the results of the BP tests for breakpoints within the data.  The 
sequential test with allowance for heterogeneous regime errors indicated one significant 
structural change for the NBA (1987-88), while the NFL (1972 and 1993) and NHL 
(1974-75 and 1994-95) series were found to have two breaks (break dates and confidence 
intervals presented in Table 4.6).  The procedure first tests the number of breaks (one 
through five) against the null of no break in the data.  These are reported as the SupFt(i) 
tests.  Next, the sequential test—SupF(i+1, i)—begins by testing two breaks against a 
single break, three breaks against two breaks, and so on.  The number of breaks chosen 
for the model depends on the results of these tests.  However, it is important to note that 
for the series considered here the number of breaks is limited by the length of regimes 
between breaks.  Therefore, these sequential tests are not always consistent with the 




cross-referenced with a Bayesian Information Criterion procedure (BIC) to ensure 
accuracy of the model. 
The second model, with assumed homogeneous error variance across regimes, finds 
slightly different results for the break dates.  For the NBA, an additional break is found 
near the 1997-1998 season, while there is an additional estimated break in the NHL 
changes from in 1966-67, with a one year change to the second break (1975-76).  Finally, 
the second NFL break moves from 1993 to 1997 for the homogeneous model.  I note that 
very little information can be gleaned from the coefficients in Table 4.7 for level shifts in 
the model.  While the first level coefficient is the intercept at the beginning of the series, 
later shifts must be accompanied by plots for visual inspection of the direction and 
magnitude of these shifts.  For this reason, fitted yearly values of attendance for both of 
the attendance estimations for NBA, NFL and NHL are plotted in Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 
4.5, respectively. 
Figure 4.3 shows that the 1987-88 break point for the NBA dramatically increased 
attendance in both models.  After that, while the trend remained positive, it was not as 
steep as prior to the break point, and the homogeneous error model indicates a flat trend 
following the second break—a slight downward shift—in 1996-97.   
The NFL break point in 1972 shifted attendance slightly downward and the trend 
declined while the break point for 1993 included no shift but an increase in trend 
thereafter (Figure 4.4). Neither of the post-1972 trends is anywhere near as steep as prior 
to that first break point.  However, the homogeneous error model indicates a slight 




Finally, for the NHL in Figure 4.5, the 1974-75 (or, in the homogeneous model, 
1975-76) breakpoint was a dramatic shift downward in attendance in both models, 
followed by the steepest trend in attendance over the sample period.  The second break 
point for the heterogeneous NHL model in 1994-95 involved no detectable shift but 
witnessed a decline in the trend afterward.  However, the lack of a detection of a break in 
1966 for the NHL in this initial model likely affected estimation of balance coefficients in 
the regression.  This is a result of the closeness of this apparent shift to the 1974 shift 
detected in the heterogeneous error model (which requires a certain regime length to 
estimate different variances between regimes).  The homogeneous model estimates an 
additional break in 1966-67, indicating a downward shift that recovered a bit before the 
second downward shift in the 1975-76 season.  From there, the method estimates a 
consistent upward attendance trend that becomes attenuated at the 1994-95 break. 
 
4.5 The BP Method and GU, PU, and CSU 
Coefficients for the competitive balance measures included in both models are 
reported in Table 4.8.  Turning to outcome uncertainty impacts for the NFL, none of the 
three measures of uncertainty of outcome are found to have statistically significant effects 
on attendance levels.  Here, the UOH is rejected at every turn for the NFL.  This makes 
the NFL much like the European leagues as assessed by Szymanski (2003).  Fort and 
Quirk (2011) also suggest that this may be due to the smaller inventory of 16 regular 
season games in the NFL.  There are other issues to be addressed with modeling NFL 
attendance, not the least of which is an issue with the econometric specification of 




should be addressed in future work on demand analysis for the NFL using cross-sectional 
tobit models that take into account the attendance breaks found here. 
The second striking result is that GU matters for the NBA and in a way that fails to 
reject Rottenberg’s UOH.  As TL rises, so does attendance.  If the NBA owners care 
about balance because fans do, then they are better off facilitating games with close 
competition.  Why this shouldn’t also be the case for the rest of the North American 
leagues remains for future work to determine (Lee and Fort, 2008, find little evidence for 
Rottenberg’s UOH with respect to GU in MLB). 
Next, PU matters for the NBA, but in a way that rejects the UOH—a decrease in 
WinDiff reduces attendance.  So, the NBA is unlike MLB in this regard (Lee and Fort, 
2008).  If leagues care about balance because fans do, then owners in the NBA and the 
NHL are better off without close regular season races to the playoffs.  Determining just 
why fans feel this way in the NBA and NHL remains for future work, and may be 
explained through asymmetrical increases in attendance for large winning markets in 
these seasons.  Lastly, the homogeneous error variance model indicates a significant 
influence of Corr on attendance in a way that is consistent with Rottenberg: when the 
same teams win year after year, the NBA is estimated to experience a decrease in 
attendance for this model. 
For the NHL heterogeneous error variance model, CSU and PU matter for the NHL 
in a way that reveals hockey fans prefer dynasties and playoff races with wider margins.  
As Corr and WinDiff increase, CSU and PU worsen, but attendance increases with this 
worsening of balance.  However, it is likely that this result for the NHL is due to the 




NHL doubled in size from 6 to 12 teams.  This expansion had an effect on the 
competitive balance of the league, especially for CSU measured by Corr.  The Corr 
measure during the first three years of expansion includes only the six original NHL 
teams in its calculation, as the expansion teams do not have the required three years’ 
worth of win data to include in the measure.  This calculation issue made the CSU 
variable drop considerably for these three years only, returning to previous levels once all 
teams have available data to include in the calculation.  This may account for the 
statistically significant effect found for CSU in the NHL.  The BP Method is unable to 
model the entire dip in attendance as an exogenous shock because of its temporal 
proximity to the following break in 1974-75 (in the model with heterogeneous variance 
across regimes).  The attendance decrease is therefore attributed to the large 
“improvement” in the CSU measurement during this time and the related preference for 
dynasties.  In a separate model where constant variance is assumed across regimes, the 
BP Method does indeed choose the NHL attendance dip in 1966-67 as an exogenous 
shock.  However, its magnitude does not account for the entire change, and dynasties are 
again revealed as a preferred choice by hockey fans. 
Still, all-in-all, at least at the annual league level, there appears to be variation in the 
importance of outcome uncertainty—and the type of outcome uncertainty—that matters 
for attendance.  This suggests that there are truly interesting and insightful differences to 





4.6 League Histories and Structural Change 
Better historians will be able to add to the offerings on historical episodes for future 
investigations, but I offer what I can to the historical relevance of structural changes in 
each league.  For the NBA, the related history that occurs to us for the 1987-88 break 
point concerns expansion and the transition from the Magic-Bird era to the Jordan era.   
The Charlotte Hornets and Miami Heat joined the league for the 1988-89 season and the 
Orlando Magic and Minnesota Timberwolves were added the very next season, 1989-90.  
Ultimately, the NBA added a large Florida market to their league through Orlando and 
Miami.  In addition, three teams moved to new arenas after the 1987 season—Detroit, 
Milwaukee and Sacramento.  While the calculation of LAPG accounts for increase in the 
number of games, each of these moves nearly doubled seating capacity for these teams.  
This break also coincides with the end of the Magic-Bird era (Kareem Abdul Jabbar and 
Magic Johnson would retire shortly; Bird just after them) and the beginning of the 
Michael Jordan phenomenon (he entered the league in 1984-85 but was a mature NBA 
player at this time).  Detroit would win two championships, but then it was all about 
Jordan and the Bulls.  The shape of expansion suggests a shift of the type in Figure 4.3 (at 
“T1”).  The changing of the guard from Magic-Bird to Jordan could end up helping 
explain the shift as well.  However, since NBA attendance does not seem to respond to 
dynasties, some other explanation would need to be explored for reduced but still positive 
trend in NBA attendance after 1987-88.  The second break detected in 1993-94 has a flat 
trend that follows, indicating that NBA attendance demand may have reached its peak or 
that reported attendance is at or near capacity just following the labor issues in both the 




effect of the 1998 labor dispute for the NBA.  This presents issues for demand 
estimation—and further work regarding this issue is recommended—but the upward shift 
may also open questions of the possibility of fan substitution from these two sports to the 
NBA.  While previous work has found little evidence of hockey-to-basketball substitution 
(Winfree and Fort, 2008) it would be interesting to revisit the question with respect to 
professional baseball and basketball. 
The earlier break point for the NFL is proximate to the AFL-NFL merger (first 
season, 1970) at the lower end of the break point confidence interval.  In addition, a rival 
league—the World Football League—was established in 1974, but folded in 1975, and 
may have had an effect on NFL attendance during this short period.  Fort and Lee (2007) 
also find a break point in NFL competitive balance at this time, but the finding here is 
that NFL attendance does not respond to any type of competitive balance.  Thus, while 
the calculation of LAPG accounts for an increase in the number of games, there can still 
be residual impacts on fan tastes for the “new” NFL.  There also was a 42-day training 
camp strike that may have soured the fans for that season.  For the later trend change, the 
break point season 1993 is the first season where both expanded free agency and the 
salary cap were in place.  While it is well documented that not much happened to balance 
due to this institutional change, it is quite possible that fans found these impositions to 
their liking.  In addition, 1993 marked the first NFC contract to new entrant FOX, 
expanding the number of games on TV and introducing a host of viewer-friendly on-
screen innovations in FOX broadcasts. 
For the NFL homogeneous model, the 1966 flattening of attendance coincides with 




national event in this day and age, it may not have had the support from NFL fans early 
on.  Because this analysis includes only NFL attendance in those years before the NFL-
AFL merger, any inferences on Super Bowl popularity by fans of the AFL and its teams 
must be left for further investigation.  The final break detected for the NFL comes in 
1981, where the attendance trend begins to increase again.  This break coincides with 
labor disputes in both the NFL and MLB, but one must take note that there was also a 
significant change in the way the game was played during this time.  Joe Montana was 
drafted in 1979, while Dan Marino became the first quarterback to throw for 5,000 yards 
in a single season in 1984.  These were two of the most prominent quarterbacks in NFL 
history, at least up to that point in time.  During this time, the importance of quarterbacks 
in the offensive game was being recognized, and passing increased significantly 
throughout the 1980s—from 159 yards per game in 1978 to 211 in 1989 and 230 in 2011 
(Football Reference, 2012).  This increase in attendance may indicate that fans have 
preferences for the high-excitement passing game in comparison to the traditional, hard-
nosed rushing attack. 
Finally, for the NHL, the only real rival league threat in the NHL’s history, the 
WHA (1972-73 to 1978-79), was proving economically troublesome at precisely the time 
of this break point.  Bobby Hull had switched to the WHA for its first season and was 
joined, probably not coincidentally given the break point, by Gordie Howe for the 1973-
74 season.  Youngsters Wayne Gretzky and Mark Messier joined the WHA for the 1978-
79 season.  When it ceased operations after the 1978-79 season, four WHA teams merged 
into the NHL (Edmonton Oilers, New England Whalers, Quebec Nordiques and 




experienced an upward trend from this point through the 1993-94 season.  The second 
structural break coincides with the 1994-95 owner lockout that shortened the season to 48 
regular season games.  Even adjusting LAPG for the 1994-95 lockout, perhaps there was 
an aftermath to the first major labor-management conflict in hockey.  Interestingly, 
however, the BP method does not detect any similar response by hockey fans for the 
2004-05 lockout in either the heterogeneous or homogeneous model.  This may be due to 
the closeness of this season to the end of the attendance series, as the BP Method does not 
allow for break estimation within a certain distance from the endpoints.  Lastly, the initial 
break detected in the homogeneous model indicates a large downward shift in 1966 at the 
time of significant expansion for the league.  Whether this is a product of poor attendance 
in these new markets (especially for the Golden Seals), a lack of interest thanks to further 
competition for the Original Six, or a combination of both is difficult to say.  While the 
expansion seemed to have resulted in a dip in attendance, the league recovered quickly 
just before the second break near the formation of the WHA. 
 
4.7 Economic Significance of Outcome Uncertainty 
Statistical significance does not guarantee economic significance.  Therefore, I take 
an approach that incrementally improves balance measures in the leagues to estimate the 
effects this would have on its attendance and stadium revenues, as in Lee and Fort 
(2008).  The revenue data are from Team Marketing Report for 2009 from Sports Data 
(2010).  For GU, statistically significant for the NBA, I improve TL by the average 
change in the measure from year to year.  For PU, statistically significant for the NBA 




Finally, for CSU—statistically significant for the NHL in the heterogeneous model and 
the NBA in the homogeneous model—I improve Corr to indicate teams are somewhat 
less dominant over time.  Resulting changes in attendance are determined, and I apply the 
correctly normalized dollar values from the Team Marketing Report data for 2009.  The 
results are in Table 4.9 (NBA) and 4.10 (NHL). 
If the NBA were able to take action that improved GU while somehow decreasing 
PU in these incremental fashions, the league would enjoy a 0.85 percent increase in 
revenues from the former and a 0.45 percent increase in revenues from the latter.  While 
statistically significant, this result indicates that the economic significance of outcome 
uncertainty to the NBA is minimal, about $16,594 per game or $680,354 for 41 home 
games for a team.  However, according to the homogeneous model, this change in 
revenues is doubled if the league can improve CSU as well.  This would seem to require 
extreme micro-level management for an increase in, at most, 1.7 percent in total league 
revenues. 
Exactly the same approach and logic also reveals that the statistical significance 
of PU and CSU for the NHL ends up relatively trivial, economically.  If the NHL were 
able to take action that improved PU and CSU in the incremental fashion devised here, 
the result would be about a 1.68 percent increase in league revenues translating into 
$878,343 per team for 41 home games.  However, this is based on the model with 
heterogeneous variance across regimes.  For the alternative model, neither coefficient is 





4.8 Summary and Conclusions 
I use the BP Method to assess the time series behavior of annual league attendance 
per game for the NBA, NFL, and NHL.  The series are all non-stationary, but stationary 
with break points.  This result should be of interest to statistical analysts using level data.  
If they wish to avoid spurious correlation outcomes, they should exercise caution and use 
the stationary subsets of the attendance data we identify.  In addition, there is believable 
correspondence between various historical occurrences and the direction of shifts and 
trend changes in these North American leagues, suggesting cross-section/time series 
investigation of merger, expansion, the presence of rival leagues, changes in player era 
dominance in the NBA and NHL, and how the imposition of salary caps and free agency 
impact fan perceptions. 
I also estimate the effects of Game Uncertainty and Playoff Uncertainty addressed 
directly by Rottenberg, and Consecutive Season Uncertainty—which he did not 
address—on gate attendance in each of these leagues.  Under the current treatment, none 
of them matter for NFL attendance.  The same is true of GU in the NHL and CSU in the 
NBA.  Further, when one of these types of outcome uncertainty is statistically significant 
for annual league attendance, the evidence on Rottenberg’s hypothesis is mixed at best.  
Playoff Uncertainty matters for both the NBA and NHL, and CSU matters for the NHL, 
but in a way that rejects Rottenberg’s hypothesis.  Only GU in the NBA is statistically 
significant and fails to reject the UOH.  Almost certainly these results will prove 




preferences in attendance demand.  It would also be interesting to extend these findings 
relate to television demand as a next step in the analysis. 
It is important to note that this analysis does not consider sellouts for league-
aggregate attendance, and this could be one reason for the null finding with respect to the 
effects of balance measures on NFL attendance.  More work is needed to evaluate the 
effects of uncertainty on NFL attendance because of this issue.  Unfortunately, the 
breakpoint method only allows for ordinary least squares regression at this point in time, 
and further evaluation of the statistical properties of the breakpoint method are necessary 
for pushing forward with the technique for other regression specifications.  Further 
inspection at the franchise level for some teams—especially in the NFL—would certainly 
be enhanced by an added consideration of sellouts in a limited dependent variables 
framework.  This is recommended in the short term, between breaks found in the data 
presented here. 
Nonetheless, despite the statistical significance of the estimated outcome 
uncertainty coefficients, the economic significance tends to be minimal.  Marginal 
alterations in outcome uncertainty can improve league revenues by 1.34 percent in the 
NBA and 1.63 percent in the NHL.  It may be that the leagues in this analysis have 
managed balance well enough that it does not negatively affect fan interest in the league. 
Given that balance seldom matters—and when it does it does not matter much—
leads to some final research suggestions.  There is now ample evidence that outcome 
uncertainty matters very little for North American pro sports in the way Rottenberg 
suggested.  However, Rottenberg’s is the typical logic espoused by team owners, acting 




and salary caps.  If not for the sake of balance, then why are the policies actually 
supported?  Economists are well equipped to examine the distributional consequences of 






TABLE 4.1: Decade Averages for LAPG and Balance Measures (NBA, NFL and NHL) 
 
League/Measure 1930's 1940's 1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's Overall Avg. 
NBA LAPG   4,778 5,714 9,644 12,110 15,836 17,204 11,436 
NBA TL   0.24143 0.02209 0.20135 0.05249 0.04432 0.10475 0.11171 
NBA PU   0.08235 0.09243 0.07622 0.07073 0.06100 0.06664 0.07590 
NBA CSU   0.40989 0.55819 0.28533 0.65375 0.60459 0.48786 0.50078 
NFL LAPG 18,205 26,521 31,211 44,349 54,326 54,048 57,732 64,478 47,432 
NFL TL 0.18876 0.16654 0.49508 0.47047 0.86188 1.36331 1.04093 0.99809 0.72494 
NFL PU 0.13792 0.12595 0.0959 0.14083 0.12145 0.09318 0.10666 0.11890 0.11652 
NFL CSU 0.64674 0.48338 0.38231 0.42758 0.51756 0.35743 0.35435 0.34454 0.42832 
NHL LAPG 
   
12,658 12,837 13,842 15,539 16,879 14,351 
NHL TL 
   
0.17446 0.08124 0.52115 0.64654 0.66000 0.41668 
NHL PU 
   
0.06925 0.08830 0.07628 0.05511 0.04150 0.06609 
NHL CSU 
   










TABLE 4.2: League-Level ADF and PP Tests 
 
League  NBA NBA Adj. NFL NFL Adj. NHL NHL Adj. 
T (seasons)  55 55 76 76 50 50 
        
ADF (p) Constant -0.880 (2) -0.883 (1) -1.919 (1) -2.017 (1) -1.206 (1) -1.210 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -1.282 (1) -1.287 (1) -2.231 (1) -2.233 (1) -2.674 (1) -2.682 (1) 
        
PP (l) Constant -0.963 (3) -0.965 (3) -1.700 (3) -1.774 (3) -1.401 (3) -1.399 (3) 
PP (l) Trend -1.418 (3)** -1.406 (3) -2.174 (3) -1.905 (3) -3.000 (3) -2.987 (3) 
Data unadjusted for strikes.   
p: the number of lags  
l: lag truncation.  















TABLE 4.3: League Level LM Test 
 
Team 𝑘� 𝑇�𝑏 ?̂?𝛾𝑗 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
NBA 7 1972/73, 1996/97 3.958***, -1.170 -5.771** λ = (0.33, 0.76) 
NBA Adj. 7 1972/73, 1996/97 3.959***, -1.050 -5.714** λ = (0.33, 0.76) 
      
NFL 3 1966, 1986 -0.279, 5.711*** -6.071** λ = (0.43, 0.70) 
NFL Adj. 3 1972, 2000 -4.703***, 3.590*** -6.076** λ = (0.51, 0.88) 
      
NHL 6 1973/74, 1985/86 -4.463***, 6.066*** -6.347** λ = (0.28, 0.52) 
NHL Adj. 6 1973/74, 1985/86 -4.427***, 6.056*** -6.323** λ = (0.28, 0.52) 
Data unadjusted for strikes.  𝑘� is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct for serial correlation.  
𝑇�𝑏 denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.  See Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  ***, ** = 



















TABLE 4.4: League Level LM Test 
 
Team 𝑘� 𝑇�𝑏 ?̂?𝛾𝑗 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
NBA 7 1992/93 3.882*** -5.255*** λ = 0.69 
NBA Adj. 7 1992/93 3.811*** -5.182*** λ = 0.69 
      
NFL 0 1972 -2.217** -4.892** λ = 0.51 
NFL Adj. 8 1980 -3.412*** -3.431 λ = 0.62 
      
NHL 3 1976/77 -3.056*** -4.638** λ = 0.34 
NHL Adj. 3 1976/77 -2.990*** -4.580** λ = 0.34 
Data unadjusted for strikes.  𝑘� is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct for serial correlation.  
𝑇�𝑏 denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.  See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  ***, **, * = 






TABLE 4.5: League Level Sequential Break Point Test Results 
 
League SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) SupFt(4) SupFt(5) UDmax WDmax 
NBA (Het.) 200.41*** 114.62***    200.41*** 200.41*** 
        
NBA (Hom.) 173.22*** 116.31*** 117.52*** 146.87*** 190.49*** 190.49*** 348.87*** 
        
NFL (Het.) 239.40*** 162.98*** 117.42***   239.40*** 239.40*** 
        
NFL (Hom.) 309.56*** 194.75*** 160.09*** 132.37*** 117.68*** 309.56*** 309.56*** 
        
NHL(Het.) 68.73*** 33.98***    68.73*** 68.73*** 
        
NHL (Hom.) 71.62*** 80.27*** 128.25*** 164.21*** 205.57*** 205.57*** 376.48*** 
 
League SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) SupF(4/3) SupF(5/4) Breaks 
NBA (Het.) 2.92    1 
      
NBA (Hom.) 35.81*** 35.81*** 35.81*** 11.52 2 
      
NFL (Het.) 13.39** 14.84**   2 
      
NFL (Hom.) 24.49*** 24.29*** 7.77 10.84 2 
      
NHL(Het.) 50.80***    2 
      
NHL (Hom.) 58.00*** 14.11** 25.54*** 10.11 2 
***Significant at the 99% critical level 
**Significant at the 95% critical level 




TABLE 4.6: League Level Break Test Results (Adjusted) 
 
League T1 T2 T3 
    
NBA (Het.) 1987-1988   
 [86-87, 88-89]   
    
NBA (Hom.) 1987-1988 1997-1998  
 [86-87, 88-89] [96-97, 00-01]  
    
    
NFL (Het.) 1972 1993  
 [71, 73] [91, 94]  
    
NFL (Hom.) 1972 1997  
 [71, 73] [96, 99]  
    
    
NHL (Het.) 1974-1975 1994-1995  
 [73-74, 75-76] [93-94, 96-97]  
    
NHL (Hom.) 1966-1967 1975-1976 1994-1995 
 [65-66, 66-67] [74-75, 76-77] [93-94, 95-96] 
    








TABLE 4.7: League Level Breakpoint Regression Results 
 
League α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 
         
NBA (Het.) 298 2453 71 13326     
 (30.26)*** (6.04)*** (4.06)*** (16.63)***     
         
NBA (Hom.) 299 2,554 236 7,168 35 10,195   
 (33.45)*** (6.93)*** (4.80)*** (3.81)*** (0.87) (7.61)***   
         
NFL (Het.) 1118 13182 334 38041 675 17335   
 (35.90)*** (12.47)*** (4.58)*** (10.03)*** (6.25)*** (2.31)**   
         
NFL (Hom.) 1,116 12,823 316 38,288 406 36,160   
 (36.99)*** (12.28)*** (5.88)*** (12.51)*** (2.44)** (3.13)***   
         
NHL (Het.) 144 10611 229 6407 122 10272   
 (4.51)*** (24.52)*** (9.01)*** (7.90)*** (3.78)*** (6.89)***   
         
NHL (Hom.) 621 9,912 131 11,217 215 7705 102 11,839 
 (7.59)*** (23.40)*** (1.96)* (16.26)*** (9.62)*** (9.59)*** (4.14)*** (9.96)*** 
         
***Significant at the 99% critical level 
**Significant at the 95% critical level 
*Significant at the 90% critical level 




TABLE 4.8: League Level Breakpoint Regression Results 
 
League γTL (GU) γWindiff (PU) γCorr3 (CSU) 𝑹�𝟐(𝑹𝟐) 
     
NBA (Het.) 2337 6953 -636 0.990 
 (3.86)*** (2.62)** (-1.79)* (0.991) 
     
NBA (Hom.) 2,086 6,885 -805 0.992 
 (3.94)*** (2.80)*** (-2.44)** (0.993) 
     
NFL (Het.) 1013 5004 -1107 0.984 
 (1.21) (1.00) (-1.05) (0.986) 
     
NFL (Hom.) 1,307 5,030 -507 0.985 
 (1.60) (1.03) (-0.48) (0.987) 
     
NHL (Het.) 412 7488 1062 0.919 
 (1.33) (2.12)** (3.20)*** (0.982) 
     
NHL (Hom.) 186 -2,939 887 0.955 
 (0.80) (-0.95) (2.86)*** (0.965) 
     
***Significant at the 99% critical level 
**Significant at the 95% critical level 
























TABLE 4.9: NBA Economic Impact of Outcome Uncertainty Measures 
 
 NBA (Het.) NBA (Hom.) 
Value GU PU GU PU CSU 
2009 LAPG 17,132 17,132 17,132 17,132 17,132 
2009 Var. 0.030 0.073 0.030 0.073 0.550 
Coef. Est.a 2,337 6,953 2,086 6,885 -805 
Elasticity 0.004 0.030 0.004 0.029 0.026 
ΔVariableb 0.064 0.012 0.064 0.012 0.171 
Inc. Factor 213.33% 16.44% 213.33% 16.4% 31.1% 
ΔLAPG 146.2 -84.5d 135.2 -82.5 137.4 
% ΔLAPG 0.85% -0.49% 0.79% -0.48% 0.80% 
Rev. Per Attc $71.93  $71.93  $71.93 $71.93 $71.93 
Δ Game Rev. $10,516  -$6,078 $9,725 -$5,934 $9,883 
a. Coefficient taken from Model 1 and follow the approach of Lee and Fort (2008, pp. 291). 
b. All measure changes imply an improvement in balance. 
c. Revenue per attendee data come from Team Marketing Report Fan Cost Index (2009). 


































TABLE 4.10: NHL Economic Impact of Outcome Uncertainty Measures 
 
 NHL (Het.) NHL (Hom.) 
Value PU CSU CSU 
2009 LAPG 17,476 17,476 17,746 
2009 Var. 0.061 0.378 0.378 
Coef. Est.a 7,488 1,062 887 
Elasticity 0.026 0.023 0.019 
ΔVariableb 0.012 0.184 0.184 
Inc. Factor 19.67% 48.68% 48.7% 
ΔLAPG -89.4 195.7 -163.3 
% ΔLAPG -0.51% -1.12% -0.93% 
Rev. Per Attc $75.14 $75.14 $75.14 














































Major League Baseball Franchises 
 
5.1 Background  
 While Lee and Fort (2008) employ the BP Method for aggregate Major League 
Baseball attendance, there is much to be learned from proceeding with its application at 
the franchise level.  I fill this gap in the literature in this chapter, as well as for the other 
three major leagues in the following three chapters .  The addition of the franchise level 
analysis informs the statistically significant positive effect from Lee and Fort for the 
Playoff Uncertainty variable on attendance.  Applying a similar approach at the team 
level may further show why only PU was found to be statistically significant and how 
this relates to the teams that are the most successful on the field.  In addition, it could be 
that at the aggregate, fans are not particularly interested in game level or consecutive 
season uncertainty; however, this may differ across franchise markets and also relate to 
the success of each individual team.  For example, results here show that—holding 
constant team quality—fans of the Red Sox find a low level of CSU particularly 
abhorrent: no surprise given the Yankee dynasties of years past.  These relationships will 
be expanded upon in later sections.  The following section describes the data collection 





5.2 Data and Methods 
 As in the previous chapter, the data used for this portion of the analysis come 
from multiple sources.  The attendance and team win percent data for each of the MLB 
franchises come from Sports Business Data (2009) and are cross-referenced at Baseball-
Reference (2009).  I recorded the number of home games (used to calculate per-game 
attendance) from Retrosheet (2009), and verified team standings, expansion, and location 
changes with the previous two sources.  Summaries of Team Average Per Game 
Attendance (TAPG), American and National League balance measures, team win 
percents, and the history of games back from the playoffs and number of postseason 
appearances can be found in Tables 5.1 through 5.5, respectively. 
 As before, the eventual breakpoint methodology requires lags of particular length, 
precluding analysis of recent expansion teams in (Arizona, Colorado, Florida, and Tampa 
Bay) and the most recent franchise move (Montreal to Washington, D.C.).  Team 
attendance series consist of thirteen American League (AL) franchises, twelve National 
League (NL) franchises and one franchise that has spent time in both leagues (the 
Milwaukee Brewers).  For those franchises that have relocated, I begin the attendance 
series in the first year of the most recent location.  For example, the San Francisco Giants 
series spans from the year of the franchise’s move in 1958 through the 2009 season.  The 
original New York Giants team is considered a separate franchise and is not used for this 
analysis.  Further the derivatives of the two versions of the Washington Senators (1901-
1960 and 1961-1971)—the Texas Rangers and the Minnesota Twins—are considered 




franchises found to be stationary in the precursory tests for the presence of a unit-root or 
unit-root with breakpoints. 
 To adjust for work stoppages, MLB franchise attendance totals in 1981, 1994 and 
1995 are averaged with the years preceding and following the season in which there was 
a labor dispute, and this is referred to as the adjusted data.  This is again a simple LLR 
approach with equal weighting on each year, similar to that of the league aggregate 
approach in the previous chapter. 
Following the unit-root analysis, those team attendance series found to be 
stationary were subjected to the BP Method as described in Chapter 3.  The team level 
attendance regression and estimated breaks come from the following model: 
 
TAPG’ft = zftβfi + xftγ + εft, t = Ti-1 + 1, …, Ti, i = 1, …, m+1. 
 
TAPGft is team average attendance per game in year t for franchise f, i indexes the ith 
regime, and the indices (T1,…, Tm) are treated as the unknown breakpoints.  Although the 
notation above could indicate the use of a panel model, in this case the BP Method is 
performed separately for each franchise due to limitations in the methodology and to 
evaluate the heterogeneous impacts at the team level.  As in Lee and Fort (2008), I 
estimate two separate models for MLB franchise attendance to evaluate the multi-faceted 
nature of competitive balance: Game Uncertainty (GU), Playoff Uncertainty (PU), and 






zt = {1, t}, xt = {TL, WinDiff, Corr, W%}, and (q=2; p=4) 
 
 The second model (Model 2) employs Humphrey’s “Competitive Balance Ratio” 
(CBR, 2002) in addition to WinDiff.  The use of CBR combines elements of both GU and 
CSU, and it is therefore included in a model only with PU as to avoid redundancy in the 
model.  Win percent is again included for the reasons stated above.  In this model: 
 
zt = {1, t}, xt = {CBR, WinDiff, W%}, and (q=2; p=3) 
 
 For both models, coefficients on the time trend and level are allowed to change 
across regimes, whereas the coefficients pertaining to the competitive balance and team 
quality variables are not.  These are classified as the partial model in Bai and Perron 
(2003).  I proceed with an ancillary model for baseball franchise attendance that includes 
an additional one year lagged team quality variable (W% in the previous season).  I 
perform this for both Model 1 and Model 2, and refer to these as Model 1B and Model 
2B.  The notation above is identical with the exception that there is an additional 
independent xt variable within the model.   
 Finally, for each of the Model 1 estimations, I also employ the BP Method with 
homogeneous error variance across regimes, as described in the previous section, as well 
as with a one year lagged win percent covariate for each franchise.  The results of each of 
these additional regressions are presented in Appendix A.  For brevity, from here on I 
narrow the discussion to only Model 1 and Model 2 with heterogeneous variance 




across models, they were relatively minor and the statistical significance and direction of 
balance coefficient estimates are virtually identical.  Fitted plots of each model for each 
team are excluded from this dissertation, but are available upon request. 
There were some instances where the estimated model did not agree with the 
results of the sequential test, in which case I cross-referenced the chosen model with both 
the Bayesian Information Criterion and the Schwarz Criterion provided by the BP 
Method output.  This was usually needed only for those attendance series with very small 
breaks or for those series with initially estimated breaks in too close of temporal 
proximity for the subsequent regression model.  From here I focus the discussion on the 
adjusted data for sixteen teams, as model differences between the real and adjusted data 
were negligible.  The results of the Bai and Perron sequential testing procedure can be 
found in Table 5.12 for Model 1 and Table 5.14 for Model 2.  The San Diego Padres 
were found to have no breaks using the BP Method.   While unit root tests indicated a 
stationary series with breaks, the breaks may be too small for the method to detect.  The 
Padres’ ADF and PP tests indicate very little evidence for rejecting a unit root for this 
series without breaks, so it may be misleading to continue with ordinary least squares 
(OLS) treating the attendance series as level data. 
 
5.3 Unit Root Results 
There is substantial agreement between the ADF and PP tests with respect to Major 
League Baseball franchise attendance.  Both reject unit root (indicating trend stationarity) 
at the 95% level or higher for five teams—the Chicago White Sox, Cincinnati, Detroit, 




stationary series, I follow with two-break LM tests of stationary behavior with 
endogenously specified break points.  The two-break LM tests reject non-stationary 
behavior at the 99% level for ten additional teams (Table 5.7).  The remaining eleven 
(Atlanta, Chicago Cubs, Houston, Kansas City, Los Angeles Angels, Minnesota, New 
York Mets, New York Yankees, Philadelphia, San Diego, and San Francisco) were 
subjected to the one-break LM test (Table 5.8).  The results reject non-stationary 
behavior at the highest level for the Chicago Cubs, Houston, San Diego, and San 
Francisco.  In addition, the Minnesota and New York Mets series—for which the unit-
root null is not rejected with the LM two-break test—is rejected at the 95% level with the 
LM one-break test.  Reasonably, only Atlanta, Kansas City, Los Angeles Angels, New 
York Yankees, and Philadelphia unadjusted series remain for eventual treatment under 
something like first differences. 
Following the same steps on the data adjusted for potential impacts of strikes 
produces some different outcomes.  For the ADF and PP tests, the only difference is 
failure to reject non-stationary behavior for St. Louis (Table 5.9).  The two-break LM test 
with endogenously specified break points indicates rejection of non-stationary behavior 
(95% level or higher) for eleven of the remaining 22 series (Table 5.10).  Continuing with 
the one-break LM test for the remaining eleven series (Atlanta, Chicago Cubs, Cleveland, 
Houston, Kansas City, Los Angeles Angels, Minnesota, Montreal, New York Mets, New 
York Yankees, and Texas), the test indicates rejection of the null of non-stationary 
behavior at the 95% level or higher for five additional franchises (Table 5.11).  For the 




New York Yankees remain for subsequent treatment under something like first 
differences. 
Staying just with the adjusted data results (Tables 5.10 and 5.11), I turn to only 
brief observations on these break points since the clear indication for all but a few teams 
is further investigation of the significance and qualitative impact of break points under 
the BP Method.  Only a few teams have been in their current locations long enough to 
have break points much before the 1970s (St. Louis, Boston, and Chicago Cubs).  The 
1970s saw breaks for just a few (New York Mets, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and 
Baltimore).  Nearly all of the action in terms of break points is from the 1980s to the end 
of the sample (eight teams in both the 1980s and 1990s).  Again, a full analysis of break 
location for each team requires the BP Method, provided in the following section. 
 
5.4 Breakpoint Analysis and Uncertainty of Outcome Results 
 For both models, the procedure finds break dates in common with Lee and Fort’s 
(2008) league level analysis for many teams under consideration (Tables 5.13 and 5.15).  
First, a number of teams experienced attendance breaks near the end of World War II, 
consistent with the AL and NL aggregate findings, likely due to the end of World War II 
and the return of a large number of soldiers to the U.S. (many of them players—like Ted 
Williams—who also increased the absolute quality of the game on the field).  Model 1 
indicates that eight of the teams in existence before 1950 experienced a large attendance 
break in 1945 or 1946 (excluding only the Chicago Cubs), while Model 2 revealed that 
seven teams had a breakpoint in these years (excluding both the Cubs and the Chicago 




the breaks) in the range from 1927 to 1932, indicating that there may have been an effect 
of The Great Depression on some fans’ ability to attend games at the time.  Interestingly, 
this was not apparent in the aggregate MLB analysis of Lee and Fort (2008).  However, 
Lee and Fort (2005) do estimate structural change in Major League Baseball’s 
competitive balance series near the Depression Era for both the NL and AL. 
There are some breakpoints detected during extended periods of on-field success 
near Strike Years, indicating a longer term structural change in attendance following a 
short-term shock for some teams.  Despite imputing strike years with a local linear 
regression, about half the team attendance series experienced shifts or trend changes in 
attendance levels following (or just before) one of the significant strike events in MLB 
history (1981 and 1994-1995).  After the labor disputes, I find that many teams 
experienced a rapid recovery in attendance levels even after estimated breaks (Boston and 
Philadelphia, for example).  Previous work has found that shocks are relatively short term 
near work stoppages (Schmidt and Berri, 2002, 2004; Coates and Harrison, 2005), and 
this analysis seems to confirm that while there tends to be a short-term attendance dip 
following a strike, the trend behavior of attendance can change dramatically even after 
these short-term level changes to make up for this shift.  The coefficients and significance 
for each of the trend (αM) and level (βM) changes can be found in Table 5.16 and Table 
5.18 for Models 1 and 2, respectively.  It is important reiterate that while the trend 
coefficients can be read directly off the table, the shift estimates are not as clear.  The 
first level coefficient (represented by β1) can be interpreted as the initial intercept of the 
least squares regression.  However, the following shift coefficients do not necessarily 




reader is referred to Figures 5.1 through 5.8, which plot the estimated Model 1 and Model 
2 for each of the sixteen franchises, respectively. 
Model 1 and Model 2 indicate similar competitive balance preferences to that of 
Lee & Fort (2008), in that the most common statistically significant uncertainty of 
outcome measure of attendance is Windiff (PU).  The coefficient for PU is significant at 
the 5% level or higher for four teams in Model 1 (Chicago Cubs, Cincinnati Reds, Los 
Angeles Dodgers, and Philadelphia Phillies) and four teams in Model 2 (Chicago Cubs, 
Houston Astros, Los Angeles Dodgers, and Philadelphia Phillies).  The negative direction 
of the coefficients is as expected for all of these teams with respect to the predictions of 
the UOH (or, an increase in attendance with a closer pennant race).  There is a significant 
estimated effect of Tail Likelihood (GU) only for Boston, Cincinnati and Detroit, with the 
sign of the coefficient reversed from UOH expectations for Boston and Cincinnati.  The 
estimated coefficient for Corr (CSU) is significant only for Boston (5% level) and 
Houston (1% level).  The sign on this coefficient is in the expected direction for the Red 
Sox, but in the opposite direction that would be predicted by the UOH for the Astros.  
Finally, in Model 2, the estimated coefficient for CBR is statistically significant only for 
the Chicago White Sox and Detroit Tigers at the 1% level.  Coefficients for balance 
measures and win percent can be found in Tables 5.17 and 5.19 for Models 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
It is interesting to see the differential effects of balance across markets.  It seems 
likely that much of this is related to the fact that uncertainty at the league level mediates 
the aggregate “hope” for individual fans, as found in Lee and Fort (2008).  In other 




favorite team(s) with a chance at the playoffs for a longer period in the regular season.  
Therefore, each of these teams likely sees an increase in attendance from the increase in 
quality and playoff chances, rather than purely from a direct relationship to uncertainty.  
This is not to say that the uncertainty itself does not create further excitement, and 
interactive effects should prove instructive in shorter term cross-sectional models.  
Further evaluation of this mediating hypothesis is recommended within a statistical 
framework that can test for direct and indirect effects. 
 Finally, the values of the measures of fit are relatively high for the models fitted, 
which is common in this sort of time series modeling.  Lee and Fort (2008) note that the 
time trend likely accounts for omitted variables such as ticket prices and population 
changes; however, this should not impact the competitive balance coefficient estimates, 
as the significance of the trend variable would simply be transferred to the significance of 
the structural variables—such as market size and ticket price—if we were to include them 
in the model.  Certainly these structural variables are of interest, and this is a shortcoming 
of the simplistic approach used here for long-term attendance.  Unfortunately, there is 
very little consistency in the economic data for such a long period of analysis—especially 
for individual market areas—and any subsequent short-term analysis of fan behavior that 
includes these variables would be a welcome complement to the current investigation.  
Over such a long period, the structure of urban sprawl also likely has had an effect on the 
definition of markets for professional sports leagues, making the inclusion of these 
factors even more difficult. 
 A further analysis of the economic implications (gained/lost fans and cost of 




coefficients are statistically significant, the practical implications of such changes for 
team gate revenues tend to be minimal.  This result echoes the conclusions from Lee and 
Fort (2008) for the league aggregate approach in Major League Baseball (see Tables 
5.20, 5.21 and 5.22 for GU, CSU and PU, respectively).  For the coefficients of each of 
the uncertainty measures, I apply a variant of the ‘Incremental Approach’ first described 
in Lee and Fort (2008), and initially revisited here in Chapter 4.  To reiterate, for PU, the 
Incremental Approach involves decreasing the average number of games separating the 
playoff races by a single game.  For the 2009 season, the average difference in the 
National League playoff races was about 5.35 games (0.033 in win percent for a 162 
game season), and I reduce the difference to 4.35 games (now 0.027, a reduction of 0.006 
in Windiff) to assess impacts on attendance for each team. 
 For GU and CSU, I take a more abstract approach to the incremental estimates.  
For the Incremental Approach I use the average season-to-season change in each 
measure.  In the case of the GU measure, in 2009 the value was 0.094 for the AL, with an 
average historical yearly change of 0.115 (in absolute value) and a “historically most 
balanced” value of 0.815.  For the NL, 2009 Tail Likelihood was at 0.472, with an 
average historical yearly change of 0.143 (in absolute value) and a “historically most 
balanced” value of 1.081. 
 Finally, the CSU measure for 2009 was 0.703 and 0.449 for the AL and NL, 
respectively, indicating that in the AL the same teams have been more dominant against 
their counterparts in recent years than those in the NL over theirs.  I apply a similar 
Incremental Approach here as for GU.  For the American League, the average change in 




value of -0.197.  In the National League, the average change from year to year has been 
0.215, with a minimum historical value of -0.536.  The results of these estimates for each 
team and the accompanying balance input can be found in Tables 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22 for 
GU, CSU and PU, respectively. 
 Beginning with the Boston Red Sox (2009 TAPG of 37,811), Model 1 indicates 
that an improvement in GU using the Incremental Approach is associated with a change 
of about 325 fans per game (0.86%) for the Red Sox.  It is important to keep in mind that 
the coefficient for GU is reversed from the predictions of Rottenberg’s UOH, indicating a 
decrease in attendance with closer game uncertainty.  However, the model unsurprisingly 
reveals that Red Sox fans tend to have a seemingly appropriate aversion to teams 
dominating over time, given their rivalry with the historically dominant New York 
Yankees.  The Incremental Approach for improving CSU is associated with an increase 
of 389 (1.03%) fans per game, still rather small overall. 
 For the Chicago Cubs, we find Model 1 estimates a significant coefficient for 
Playoff Uncertainty.  Continuing with the Incremental Approach, the model estimates an 
increase of about 194 fans per game, (0.49% for a 2009 TAPG of 39,610).  For Model 2, 
the coefficient estimate for PU is about 37% less, indicating an even smaller effect of 
Windiff. 
 I also find significant effects of both PU and GU for the Cincinnati Reds.  With a 
2009 TAPG of 21,579, the estimated attendance changes are 69 fans (0.32%) for an 
incremental change in PU, and a change of 156 (0.39%) fans for the incremental change 
in GU.  While the coefficient for PU is in the expected direction for the UOH, the 




 For the Detroit Tigers Tail Likelihood coefficient (2009 TAPG of 31,693), using 
the average change in TL, I find a change in TAPG of about 506 fans per game (or 
1.60%).  The direction of the coefficient indicates an increase in fans with an 
improvement in game uncertainty. 
 Model 1 estimates a statistically significant effect of CSU, while Model 2 
indicates a significant effect of PU on Astros attendance.  Using the Incremental 
Approach for the CSU coefficient, there is a predicted decrease of 1,162 (3.73% of a 
2009 TAPG of 31,124) fans per game using the average yearly improvement in CSU.  
Keep in mind that these apparent fan preferences indicate a reversal in sign from the 
expectations of UOH, as we would expect dynasties to negatively affect uncertainty of 
outcome and.  Considering the Houston Astros are not a historic perennial powerhouse, 
these results are somewhat surprising.  There may be issues with this shorter series at 
play here, similar to those affecting the balance coefficients in the league level National 
Hockey League model from Chapter 4, though the homogeneous version of Model 1 does 
not confirm this speculation.  For Playoff Uncertainty (using the coefficient in Model 1 to 
remain consistent), implementing the Incremental Approach indicates an increase of 298 
fans per game (0.96%).  This result is consistent with the Uncertainty of Outcome 
Hypothesis. 
 The attendance effect of Playoff Uncertainty is shown to be statistically 
significant for the Los Angeles Dodgers—not to be confused with the Brooklyn 
Dodgers—in Model 1 as well.  Using the Incremental Approach, a one game 
improvement in the closeness of the playoff race is associated with an increase of about 




also statistically significant, indicating a similar increase in fans per game associated with 
the associated improvement in Windiff. 
 Finally, for Philadelphia, I find statistically significant coefficients for PU.  The 
elasticity estimates indicate that reducing the 2009 playoff standings by a single game 
would increase Phillies attendance by 267 fans per game (0.60% of a 2009 TAPG of 
44,453) for Model 1.  For each of the balance measures across all models, it seems that 
the practical implications of changes in the balance measures with respect to attendance 
levels are small at best. 
 Very few of the team attendance levels in this analysis revealed significant effects 
of competitive balance as measured by Windiff, Tail Likelihood, Corr, or CBR.  These 
findings confirm some of the findings in aggregated approaches by Lee and Fort (2008) 
and Krautmann and Hadley (2006).  While Lee and Fort (2008) find evidence of an 
attendance effect only for Playoff Uncertainty, the current research provides further 
evidence for the possibility that fans in some places are also sensitive to both Game 
Uncertainty (as in Soebbing, 2008) and Consecutive Season Uncertainty (as in 
Krautmann et al., 2008). 
 These results suggest that while some fans show a preference for more balance, 
others seem to prefer less, and many have little response with respect to the decision to 
attend a baseball game (holding constant team quality).  This has interesting implications 
for the UOH and the conclusions made by Major League Baseball’s Blue Ribbon Panel 
that fans invariably prefer uncertain outcomes to relatively known ones.  However, this 
does not mean that the UOH is invalidated.  It very well could be that MLB has managed 




these models with respect to fan decisions to attend games (Lee and Fort, 2008).  There is 
also the possibility that teams adjust ticket prices in season based on the balance of the 
league and the team’s current standing.  The estimations presented here do not fully 
account for this sort of dynamic pricing behavior.  And I do find significant effects of 
balance on certain teams in the league.  Certainly, the effects of balance on television 
contracts and viewership are an important consideration in sports league fan behavior 
(see Alavay, Gaskell, Leach and Szymanski, 2006; Buriamo and Simmons, 2008; 
Tainsky, 2010). 
 In addition, if a team is consistently finishing in the bottom half of the standings, 
we would expect much of the variation in attendance levels to be caught through the Win 
Percent measure in the model.  For example, if only a single team were finishing very 
low in consecutive years, while the rest of the league is very balanced, we may expect to 
only see effects of quality in this single team’s attendance record, as there is little 
uncertainty as to whether or not they will prosper over the rest of the teams in the league.  
Under this scenario, there may still be little variation in the balance measure for the 
league.  Because the league is highly balanced overall in this hypothetical situation, there 
could be a net increase in the aggregated attendance for MLB despite the loss of fans in 
the flailing team’s market.  This is one important advantage to understanding balance 
effects at both the aggregated and disaggregated level.  At the league level, it very well 
may be beneficial to have “designated” losing teams and winning teams in order to 
provide a net gain in revenues, as long as the low-level teams are sustainable at their 
revenue levels.  As a whole, the analysis here as well as in Lee and Fort (2008) and 




in baseball and attendance at the league level is related to balance through a larger 
number of teams with higher win percent, rather than directly related to the interest in the 
uncertainty itself.  Hope and expectation may be a better characterization of this 
phenomenon.  Most likely, the New York Yankees will attract more in revenues than the 
Kansas City Royals with a World Series win.  Switching the performances of the 
Yankees and Royals for prolonged periods may result in a net decrease in revenues and 
attendance for Major League Baseball, given the relative market sizes of these two teams.  
Fort and Quirk (2010) discuss this theoretical issue for single game ticket leagues in more 
detail. 
 Since we expect fans to first care about their own team success with balance as a 
secondary component to attendance (El-Hodiri and Quirk, 1971), these results are not 
particularly surprising.  On average a low-level team with a better chance of winning 
each of its games would indicate an improvement in both GU and home team win 
percent.  Based on the UOH, we would expect this to increase attendance levels for that 
team due to both an increase in uncertainty and an increase in home team quality.  
However, this simplistic model seems to account the change to win percent alone for a 
majority of franchises.  For inferior clubs, once fans give up on their team’s playoff 
prospects, they may turn to preferring absolute quality of play on the field rather than 
relative quality (Meehan et al., 2007).  After all, a Kansas City Royals and Pittsburgh 
Pirates matchup may not sound very appealing to many fans, despite the relative 
competitiveness of the two franchises.  Conversely, a Royals and Yankees matchup may 
well attract significant Royals (and local Yankee) fans due to the absolute quality of the 




Recent work by Davis (2009) and Meehan et al. (2007) have begun to investigate these 
preferences in more detail in shorter term cross-sectional analyses. 
 Additionally, we may not expect a close pennant race to increase attendance for a 
team not involved in that pennant race for most of the season.  When many teams are 
close to winning a pennant, there seems little reason to believe that there would be an 
attendance increase for those teams not involved in that race.  A team within the pennant 
race could experience higher attendance levels if they are both very good and barely 
holding off a competitor, and the aggregate of many of these teams may be net beneficial 
for aggregate MLB attendance.  Lee and Fort (2008) mention this phenomenon in their 
aggregate approach, as much of the PU effect could be coming only from those few 
teams involved in the pennant race.  Therefore, at the team level, much of the excitement 
found in close pennant races may be accounted for by the inclusion of win percent when 
that team is in fact entrenched in the race for the playoffs. 
 These effects of the inclusion of win percent in the model could also be the case 
for CSU, as fans of the continually dominant team would be predicted to continue to 
attend at high levels, while fans of the continually losing team may cease to attend at all.  
In this investigation, I find little pattern with respect to home team quality characteristics 
for those franchises with a significant coefficient for any of the competitive balance 
measures.  However, I was unable to include the Yankees attendance series in our 
analysis because of concerns over its time series properties.  Interestingly, the Boston 
Red Sox are the only long-tenured team to show a preference for improvement in 
Consecutive Season Uncertainty, indicating a possible effect of the Yankees dynasty on 




Red Sox, indicating that fans in Boston may be especially sensitive to Yankee 
dominance.  In a related fashion, it seems reasonable to expect Yankee fans to show 
preferences for low CSU, given the history of Yankee Dynasties over the past 100 years.  
When the Yankees go on the road, this could increase attendance by fans who value 
absolute quality, as opposed to relative quality of the two competing teams.  Ultimately, 
it could be optimal for the league to have a consistently dominant New York Yankees 
team when attempting to maximize revenues across the league. 
 The evidence here suggests that the prediction of El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971)—
that the optimal probability of winning for a given home team is somewhere between 0.5 
and 1—may need more consideration, and may differ across markets and certain time 
points within a season depending on the playoff race.  As mentioned earlier, recent work 
has been headed in this direction (Meehan et al., 2007).  Variability in fan preferences is 
important to both team and league managers with respect to ticket pricing and league 
policy, respectively.  The simplistic model discussed here would be well served with the 
addition of further analysis—accounting for exogenous breaks, of course—of varying fan 
preferences at the game level in order to assess how the predictions of the UOH differ 
across markets and absolute quality of visiting teams and the implications of this with 
respect to league organization.  Extending the work here to this consideration is a planned 
next step for empirical research. 
 
5.5 Breakpoint Regression Results 
 The breakpoints estimated from Model 1 and Model 2 coincide with significant 




following subsections illustrate specific time lines of significant events near breakpoints 
for each of the franchises in the analysis.  Much of the historical information provided 
comes from extensive searches through Wikipedia (in a general sense for links to 
reputable sources), USA Today and The New York Times.  The size and direction of 
each structural change in both levels and trends can be gleaned from Figures 5.1 to 5.8. 
 
5.5.1 Baltimore Orioles 
 The Baltimore Orioles have common breakpoints of 1974 and 1991 in both 
Models 1 and 2.  In 1973 and 1974, Baltimore made the playoffs only to lose the AL 
Pennant to the Oakland Athletics in both seasons.  This success may explain some of the 
upward attendance level shifts and trend changes during the 1970s through 1991.  The 
season following 1991 brought forth another massive uptick in attendance for the Orioles, 
as Camden Yards opened in 1992, immediately following the 1991 AL MVP Award of 
Cal Ripken, Jr.  Since this massive peak, Orioles attendance has been trending sharply 
downward. 
 
5.5.2 Boston Red Sox 
 The 1918 Boston break point estimated in Model 1 occurs near the end of World 
War I, and this seems to be the most likely explanation for the structural change at this 
time.  Similarly, the 1945 break occurs at the end of World War II, a finding common to 
many of the teams analyzed here.  In both models, the Boston Red Sox have a breakpoint 
estimated for the year 1966.  This structural shift seems relatively straight forward, as 




Sox were in a 4-team race for the AL Pennant almost to the final game, riding Carl 
Yastrzemski’s Triple Crown to the top of the standings.  It seems that this extraordinary 
year had a longer-term impact on attendance than one would initially expect, though there 
could be other causes of this large change that I am unaware of.  The final estimated 
break occurs in 1993 for Model 1.  This is shown as a slight downward blip in attendance 
in Figure 5.1; however, there is a rapid recovery just after the shift.  Given the labor strife 
in the 1994/1995 season, this finding seems to support the findings of Schmidt and Berri 
(2002) that strikes cause short-term effects in fan interest. 
 
5.5.3 Chicago Cubs 
 In 1917, the Cubs hired William Veeck, Sr. (father of Bill Veeck) who brought 
the team 3 pennants (1918, 1929 and 1932).  Looking at Figure 5.1, we can see a sharp 
upward trend during this time, with a large drop off just after the 1932 season.  Given the 
fact that the Cubs won the NL pennant in that season, it seems that the city of Chicago 
was particularly susceptible to the Great Depression, indicated by this large downward 
attendance shift.  Cook County significantly cut back on government employed workers, 
and nearly went bankrupt.  In addition, the neighboring city of Gary, Indiana and its steel 
industry were hit particularly hard after the crash in 1929.  It is not surprising that the 
Cubs would see the effects of these events in their attendance levels despite their success 
on the field in those years immediately preceding the 1932 season. 
 Each of the two models indicate breaks in the 1950’s (1955 in Model 1 and 1950 
in Model 2).  Each of these breaks is associated with a downward shift in attendance 




shift for Cubs attendance, while Model 2 indicates a negative trend following the 
downward level shift in 1950.  The 1950’s were a bad time for the Cubs franchise, and 
marked a time when even players on the team had little confidence in the team’s potential 
(player/manager Phil Cavarretta was fired after publicly admitting the team would not 
finish above 5th place in 1954 (Goldstein. 2010)). 
 Finally, the Cubs franchise also has breakpoints estimated in 1967 in Model 2 and 
in 1983 for both models.  These final two breakpoints indicate a large upward level shift 
in attendance for both breaks (Figure 5.5).  The 1967 season marked a year in which the 
Cubs rebounded from a 103 loss season.  Again in 1984, the Cubs had a strong squad, 
winning their first pennant since 1945. 
 
5.5.4 Chicago White Sox 
 Though the White Sox have a structural shift estimated for the 1927 season, it is 
difficult to attribute this completely to the Great Depression given its relatively early 
onset.  Outside of this explanation, it is unclear why Chicago’s American League team 
saw such a change. The Depression effect hypothesis seems reasonable, given the similar 
downward shift found in the Chicago Cubs model.  Like the Cubs and many other teams, 
the White Sox also experienced a large upward jump in attendance following World War 
II in 1945, according to Model 1. 
 The White Sox also have breaks in 1975 and 1993.  The years surrounding the 
1975 breakpoint were of significant turmoil for the White Sox franchise.  The notoriously 
innovative Bill Veeck purchased the team in 1975 after the Seattle Pilots lawsuits that 




1976 and held open tryouts in 1978, only adding to the marketing gimmicks he is known 
well for.  As I will discuss later, Bill Veeck had a tendency to make an appearance at 
other breakpoints in franchise histories as well.  At this particular break, there is a large 
sudden increase in attendance that persists as a trend with significant variability through 
2009.  However, in Model 2 there is a breakpoint estimated for the 1993 season, 
indicating a possible effect of the work stoppage in the following seasons.  While the 
White Sox eventually recovered, they seem to have been hit harder by the strike than 
other teams included in this analysis. 
 
5.5.5 Cincinnati Reds 
 Both of the models discussed here estimate the same break dates for the 
Cincinnati Reds: 1945 (as in most other long-tenured teams near the end of WWII) and 
1969.  In 1969, Hamilton County agreed to build a new stadium to keep the Reds from 
moving to San Diego.  The following year is known as the start of the “Big Red 
Machine” and the hiring of manager Sparky Anderson in 1970—a year in which the Reds 
lost to the Baltimore Orioles in the World Series after a very successful season.  The 
1978 and 1979 seasons saw the dismantling of the popular “Big Red Machine”, and it is 
easy to see a dramatic downward spike in attendance just after this season.  However, the 
models did not estimate any structural shifts during this time, indicating that the Reds 





5.5.6 Cleveland Indians 
 For the Cleveland Indians, Models 1 and 2 estimate essentially the same breaks 
within the attendance series.  The 1945/1946 change coincides with many of the other 
teams seeing a large spike in attendance after the end of World War II.  Looking at the 
true attendance data, it seems that there was an enormous shift upward following the end 
of WWII before attendance quickly regressed to low levels for Cleveland following the 
reign of Bill Veeck (who bought the team in 1946 and sold it in 1949) and a World Series 
title.  During his short tenure as owner of the Cleveland Indians, Veeck broke the AL 
color barrier by signing Larry Doby in 1947 and Satchel Paige in 1948, concurrently 
moving the team into Cleveland Municipal Stadium full time (and winning the World 
Series in 1948).  While the stadium was not new at the time, the Indians had been playing 
the majority of their games at League Park, with a capacity of just over 21,000.  
Municipal stadium had a capacity of 78,000 for Indians games.  Veeck’s proclamation 
that attendance levels were dwindling for his own team seems to be a reasonable concern 
for the years following his tenure as owner, but it is unclear why such a large attendance 
increase was not sustained by Cleveland as it was for many of the other teams who saw a 
similar increase after World War II (especially apparent in the National League). 
 Indians attendance did not begin to trend slowly trend upward until the break 
estimated in 1963/1964.  The upward trend is surprising, given that the era from 1960 
through 1990 was a dismal time for the Indians in which the team did not finish above 3rd 
place in any season during that span.  This period in Indians history even sparked the 
making of a series of disparaging comedies about the ineptitude of the franchise.  Finally, 




(1991/1992 break date).  This coincides with the opening of the brand new Jacobs Field 
and a wildly successful Indians franchise featuring the likes of Manny Ramirez, Jim 
Thome and Albert Belle.  This success was short-lived, however, as attendance again 
regressed quickly as the 21st century progressed through its first decade. 
 
5.5.7 Detroit Tigers 
 It is well-known that the manufacturing industry in Detroit was hit hard by the 
depression, and it is no surprise that the Tigers saw the effects of this as indicated by a 
breakpoint estimated in 1929.  However, this downward shift was found only in Model 1, 
and does not seem to have been sustained for long afterward.  While there was a slight 
recovery in attendance after the end of the Depression Era, the Tigers saw a large shift 
upward with the end of WWII.  Both models estimate a breakpoint in the range of 1967 
to 1969 for the Tigers.  The 1967 break coincides with one of the closest AL Pennant 
races in history; however, the Tigers were unable to hold off the Boston Red Sox.  
Detroit’s baseball mainstay continued to have solid draws in spite of this, as attendance 
increased steadily until shortly before the player strike in the early 1990s. 
 According to Model 1, 1989 signaled a large downward shift in attendance levels 
(a shift for Model 2 was estimated for 1991, with a confidence interval spanning back to 
1989).  Tigers attendance has recovered nicely and has seen a generally upward trend 
since the work stoppage.  Tigers attendance was particularly volatile through the 1990s 
and 2000s, as Detroit lost 103 games in 1989—marking one of the worst seasons in 
franchise history—and continued their futility throughout much of the decade.  Following 




rebounded dramatically.  Unfortunately, the break point regression model restricts the 
estimation of breakpoints within a certain time period of each endpoint, so the effects of 
these later events would need to be estimated in another fashion or when more data is 
available for those seasons well after 2009. 
 
5.5.8 Houston Astros 
 Model 1 and 2 estimate vastly different breakpoints for the Houston Astros' 
attendance series.  The Model 1 break (1973) does not seem to coincide with any 
significant team events, but indicates a downward shift followed by an upward trend in 
attendance.  In Model 2, structural changes are estimated not to have occurred until much 
later in the franchise’s history.  After the 1997 season, this regression indicates a massive 
upward shift in attendance for the Astros, coinciding with a very successful run of 6 
playoff appearances from 1997 through 2005 and the opening of their new stadium in 
2000 (then named Enron Field). 
 
5.5.9 Los Angeles Dodgers 
 For the Los Angeles Dodgers, Models 1 and 2 estimate a large structural shift in 
1974.  For the first part of the Dodgers’ 1958 move to Los Angeles, the team experienced 
a general downward trend in attendance; however, in 1974, this changed dramatically.  
The 1973 season signaled a very large upward shift in attendance, followed by a gradual 
trend through the 2009 season.  The 1973 season began the 8 year tenure of a Dodgers’ 
star infield that would stay together through the 1981 season, reaching 2 World Series 





5.5.10 Milwaukee Brewers 
 The breaks estimated in the Milwaukee Brewers attendance series differ across 
Models 1 and 2.  Model 1 finds two breaks—one in 1983 and one in 1993—while Model 
2 estimates breaks for only the 1990 season.  In Model 1, the 1983 break identifies what 
seems to be a slight downward shift in attendance levels.  This is a strange event 
considering the Brewers reached their first and only World Series in 1982 (a feat they 
have not achieved since that year).  The team was relatively successful from the 1978 
season through this time, while those seasons after 1982 had mixed results.  With most of 
the teams in this analysis, appearing in the World Series has often been associated with a 
large upward shift in attendance, but Milwaukee was particularly poor after its World 
Series loss in ’82.   
 As with many of the teams in this analysis, the BP Method estimates that the 
Brewers experienced a downward shift near the 1994-95 work stoppage (in 1993), 
followed by a rapid recovery through the 2009 season.  In Model 1, the trend after the 
player strike is relatively consistent with the exception of a large spike in the data, likely 
due to the opening of Miller Park in 2001.  However, Model 2 indicates a significant 
break—a downward shift—just after the opening of the stadium.  Taken together, these 






5.5.11 New York Mets 
 The models for the New York Mets estimate two common breakpoints for 1975 
and 1993.  Both breaks are associated with a downward shift in attendance, the second of 
which occurs after a period of success for the Mets franchise in the 1980’s. The 1993 
season was abysmal for the Mets, a year in which they lost 103 games and experienced a 
very large downward shift after the 1993 season.  This shift may have been enhanced by 
the strike shortened seasons of 1994 and 1995, after which the team has experienced an 
upward trend in attendance levels through the 2009 season. 
 
5.5.12 Oakland Athletics 
 For the Oakland Athletics, I find two similar breaks in each model in 1981 and 
1993.  These both coincide with the major labor disputes in Major League Baseball.  
Interestingly, these breaks shift in opposite directions: upward following the 1981 work 
stoppage, and then downward near the 1994 player strike.  In addition, the 1993 season 
represented a difficult year for the A’s, as they finished last in the American League and 
experienced a downward shift.  The Athletics do not seem to recover from the attendance 
decrease following the breakpoint in 1994 until the turn of the century and the reign of 
Billy Beane as general manager. 
 The sharp trend from the mid-1980’s through the end of the decade coincides with 
a significant speculation made by Lee and Fort (2008), who found a large break in the 
aggregate American League attendance estimation.  The 1987 season marked the 
beginning of the “Bash Brothers Era” in Oakland, and the American League saw a very 




of the five seasons from 1988 to 1992, sweeping their cross-town rivals—the San 
Francisco Giants—in the infamous 1989 “Earthquake Series”.  The end of this run 
coincides with the steep drop-off as indicated by the structural break in 1993. 
 
5.5.13 Philadelphia Phillies 
 Both models for the Philadelphia Phillies indicate breaks at 1945 and 1970 in the 
attendance series.  In addition, Model 1 estimates a third break following the 1930 
season.  The first two estimated breaks, at 1930 and 1945, are concurrent with the 
previously discussed historical events of the Great Depression and World War II.  There 
is a large level shift in attendance after the 1970 season: the final season the team was 
housed in Connie Mack Stadium.  In 1971, the Phillies moved to Veteran’s Stadium, 
where they remained until the opening of Citizen’s Bank Park in 2004.  However, the 
honeymoon effect does not seem to be apparent for the move to Veteran’s Stadium, and 
the Phillies sustained relatively high levels of attendance through the entirety of their stay 
there. 
 
5.5.14 Pittsburgh Pirates 
 The Pittsburg Pirates models have common breakpoints in 1927 preceding the 
Great Depression, near the end of World War II (1945/1946) and in 1961.  Model 1 
estimates an addition break for the team in 1987.  The structural change in 1927 just prior 
to the Great Depression indicates a significant shift downward in attendance levels.  
Pittsburgh’s steel industry was hit particularly hard; however, the fact that this drop 




regarding this break.  The final common breakpoint for the Pirates falls in 1961, a year 
after winning the World Series and just as Roberto Clemente rose to prominence for the 
team.   
 Finally, Model 1 estimates a break in 1987.  While Lee and Fort (2008) found a 
shift for AL attendance in 1987, this shift was absent for the NL.  Perhaps the upward 
shift in attendance may be explained by the emergence of Barry Bonds (a rookie in 
1986).  While Bonds was a very good player in his early years, he did not reach the epic 
performance he is most well-known for until later in his career (and in fact did not hit 30 
or more home runs until his 5th season in Major League Baseball).  This leaves room for 
another explanation. 
 
5.5.15 San Francisco Giants 
 Both models for the San Francisco Giants estimated similar breaks in 1975.  
While the Giants experienced a gradual attendance decline after its move to San 
Francisco in 1958, the BP procedure estimates an upward shift followed by an increasing 
attendance trend after the 1975 season.  The team was sold to Bob Lurie the in 1976, 
saving them from a move to Toronto and possibly reenergizing fan interest for the team 
afterward.  While the 1970’s were not particularly successful for the Giants on the field, 
perhaps remaining in San Francisco had restored fan confidence in the franchise as the 





5.5.16 St. Louis Cardinals 
 For the St. Louis Cardinals, both Model 1 and Model 2 estimate significant 
breakpoints for the post-WWII years (1945).  They also share a similar breakpoint at 
1981/1982, indicating a possible effect of the labor stoppage of 1981 and subsequent 
restructuring of the playoffs for that season.  Interestingly, there is a large upward 
attendance shift after the 1981 work stoppage for the Cardinals, which is sustained along 
with a strong trend upward through 2009.  In addition to the 1981 strike, St. Louis 
acquired shortstop legend Ozzie Smith just before the 1982 season, and went on to win 
the World Series that year. 
 I also find a breakpoint estimated at 1964 for Model 1.  The 1964 break follows 
the World Series Championship won by the Cardinals that year.  Figure 5.4 exhibits a 
large shift upward in attendance that only slowly decreased to the 1981 strike season, at 
which point it jumped up significantly.  It’s also important to note that in 1966, the 
Cardinals moved to Busch Memorial Stadium.  A recent World Series victory and a new 
stadium could very well have created a perfect storm for a large sudden increase in 
attendance levels in the mid-1960s.  While this break is not found for Model 2, an 
additional structural shift is estimated for the 1921 season.  However, there does not seem 
to be any significant reasonable explanation for this break, and likely has to do with the 






5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, I evaluate the time series behavior of franchise attendance in 
Major League Baseball and its relationship to Uncertainty of Outcome as described by 
Rottenberg.  All in all, the analysis here finds scant evidence of any large influence of 
uncertainty of outcome as it pertains to attracting fans to the ballpark.  While a few teams 
were found to have significant effects of certain uncertainty measures—with PU being 
the most common, as in Lee and Fort (2008)—the models presented here tend to indicate 
that fans are less worried about balance throughout the league and more interested in 
whether or not their home team will be able to compete in the given season. 
Despite the statistical significance of the estimated outcome uncertainty 
coefficients, the economic significance tends to be minimal.  Marginal alterations in 
outcome uncertainty can improve team revenues in MLB by at most one percent 
(excluding the strange case of the Houston Astros, for which further evaluation is 
suggested).  While leagues may have managed balance well enough that it does not affect 
attendance numbers for teams, it seems that it would be difficult for league balance to 
become truly detrimental to league survival based on the results here. 
Again, while large historical events like World War II had significant influences on 
franchise attendance, most shifts or fluctuations in the number of fans at each game tend 
to be most related to team performance, new stadiums and generalized increases in 
interest in professional baseball over time.  There is additional evidence that some teams 
experienced more harm by work stoppages than others; however, they tend to be minimal 
across the entire league.  For those series which are found to be non-stationary, a further 




recommended.  In addition, as with the league-level analysis, a further evaluation of the 
impact of sellouts on possibly downward biased coefficient estimates for a few teams 








TABLE 5.1: MLB Franchise TAPG by Decade 
 
Team 1900's 1910's 1920's 1930's 1940's 1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's 1901-2009 
ATL       16,960 10,570 16,531 36,685 32,194 23,356 
BAL      11,952 12,228 13,685 23,676 41,716 30,997 23,073 
BOS 6,033 6,172 4,285 6,329 12,328 14,684 14,300 22,230 24,863 29,560 34,919 16,064 
CHC 6,045 5,223 10,529 11,300 11,565 11,235 11,008 16,942 21,629 29,329 37,460 15,749 
CHW 6,578 7,312 8,119 5,378 9,257 14,518 13,445 13,948 18,641 25,705 27,066 13,698 
CIN 4,241 3,709 6,178 5,696 7,936 9,693 11,169 26,647 21,261 26,735 25,732 13,631 
CLE 4,072 4,950 7,169 6,385 14,091 15,907 9,402 10,517 12,898 31,611 28,506 13,312 
DET 3,628 6,020 9,888 9,390 15,224 15,284 15,832 18,461 24,032 19,140 28,024 15,097 
HOU       16,182 15,340 20,858 23,479 34,812 22,326 
KCR       11,005 17,391 27,551 21,761 19,456 21,234 
LAD      25,260 27,135 30,385 39,416 38,330 42,589 35,209 
LAA       11,476 15,445 31,550 26,319 36,453 24,420 
MIL        13,803 22,409 19,891 29,183 21,184 
MIN       16,359 11,285 18,822 21,290 24,604 18,368 
MON       14,970 15,520 22,873 17,112 10,287 17,223 
NYM       19,969 20,811 26,079 24,942 37,066 26,015 
NYY 4,857 4,727 13,665 11,820 18,494 20,872 16,537 19,591 28,537 28,949 46,743 19,938 
OAK 
      
9,849 9,507 20,243 22,644 24,113 18,685 
PHI 3,482 4,305 3,508 3,033 6,907 11,934 11,019 23,780 26,354 26,276 32,151 13,982 
PIT 4,652 3,793 8,341 4,814 10,394 11,443 12,519 15,688 14,418 20,208 22,065 11,731 
SDN 
      
6,333 13,361 19,756 23,015 30,538 21,294 
SEA 
       
12,594 12,418 28,025 36,044 24,323 
SFG 
     
17,498 17,459 11,024 16,745 23,050 38,478 21,203 
STL 3,703 3,319 6,233 5,193 10,170 12,935 17,376 18,507 28,985 32,804 40,362 16,442 
TEX 
       
14,043 17,635 31,804 29,539 23,740 
TOR 
       
19,410 26,636 40,632 24,696 29,632 
A.L. 4,809 4,997 7,796 6,445 11,235 13,360 12,606 14,824 22,015 27,892 29,160 14,189 









TABLE 5.2: MLB Decade Averages for All Balance Measures 
 
Measure 1900’s 1910’s 1920’s 1930’s 1940’s 1950’s 1960’s 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s 2000’s Overall 
A.L. TL 0.038 0.045 0.064 0.018 0.103 0.055 0.166 0.267 0.364 0.395 0.167 0.154 
A.L. CSU 0.499 0.458 0.628 0.747 0.616 0.742 0.638 0.558 0.433 0.337 0.560 0.568 
A.L. PU 0.027 0.051 0.050 0.072 0.045 0.040 0.047 0.041 0.035 0.045 0.038 0.045 
A.L. CBR 0.763 0.806 0.894 0.901 0.882 0.864 0.790 0.744 0.795 0.818 0.817 0.826 
N.L. TL 0.006 0.101 0.090 0.072 0.047 0.146 0.148 0.294 0.393 0.339 0.543 0.200 
N.L. CSU 0.690 0.396 0.690 0.685 0.631 0.693 0.494 0.603 0.298 0.178 0.429 0.520 
N.L. PU 0.082 0.062 0.032 0.029 0.043 0.038 0.030 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.033 0.042 























TABLE 5.3: MLB Win Percent by Decade 1901-2009 
 
Team 1900's 1910's 1920's 1930's 1940's 1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's Overall 
ATL       0.517 0.450 0.457 0.595 0.551 0.513 
BAL      0.436 0.565 0.590 0.512 0.512 0.431 0.513 
BOS 0.514 0.569 0.386 0.461 0.550 0.528 0.475 0.556 0.525 0.523 0.568 0.514 
CHC 0.600 0.546 0.523 0.576 0.475 0.434 0.456 0.487 0.471 0.476 0.499 0.502 
CHW 0.550 0.529 0.474 0.443 0.460 0.545 0.528 0.468 0.485 0.525 0.529 0.503 
CIN 0.473 0.470 0.518 0.432 0.496 0.481 0.536 0.592 0.499 0.520 0.463 0.499 
CLE 0.516 0.488 0.511 0.534 0.518 0.585 0.486 0.460 0.455 0.531 0.504 0.508 
DET 0.509 0.525 0.489 0.531 0.537 0.476 0.546 0.490 0.535 0.452 0.450 0.503 
HOU       0.428 0.492 0.522 0.523 0.514 0.498 
KCR       0.423 0.528 0.529 0.468 0.415 0.483 
LAD 
     
0.513 0.545 0.565 0.526 0.513 0.532 0.536 
LAA 
      
0.470 0.484 0.500 0.475 0.556 0.498 
MIL 
       
0.458 0.514 0.478 0.457 0.476 
MIN 
      
0.540 0.505 0.468 0.463 0.532 0.501 
MON 
      
0.321 0.464 0.518 0.499 0.454 0.483 
NYM 0.381 0.473 0.523 0.494 0.504 0.478 
NYY 0.491 0.466 0.606 0.629 0.602 0.620 0.549 0.555 0.547 0.548 0.596 0.567 
OAK       0.523 0.520 0.512 0.497 0.550 0.521 
PHI 0.473 0.508 0.369 0.379 0.378 0.495 0.473 0.503 0.500 0.471 0.525 0.462 
PIT 0.634 0.488 0.568 0.529 0.486 0.398 0.528 0.568 0.469 0.498 0.421 0.507 
SDN       0.321 0.415 0.486 0.487 0.474 0.461 
SEA        0.386 0.429 0.493 0.517 0.471 
SFG      0.529 0.560 0.493 0.493 0.508 0.528 0.517 
STL 0.382 0.433 0.533 0.588 0.615 0.502 0.550 0.495 0.528 0.488 0.564 0.518 
TEX        0.477 0.461 0.519 0.479 0.484 




TABLE 5.4: MLB Average Games Back From Playoffs by Era 
 
Team AL/NL (1901-1968) Div. Era (1969-1993) WC Era (1994-2009) 
ATL 16.83 18.48 2.38 
BAL 18.63 8.56 18.13 
BOS 20.93 10.48 4.06 
CHC 17.65 16.64 11.16 
CHW 19.50 15.72 7.28 
CIN 21.83 8.26 11.16 
CLE 16.94 23.58 6.47 
DET 17.86 14.02 20.13 




LAD 9.23 8.64 4.38 








NYM 41.21 14.74 9.16 
NYY 9.54 10.40 0.38 
OAK 21.00 10.32 8.38 
PHI 29.05 14.76 10.28 







SFG 7.00 14.74 6.44 



























TABLE 5.5: MLB Franchise Playoff Appearances by Era 
 
Team AL/NL (01-68) Div. Era (69-93) WC Era (94-09) Total % of Seasons 
ATL 0 5 12 17 38.6% 
BAL 1 7 2 10 17.9% 
BOS 8 4 9 21 19.3% 
CHC 10 2 4 16 14.7% 
CHW 5 2 4 11 10.1% 
CIN 4 8 2 14 12.8% 
CLE 3 0 8 11 10.1% 
DET 8 3 1 12 11.0% 
HOU 0 2 6 8 16.7% 
KCR 
 
6 0 6 14.6% 
LAD 4 6 7 17 32.7% 
LAA 0 3 6 9 18.4% 
MIL 
 
2 1 3 7.5% 
MIN 1 4 5 10 20.4% 
MON 
 
0 1 1 2.8% 
NYM 0 4 3 7 14.6% 
NYY 29 4 15 48 44.9% 
OAK 0 10 5 15 35.7% 
PHI 2 6 3 11 10.1% 
PIT 7 9 0 16 14.7% 
SDN 
 
1 4 5 12.2% 
SEA 
 
0 4 4 12.1% 
SFG 1 3 4 8 15.4% 
STL 12 4 8 24 22.0% 
TEX 
 
0 4 4 10.5% 
TOR 
 







TABLE 5.6: MLB Franchise ADF and PP Tests (Unadjusted) 
 
Team   ATL BAL BOS CHC CHW CIN CLE 
T (seasons)  44 56 109 109 109 109 109 
ADF (p) Constant -1.772 (1) -1.189 (0) 0.558 (6) -0.015 (3) -0.251 (7) -1.696 (0) -1.960 (0) 
ADF (p) Trend -2.757 (1) -1.171 (0) -2.234 (6) -1.826 (3) -4.747 (1)*** -3.494 (3)** -3.096 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -1.496 (3) -1.204 (3) -0.397 (4) -0.390 (4) -1.879 (4) -1.613 (4) -2.110 (4) 
P-P (l) Trend -2.354 (3) -1.290 (3) -3.230 (4)* -2.268 (4) -4.220 (4)*** -3.535 (4)** -2.922 (4) 
Team   DET HOU KCR LAD LAA MIL MIN 
T (seasons)  109 48 41 52 49 40 49 
ADF (p) Constant -1.028 (5) -0.394 (7) -2.139 (0) -0.745 (7) -1.393 (0) -1.849 (0) -2.014 (5) 
ADF (p) Trend -5.318 (1)*** -2.482 (7) -2.023 (0) -2.532 (3) -2.430 (0) -3.283 (0)* -3.192 (5) 
P-P (l) Constant -1.953 (4) -1.973 (3) -2.112 (3) -1.823 (3) -1.283 (3) -1.439 (3) -1.785 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -4.770 (4)*** -3.289 (3)* -1.950 (3) -3.446 (3)* -2.424 (3) -3.225 (3)* -2.618 (3) 
Team   MON NYM NYY OAK PHI PIT SD 
T (seasons)  36 48 107 42 109 109 41 
ADF (p) Constant -2.214 (0) -1.239 (7) -0.945 (0) -1.778 (4) -0.200 (2) -0.896 (7) -1.421 (5) 
ADF (p) Trend -2.374 (0) -3.625 (6)** -2.605 (0) -3.003 (3) -2.953 (0) -5.448 (4)*** -3.239 (0)* 
P-P (l) Constant -2.269 (3) -2.095 (3) -0.934 (4) -2.025 (3) -0.276 (4) -2.434 (4) -2.195 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -2.392 (3) -2.535 (3) -2.781 (4) -2.154 (3) -2.960 (4) -5.135 (4)*** -3.248 (3)* 
Team   SEA SF STL TEX TOR 
T (seasons)  33 52 109 38 33 
ADF (p) Constant -2.527 (6) -1.445 (0) -0.323 (1) -1.475 (5) -2.576 (7) 
ADF (p) Trend -1.585 (6) -2.730 (7) -3.722 (0)** -1.282 (8) -2.667 (7) 
P-P (l) Constant -1.074 (3) -1.286 (3) -0.184 (4) -1.946 (3) -1.498 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -1.862 (3) -2.481 (3) -3.571 (4)** -2.281 (3) -1.338 (3) 
Data unadjusted for strikes.  p: the number of lags; l: lag truncation.   




TABLE 5.7: MLB Franchise Two-Break LM Test (Unadjusted) 
 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
ATL 8 1982, 1990 0.164, 4.956*** -4.884 λ = (0.39, 0.57) 
BAL 8 1978, 1990 0.113, 5.311*** -6.662*** λ = (0.45, 0.66) 
BOS 4 1944, 1959 4.240***, -4.416*** -6.115*** λ = (0.40, 0.54) 
CHC 3 1951, 1985 -4.151***, 4.154*** -5.692** λ = (0.47, 0.78) 
CHW 3 1950, 1976 -1.038, 0.211 -6.5254*** λ = (0.46, 0.70) 
CIN 6 1960, 1970 -2.413**, 4.137*** -6.447*** λ = (0.55, 0.64) 
CLE 8 1959, 1991 -0.502, 5.627*** -6.333*** λ = (0.54, 0.83) 
DET 8 1981, 1996 2.342**, -0.240 -6.332*** λ = (0.74, 0.88) 
HOU 8 1981, 1994 0.037, 5.545*** -6.136** λ = (0.42, 0.69) 
KCR 8 1987, 2002 -6.735***, 1.134 -5.216 λ = (0.46, 0.83) 
LAD 8 1978, 1991 5.841***, 3.174*** -7.201*** λ = (0.40, 0.65) 
LAA 7 1986, 2001 0.545, 3.683*** -4.480 λ = (0.53, 0.84) 
MIL 7 1982, 1999 -5.646***, 7.029*** -6.587*** λ = (0.33, 0.75) 
MIN 6 1982, 1995 5.056***, -4.012*** -5.853** λ = (0.45, 0.71) 
MON 5 1982, 1992 -0.363, 5.262*** -6.587*** λ = (0.39, 0.67) 
NYM 6 1982, 1997 1.471, -2.312** -4.861 λ = (0.44, 0.75) 
NYY 2 1961, 1994 -1.207, 3.653*** -4.649 λ = (0.55, 0.86) 
OAK 7 1987, 1996 5.514***, 4.786*** -6.736*** λ = (0.48, 0.69) 
PHI 7 1972, 1992 4.429***, -4.859*** -6.010** λ = (0.66, 0.84) 
PIT 5 1945, 1986 3.994***, 2.140** -6.991*** λ = (0.41, 0.79) 
SD 4 1991, 2004 -5.200***, -0.084 -6.224** λ = (0.56, 0.88) 
SEA 8 1990, 1994 -0.523, 7.304*** -9.114*** λ = (0.42, 0.55) 
SF 7 1970, 1984 -2.979***, 5.628*** -6.089** λ = (0.25, 0.52) 
STL 8 1927, 1983 -2.680***, 5.876*** -6.195*** λ = (0.25, 0.76) 
TEX 5 1984, 1993 -2.520**, -8.091*** -7.405*** λ = (0.34, 0.58) 
TOR 8 1990, 2004 4.085***, 4.089*** -7.039*** λ = (0.42, 0.85) 
Data unadjusted for strikes.  𝑘�  is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit 
root test to correct for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏 denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j 
= 1,2.  See Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  ***, ** = significant at 99% and 95% 




TABLE 5.8: MLB Franchise One-Break LM Test (Unadjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
ATL 8 1989 4.251*** -4.388* λ = 0.55 
CHC 2 1955 -2.368** -5.207*** λ = 0.50 
HOU 7 1994 4.800*** -5.454*** λ = 0.69 
KCR 7 1990 -4.535*** -4.481* λ = 0.54 
LAA 8 1982 -0.967 -4.352* λ = 0.45 
MIN 6 1976 -0.676 -4.731** λ = 0.33 
NYM 6 1997 -1.799* -4.715** λ = 0.75 
NYY 2 1994 3.292*** -4.247* λ = 0.86 
PHI 5 1949 -1.824* -4.1000 λ = 0.45 
SD 8 1980 3.184*** -5.338*** λ = 0.20 
SF 7 1984 5.775*** -6.022*** λ = 0.52 
Data unadjusted for strikes.  𝑘� is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in 
the unit root test to correct for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏 denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the 
value of DTjt for j = 1,2.  See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  ***, **, * = 







TABLE 5.9: MLB Franchise ADF and PP Tests (Adjusted) 
Team  ATL BAL BOS CHC CHW CIN CLE 
T (seasons)  44 56 109 109 109 109 109 
ADF (p) Constant -1.749 (1) -1.174 (0) 0.610 (6) 0.048 (3) -2.525 (7) -1.628 (0) -1.944 (0) 
ADF (p) Trend -2.656 (1) -1.119 (0) -2.194 (6) -1.775 (3) -4.833 (1)*** -3.521 (3)** -3.004 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -1.479 (3) -1.203 (3) -0.376 (4) -0.330 (4) -1.807 (4) -1.604 (4) -2.108 (4) 
P-P (l) Trend -2.290 (3) -1.270 (3) -3.153 (4)* -2.203 (4) -4.124 (4)*** -3.522 (4)** -2.935 (4) 
Team   DET HOU KCR LAD LAA MIL MIN 
T (seasons)  109 48 41 52 49 40 49 
ADF (p) Constant -1.019 (5) -0.401 (7) -2.089 (0) -0.742 (7) -1.355 (0) -1.672 (0) -1.688 (4) 
ADF (p) Trend -5.350 (1)*** -2.651 (7) -1.967 (0) -2.475 (3) -2.281 (0) -2.923 (0) -2.846 (4) 
P-P (l) Constant -1.943 (4) -1.905 (3) -2.083 (3) -1.806 (3) -1.291 (3) -1.336 (3) -1.676 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -4.789 (4)*** -3.229 (3)* -1.917 (3) -3.431 (3)* -2.315 (3) -2.898 (3) -2.544 (3) 
Team   MON NYM NYY OAK PHI PIT SD 
T (seasons)  36 48 107 42 109 109 41 
ADF (p) Constant -1.974 (0) -2.684 (1)* -0.886 (0) -2.354 (1) -0.524 (0) -0.385 (8) -1.743 (5) 
ADF (p) Trend -2.236 (2) -3.204 (1)* -2.536 (0) -2.533 (1) -2.904 (0) -5.588 (2)*** -2.308 (5) 
P-P (l) Constant -2.078 (3) -2.087 (3) -0.896 (4) -1.935 (3) -0.198 (4) -2.304 (4) -2.128 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -2.218 (3) -2.541 (3) -2.732 (4) -2.052 (3) -2.892 (4) -4.927 (4)*** -2.890 (3) 
Team   SEA SF STL TEX TOR 
T (seasons)  33 52 109 38 33 
ADF (p) Constant -3.105 (6)** -1.395 (0) 0.226 (3) -1.847 (0) -1.624 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -1.518 (6) -2.702 (7) -3.482 (0)** -1.450 (0) -1.481 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -1.030 (3) -1.260 (3) -0.063 (4) -1.843 (3) -1.504 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -1.515 (3) -2.476 (3) -3.320 (4)* -1.347 (3) -1.345 (3) 
Data adjusted for strikes.  p: the number of lags; l: lag truncation.   




TABLE 5.10: MLB Franchise Two-Break LM Test (Adjusted) 
 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
ATL 2 1985, 1994 0.947, 0.550 -5.198 λ = (0.45, 0.66) 
BAL 8 1978, 1990 0.391, 5.365*** -6.740*** λ = (0.45, 0.66) 
BOS 4 1944, 1959 4.147***, -4.261*** -5.973** λ = (0.40, 0.54) 
CHC 2 1955, 1986 -2.373**, 1.452 -5.524* λ = (0.50, 0.79) 
CHW 1 1931, 1967 1.271, -1.250 -6.214** λ = (0.28, 0.61) 
CIN 4 1960, 1970 -2.274**, 3.842*** -6.852*** λ = (0.55, 0.64) 
CLE 6 1959, 1991 -0.534, 4.771*** -5.471* λ = (0.54, 0.83) 
DET 1 1981, 1996 2.411**, -0.284 -6.343** λ = (0.74, 0.88) 
HOU 1 1972, 1998 -3.004***, 2.663** -5.254 λ = (0.23, 0.77) 
KCR 6 1988, 1999 -6.358***, 0.857 -5.558* λ = (0.49, 0.76) 
LAD 8 1980, 1991 3.469***, 5.141*** -6.611*** λ = (0.44, 0.65) 
LAA 5 1983, 2001 2.096**, 2.858*** -4.376 λ = (0.45, 0.84) 
MIL 6 1980, 2000 2.573**, -6.512*** -7.454*** λ = (0.28, 0.78) 
MIN 6 1982, 1995 4.921***, -3.945*** -5.525* λ = (0.45, 0.71) 
MON 4 1980, 1986 1.661*, 1.245 -5.591* λ = (0.33, 0.50) 
NYM 6 1982, 1997 1.547, 2.844*** -4.716 λ = (0.44, 0.75) 
NYY 2 1961, 1998 -2.199**, 1.994** -4.582 λ = (0.55, 0.90) 
OAK 7 1982, 1986 0.517, 4.771*** -7.524*** λ = (0.36, 0.45) 
PHI 7 1972, 1992 4.569***, -5.042*** -6.215** λ = (0.66, 0.84) 
PIT 5 1944, 1986 4.831***, 0.917 -6.943*** λ = (0.40, 0.79) 
SD 4 1990, 2005 -5.086***, 0.082 -5.879** λ = (0.54, 0.90) 
SEA 0 1989, 2002 6.049***, -4.796*** -6.391** λ = (0.39, 0.79) 
SF 8 1972, 1984 -2.416**, 5.457*** -6.086** λ = (0.29, 0.52) 
STL 8 1927, 1983 -2.797***, 6.104*** -6.423*** λ = (0.25, 0.76) 
TEX 5 1982, 1996 -3.740***, 0.246 -4.941 λ = (0.29, 0.66) 
TOR 4 1987, 1998 5.405***, -6.140*** -7.230*** λ = (0.33, 0.67) 
Data adjusted for strikes.   𝑘�  is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root 
test to correct for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏  denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 
1,2.  See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  ***, **, * = significant at 99%, 95%, and 





TABLE 5.11: MLB Franchise One-Break LM Test (Adjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
ATL 2 1991 2.785*** -4.295* λ = 0.59 
CHC 2 1955 -2.318** -5.162*** λ = 0.50 
CLE 6 1991 3.564*** -4.576** λ = 0.83 
HOU 7 1995 3.941*** -4.600** λ = 0.71 
KCR 0 1979 -1.940* -3.086 λ = 0.27 
LAA 8 1982 -1.207 -4.448* λ = 0.45 
MIN 6 1976 -0.366 -4.320* λ =0.33 
MON 8 1976 0.708 -4.149 λ = 0.22 
NYM 8 1969 -2.262** -4.636** λ = 0.17 
NYY 2 1962 -1.464 -4.098 λ = 0.56 
TEX 6 1991 3.046*** -4.948** λ = 0.53 
NOTE: 𝑘� is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to 
correct for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏 denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j 
= 1,2.  See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  Data adjusted for strikes.  







TABLE 5.12: MLB Franchise Model 1 Break Point Test Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) SupFt(4) SupFt(5) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) SupF(4/3) SupF(5/4) Breaks 
             
BAL 214.05a 179.72a    214.05a 250.21a 80.80a    2 
             
BOS 61.22a 131.84a 96.00a 105.81a 75.32a 131.84a 188.02a 117.74a 29.84a 29.84a  4 
             
CHC 156.74a 138.53a 106.57a 114.65a 86.77a 156.74a 203.72a 27.39a 31.20a 9.41  3 
             
CHW 17.26a 15.83a 21.54a 26.52a 23.81a 26.52a 52.29a 43.92a 43.92a 13.38c  2 
             
CIN 157.01a 102.66a 84.40a 82.63a 70.28a 157.01a 157.01a 32.19a 31.04a 31.06a 5.36 2 
             
CLE 56.08a 44.08a 47.56a 44.56a 39.10a 56.08a 85.86a 15.78b 35.29a 12.22 7.81 3 
             
DET 21.76a 20.58a 30.89a 27.69a 24.29a 30.89a 53.33a 14.52b 28.64a 16.26b  4 
             
HOU 16.92a 12.19a    16.92a 16.97a 5.68    1 
             
LAD 38.44a 34.76a    38.44a 48.38a 8.64    1 
             
MIL 12.08b 14.10a    14.10a 19.63a 17.85a    2 
             
NYM 34.32a 54.72a    54.72a 76.18a 40.54a    2 
             
OAK 35.31a 21.95a    35.31a 35.31a 11.40b    2 
             
PHI 86.27a 72.57a 57.35a 50.96a 45.75a 86.27a 100.45a 51.10a 51.10a 34.97a 10.78 3 
             
PIT 15.95a 38.05a 30.98a 32.45a 24.67a 38.05a 57.67a 62.30a 51.30a 45.76a  4 
             
SDN 7.98 9.50c    9.50c 12.27b 10.99b    0 
             
SFG 96.07a 53.18a    96.07a 96.07a 3.47    1 
             
STL 160.13a 151.07a 137.00a 108.22a 83.68a 160.13a 205.03a 47.16a 17.05b 6.02  3 
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 







TABLE 5.13: MLB Franchise Model 1 Estimated Break Dates (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 T3 T4  Team T1 T2 T3 T4 
           
BAL 1974 1991    LAD 1974    
 [73, 75] [90, 92]     [73, 76]    
           
BOS 1918 1945 1966 1993  MIL 1983 1993   
 [17, 20] [44, 46] [65, 67] [92, 95]   [82, 85] [90, 94]   
           
CHC 1932 1955 1983   NYM 1975 1993   
 [30, 33] [54, 58] [82, 90]    [74, 76] [90, 94]   
           
CHW 1945 1975    OAK 1981 1993   
 [42, 46] [73, 76]     [80, 82] [92, 95]   
           
CIN 1945 1969    PHI 1930 1945 1970  
 [43, 46] [68, 70]     [24, 31] [44, 46] [69, 71]  
           
CLE 1946 1964 1992   PIT 1927 1946 1961 1987 
 [44, 47] [63, 66] [90, 93]    [25, 28] [43, 47] [56, 63] [84, 89] 
           
DET 1929 1945 1967 1989  SFG 1975    
 [27, 40] [43, 46] [66, 69] [84, 90]   [74, 76]    
           
HOU 1973     STL 1945 1964 1981  
 [71, 75]      [44, 46] [62, 65] [80, 83]  
           









TABLE 5.14: MLB Franchise Model 2 Break Point Test Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) SupFt(4) SupFt(5) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) SupF(4/3) SupF(5/4) Breaks 
             
BAL 197.39a 149.94a    197.39a 208.75a 39.28a    2 
             
BOS 79.52a 156.08a 114.26a 95.55a 52.17a 156.08a 197.44a 46.05a 8.90 8.90  2 
             
CHC 189.70a 147.00a 109.03a 113.78a 100.49a 189.70a 220.64a 15.75b 20.95a 20.61a  4 
             
CHW 34.99a 39.81a 26.81a 26.88a 22.06a 39.81a 50.36a 46.49a 23.53a 23.53a  2 
             
CIN 150.13a 97.41a 86.30a 75.68a 47.77a 150.13a 150.13a 30.65a 29.69a 12.57  2 
             
CLE 63.61a 52.30a 53.33a 46.00a 39.22a 63.61a 86.11a 40.73a 24.16a 12.61 12.61 3 
             
DET 20.85a 38.09a 32.21a 26.00a 19.36a 38.09a 48.21a 14.76b 12.29 7.08  3 
             
HOU 20.60a 13.05a    20.60a 20.60a 4.59    1 
             
LAD 42.67a 38.48a    42.67a 53.57a 10.32    1 
             
MIL 12.28b 17.53a    17.53a 24.41a 4.13    1 
             
NYM 34.02a 48.85a    48.85a 68.01a 35.35a    2 
             
OAK 36.14a 26.67a    36.14a 37.12a 15.60a    2 
             
PHI 97.84a 68.20a 57.50a 49.21a 45.21a 97.84a 99.26a 63.11a 63.11a 35.37a 9.75 2 
             
PIT 46.73a 39.11a 32.43a 35.55a 18.67a 46.73a 63.17a 48.39a 48.39a 46.21a  3 
             
SDN 8.67 10.46c    10.46c 13.51b 9.31c    0 
             
SFG 86.32a 45.80a    86.32a 86.32a 3.97    1 
             
STL 187.42a 151.52a 139.97a 112.68a 70.19a 187.42a 209.48a 31.07a 22.46a 16.47b  3 
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 







TABLE 5.15: MLB Franchise Model 2 Estimated Break Dates (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 T3 T4  Team T1 T2 T3 T4 
           
BAL 1973 1991    LAD 1974    
 [72, 74] [90, 92]     [73, 75]    
           
BOS 1945 1966    MIL 1990    
 [44, 46] [65, 67]     [85, 91]    
           
CHC 1932 1950 1967 1983  NYM 1975 1993   
 [30, 33] [49, 52] [66, 68] [82, 88]   [74, 76] [92, 94]   
           
CHW 1927 1993    OAK 1981 1993   
 [26, 28] [81, 94]     [80, 82] [92, 95]   
           
CIN 1945 1969    PHI 1945 1970   
 [43, 46] [68, 70]     [38, 46] [69, 71]   
           
CLE 1945 1963 1991   PIT 1927 1945 1961  
 [42, 46] [62, 65] [89, 92]    [26, 28] [43, 46] [59, 62]  
           
DET 1946 1969 1991   SFG 1975    
 [45, 47] [68, 72] [82, 92]    [74, 76]    
           
HOU 1997     STL 1921 1945 1982  
 [96, 99]      [19, 25] [44, 46] [81, 84]  
           









TABLE 5.16: MLB Franchise Model 1 (Heterogeneous) Breakpoint Regression Results 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 α5 β5 
BAL -204 2077 1225 -26700 -1237 84764     
t-value (-1.75)c (0.69) (8.90)a (-4.28)a (-9.24) a (10.32)a     
BOS -273 3039 109 -2009 -310 26286 447 -16389 653 -39416 
t-value (-2.50)b (1.69)c (2.35)b (-1.21) (-4.41)a (5.56)a (9.84)a (-3.97)a (6.66)a (-3.98)a 
CHC 403 -14086 487 -24063 301 -20001 611 -40652   
t-value (7.09)a (-5.19)a (5.96)a (-5.12)a (5.24)a (-4.78)a (7.84)a (-5.42)a   
CHW 49 -8267 -130 6361 325 -22701     
t-value (1.05) (-2.73)a (-1.71)c (1.24) (5.56)a (-3.88)a     
CIN 38 -7064 4 -1453 142 1133     
t-value (1.09) (-3.13)a (0.04) (-0.31) (3.59)a (0.24)     
CLE 91 -9668 -1040 58480 264 -21410 -849 104045   
t-value (2.07)b (-3.02)a (-6.36)a (5.71)a (3.17)a (-2.94)a (-4.58)a (5.27)a   
DET 382 -17136 176 -14823 -439 23042 218 -15110 976 -90325 
t-value (5.47)a (-6.64)a (1.23) (-2.51)b (-4.81)a (4.21)a (2.39)b (-1.98)c (8.52)a (-7.84)a 
HOU 92 -952 661 -13594       
t-value (0.22) (-0.16) (8.87)a (-1.84) b       
LAD -180 8012 210 12408       
t-value (-1.20) (1.50) (3.98)a (2.17) b       
MIL 1138 -1390 167 7335 1346 -27724     
t-value (4.18)a (-0.23) (0.44) (0.81) (6.55)a (-3.30)a     
NYM -571 -3916 1032 -34387 1581 -67034     
t-value (-2.08)b (-1.28) (5.96) a (-6.31) a (7.91)a (-7.82)a     
OAK 221 -11109 1034 -16529 312 -9027     
t-value (1.05) (-2.63)b (4.17)a (-3.12)a (1.88) c (-1.40)     
PHI 144 -12260 469 -25518 -57 -830 213 -7983   
t-value (1.45) (-3.43)a (2.19)b (-2.91)a (-0.56) (-0.13) (4.05)a (-1.50)   
PIT 238 -13545 311 -20816 -183 10885 180 -15082 191 -11002 
t-value (3.15)a (-5.05)a (3.09)a (-4.68)a (-1.25) (1.41) (2.75)a (-2.73)a (1.82)c (-1.03) 
SFG -642 -3553 835 -27287       
t-value (-3.63)a (-0.56) (11.54)a (-5.07)a       
STL -70 -4857 -40 3558 -100 1485 462 -20641   
t-value (-1.83)c (-2.74)a (-0.43) (0.62) (-0.92) (1.76)c (8.62)a (-4.01)a   
a. Significant at the 99% critical level. b. Significant at the 95% critical level. c. Significant at the 90% critical level. αM and βM  







TABLE 5.17: MLB Franchise Model 1 (Heterogeneous) Regression Coefficients 
 
Team TL CSU PU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐)  Team TL CSU PU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
             
BAL 2066 1059 21525 19037 0.964  LAD 2934 -950 -71092 40454 0.842 
t-value (0.99) (0.64) (1.37) (3.15)a (0.970)  t-value (1.50) (-0.65) (-3.51)a (4.34)a (0.863) 
             
BOS -2959 -1949 -1592 13481 0.974  MIL -2038 -3176 6475 24473 0.794 
t-value (-2.22)b (-2.22)b (-0.27) (4.59)a (0.977)  t-value (-0.73) (-1.19) (0.20) (2.04)b (0.841) 
             
CHC 1008 321 -30218 29134 0.941  NYM -157 3045 -27969 69400 0.870 
t-value (0.68) (0.36) (-3.26)a (7.52)a (0.947)  t-value (-0.06) (1.62) (-1.10) (9.17)a (0.895) 
             
CHW 3699 -1422 3095 29418 0.831  OAK -3671 -4609 -35819 46882 0.886 
t-value (1.54) (-0.91) (0.27) (6.13)a (0.845)  t-value (-1.38) (-1.99) c (-1.49) (7.49)a (0.911) 
             
CIN -3465 376 -19632 25238 0.923  PHI -151 -925 -36253 36026 0.908 
t-value (-2.21)b (0.42) (-1.99)b (6.36)a (0.930)  t-value (-0.07) (-0.77) (-2.68)a (6.94)a (0.917) 
             
CLE 1069 2622 -8773 24129 0.893  PIT 1717 1102 -17650 28571 0.872 
t-value (0.41) (1.52) (-0.75) (4.23)a (0.904)  t-value (1.16) (1.26) (-1.91)c (7.43)a (0.888) 
             
DET 5386 -1034 -701 35046 0.894  SFG 110 1545 -39149 46152 0.867 
t-value (2.62)b (-0.78) (-0.08) (9.21)a (0.907)  t-value (0.04) (0.83) (-1.60) (4.35)a (0.885) 
             
HOU 679 5403 -48255 33875 0.766  STL 1622 1405 -4703 21090 0.971 
t-value (0.22) (2.77)a (-1.71)c (2.42)b (0.800)  t-value (1.24) (1.77)c (-0.58) (5.57)a (0.974) 
             
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 









TABLE 5.18: MLB Franchise Model 2 (Heterogeneous) Breakpoint Regression Results 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 α5 β5 
BAL -234 7925 1259 -22091 -1251 90986     
t-value (-1.53) (0.63) (9.22)a (-2.09)b (-10.96 ) a (6.93)a     
BOS 72 3227 -412 35800 402 -9802     
t-value (2.12)b (0.54) (-4.57)a (3.43)a (14.67)a (-1.84)c     
CHC 336 -15542 711 -35967 -144 3045 91 -6753 620 -45077 
t-value (6.57)a (-3.36)a (6.91)a (-5.51)a (-1.29) (0.32) (0.77) (-0.65) (11.15)a (-5.86)a 
CHW -115 -38524 351 -55113 631 -86550     
t-value (-1.00) (-4.94)a (10.57)a (-5.44)a (3.44)a (-4.27)a     
CIN 51 -5760 -40 2648 125 3213     
t-value (1.33) (-1.18) (-0.48) (0.34) (3.13)a (0.50)     
CLE 127 -5181 -1009 62396 273 -17042 -765 100555   
t-value (2.24)b (-0.57) (-5.90)a (3.75)a (3.25)a (-1.79)c (-4.53)a (5.04)a   
DET 48 -36345 -140 -18841 185 -33934 814 -97172   
t-value (0.93) (-4.78)a (-1.37) (-1.52) (1.88)c (-3.75)a (7.75)a (-7.50)a   
HOU 240 21135 228 31208       
t-value (2.68)a (1.10) (0.60)a (1.09)       
LAD -211 22408 242 26228       
t-value (-1.29) (1.64) (4.64)a (1.97) c       
MIL 736 16134 1099 -193       
t-value (3.06)a (0.57) (6.26)a (-0.01)       
NYM -500 27644 1037 -1279 1666 -37161     
t-value (-1.91)c (1.59) (6.06) a (-0.07) (8.81)a (-2.02)c     
OAK 140 -3875 1159 -11568 274 -41     
t-value (0.63) (-0.18) (4.43) a (-0.55) (1.70)c (-0.00)     
PHI 90 -11957 -50 -1783 219 -8932     
t-value (1.74)c (-1.56) (-0.50) (-0.16) (4.29)a (-0.99)     
PIT 262 -18176 219 -21897 -97 1840 340 -30548   
t-value (3.34)a (-3.41)a (1.91)c (-3.15)a (-0.68) (0.22) (11.28)a (-5.11)a   
SFG -697 10022 838 -14069       
t-value (-3.68)a (0.63) (12.62)a (-0.94)       
STL -184 -498 -116 283 265 -8756 453 -15885   
t-value (-1.77)c (-0.10) (-1.54) (0.05) (6.88)a (-1.32) (7.44)a (-1.94)c   
a. Significant at the 99% critical level. b. Significant at the 95% critical level. c. Significant at the 90% critical level. αM and βM  







TABLE 5.19: MLB Franchise Model 2 (Heterogeneous) Regression Coefficients 
 
Team PU CBR W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐)  Team PU CBR W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
           
BAL -21237 -5085 18197 0.964  LAD -75596 -12501 34271 0.838 
t-value (1.35) (-0.37) (3.11)a (0.970)  t-value (-3.74)a (-0.89) (3.90)a (0.857) 
           
BOS -4808 -5108 11623 0.968  MIL 16502 -34007 40496 0.757 
t-value (-0.78) (-0.74) (4.27)a (0.971)  t-value (0.51) (-0.96) (3.41)a (0.795) 
           
CHC -19173 6037 25636 0.957  NYM -28589 -38510 70678 0.874 
t-value (-2.55)b (1.09) (7.49)a (0.962)  t-value (-1.15) (-1.71) c (9.30)a (0.895) 
           
CHW -4094 40971 27271 0.820  OAK -28352 -10151 41588 0.872 
t-value (-0.36) (4.08)a (5.53)a (0.834)  t-value (-1.17) (-0.39) (6.45)a (0.897) 
           
CIN -16774 -3006 26421 0.921  PHI -26087 1436 32824 0.907 
t-value (-1.85)c (-0.46) (6.58)a (0.927)  t-value (-2.21)b (0.16) (6.39)a (0.914) 
           
CLE -5674 -5430 25575 0.894  PIT -17072 4323 31520 0.861 
t-value (-0.51) (-0.48) (4.59)a (0.904)  t-value (-1.92)c (0.65) (8.40)a (0.874) 
           
DET -3000 29924 34157 0.887  SFG -36766 -16714 48973 0.921 
t-value (-0.33) (3.12)a (9.12)a (0.898)  t-value (-1.52) (-0.97) (5.16)a (0.934) 
           
HOU -60458 -22605 28296 0.757  STL -8596 -3688 22413 0.964 
t-value (-2.14)b (-0.97) (2.10)b (0.788)  t-value (-0.99) (-0.61) (5.44)a (0.967) 
           
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 







TABLE 5.20: MLB Franchise Economic Implications of Game Uncertainty 
 
 BOS CIN DET 
    
2009 TAPG 37,811 21,579 31,693 
    
2009 GU 0.094 0.472 0.094 
    
GU Coef. Est.a -2,959* -3,465* 5,386* 
Elasticity 0.007 0.043 0.013 
    
ΔGUb 0.115 0.143 0.115 
Inc. Factor 122.92% 30.30% 122.92% 
    
ΔTAPG -325.3d -281.1 506.4 
% ΔTAPG -0.86% -1.30% 1.60% 
    
Rev. Per Attendc $81.61 $36.19 $51.26 
    
Δ Game Rev. -$26,550 -$10,174 $25,959 
    
a. Coefficient taken from Model 1 and follow the approach of Lee and Fort (2008, pp. 291). 
b. All measure changes imply an improvement in balance. 
c. Revenue per attendee data come from Team Marketing Report Fan Cost Index (2009). 
d. Bold Italic font indicates disagreement with Rottenberg’s Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis. 










TABLE 5.21: MLB Franchise Economic Implications of Consecutive Season Uncertainty 
 
 BOS HOU 
   
2009 TAPG 37,811 31,124 
   
2009 CSU 0.703 0.449 
   
CSU Coef. Est.a -1,949* 5,403* 
Elasticity 0.036 0.078 
   
ΔCSUb -0.201 -0.215 
Inc. Factor 28.59% 47.88% 
   
ΔTAPG 389.2 -1,162.4 
% ΔTAPG 1.03% -3.73% 
   
Rev. Per Attendc $81.61 $52.48 
   
Δ Game Rev. $31,762 -$61,003 
   
a. Coefficient taken from Model 1 and follow the approach of Lee and Fort (2008, pp. 291). 
b. All measure changes imply an improvement in balance. 
c. Revenue per attendee data come from Team Marketing Report Fan Cost Index (2009). 
d. Bold Italic font indicates disagreement with Rottenberg’s Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis. 












TABLE 5.22: MLB Franchise Economic Implications of Playoff Uncertainty 
 
 CHC CIN LAD PHI 
     
2009 TAPG 39,610 21,579 46,440 44,453 
     
2009 PU 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
     
PU Coef. Est.a -30,218* -19,632* -71,902* -36,253* 
Elasticity 0.026 0.017 0.051 0.032 
     
ΔPUb -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
Inc. Factor 18.79% 18.79% 18.79% 18.79% 
     
ΔTAPG 193.5 68.9 445.0 267.3 
% ΔTAPG 0.49% 0.32% 0.96% 0.60% 
     
Rev. Per Attendc $76.25 $36.19 $55.41 $54.98 
     
Δ Game Rev. $14,755 $2,495 $24,657 $14,695 
     
a. Coefficient taken from Model 1 and follow the approach of Lee and Fort (2008, pp. 291). 
b. All measure changes imply an improvement in balance. 
c. Revenue per attendee data come from Team Marketing Report Fan Cost Index (2009). 




























































































National Basketball Association Franchises 
 
6.1 Justification 
 As with Major League Baseball, understanding the intricacies of the effects of 
uncertainty on franchise level attendance can help to inform those results at the league 
level for the NBA.  In addition, research regarding franchise-level estimation of 
attendance in the NBA has been relatively sparse, especially compared to its baseball 
counterpart.  Finally, a full estimation of all possible teams in all four major leagues can 
add to our understanding of fan substitution between sports, specifically using diverging 
attendance shifts for same-market teams in different leagues.  Analysis of NFL and NHL 
will follow in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, respectively.  Whether or not same market teams 
in different sports are competitors with one another is surely an important issue with 
respect to not only demand at the league and team level, but may have implications for 
competition and antitrust research in sport (Winfree, 2009a, 2009b).  Therefore, this 
section evaluates structural change and the importance of uncertainty of outcome 
variables on team-level data in the NBA.  Data for analysis of teams in the NBA were 
used for the aggregate league-level investigation, and therefore come from the same 




general description of this data.  For the NBA franchise-level analysis here, I again use 
TAPG as defined in the analysis of MLB franchises (Chapter 5). 
 
6.2 Data and Methods 
 For the team-level analysis, the BP model is defined exactly as in the 
Model 1 MLB franchise attendance analysis: 
 
zt = {1, t}, xt = {TL, WinDiff, Corr, W%}, and (q=2; p=4) 
 
for each team in each league.  Again, I estimate an ancillary model as above with an 
additional lagged win percent variable (NBA Model B).  Given the lack of coherent 
application of CBR in the regression models, I neglect to include this measure for the 
NBA (and subsequent leagues at the franchise level).  Models with both heterogeneous 
and homogeneous variance are estimated; however, I continue with a full discussion of 
only the heterogeneous error variance models.  The latter are provided in Appendix B. 
The requirement of lags of particular length again comes into play, leaving only 
some teams subject to the analysis performed here.  For example, this consideration 
excludes the Baltimore Bullets/Wizards from analysis, despite the relatively short 
relocation distance.  However, one NBA team that moved within the last 5 years with a 
length meeting the requirements for the breakpoint methodology preceding the move is 
included in the initial unit root analysis (Seattle Supersonics).  With this single exception, 
for those franchises that have relocated I begin the attendance series in the first year of 




analysis.  I will continue with modeling only current franchises found to be stationary in 
the preliminary analysis of unit-roots and unit-roots with breakpoints. 
 There are a few additional considerations for the franchise-level data in the NBA.  
For the adjusted series, the individual franchises are imputed just as the league-level 
NBA attendance in Chapter 4.  To reiterate, I take a weighted average of the years just 
before and just following years in which a labor dispute takes place (for the NBA, 1998-
99).  Only National Basketball Association attendance (rather than ABA attendance) is 
included in the regression estimations.  This consideration ultimately excludes the 
Indiana Pacers and San Antonio Spurs (Dallas Chaparrals) from the analysis despite the 
fact that these franchises opened for business in 1967.  As with MLB franchises in the 
previous chapter, teams that move from one location to another are considered a new 
franchise at the new location. 
 The NBA contains twelve (12) individual franchises with attendance series of 
sufficient length (40 years) for the breakpoint analysis.  Descriptive statistics regarding 
TAPG and win percent for each of the franchises can be found in Table 6.1. 
 
6.3 Unit Root Results 
 Turning to the unit root results, nine of twelve unadjusted attendance series were 
found to be stationary or stationary with breakpoints.  Tables 6.2 through 6.7 present the 
unit root results for the unadjusted and adjusted data.  Stationary series include the 
Atlanta Hawks, Boston Celtics, Cleveland Cavaliers, Detroit Pistons, New York Knicks, 
Philadelphia 76ers, Phoenix Suns, Portland Trailblazers, and Seattle Supersonics (pre-




ADF and PP tests indicate some evidence of the Los Angeles Lakers attendance series 
being stationary without breaks; however, the DFGLS test did not indicate evidence for 
rejection of a unit root for this series (available upon further request).  Therefore, I 
proceed with treating only those found to be stationary with breaks above as stationary 
data for the BP Method, the results of which are presented in the following sections.  
Given the similarity between the adjusted and unadjusted results, I limit discussion and 
regression estimation with only the adjusted data from this point forward. 
 
6.4 Uncertainty of Outcome Results 
 Results of influence of uncertainty of outcome were mixed across franchises 
analyzed in this chapter.  This is the case both for the direction and size of the effect, and 
there is again little evidence for comprehensive confirmation of Rottenberg’s UOH.  This 
section discusses those franchises with statistically significant coefficients (Table 6.11) 
estimated for the uncertainty measures as well as the economic significance of these 
estimated effects (Table 6.12).  To summarize, none of the estimated coefficients for the 
realizations of outcome uncertainty included in these models were universally in favor of 
Rottenberg’s UOH.  While Atlanta and Philadelphia both had statistically significant 
coefficients for GU, Atlanta’s fans tend to prefer less balance (Table 6.11).  In both 
instances, the manipulation in Tail Likelihood described in Chapter 4 did not change team 
revenues by more than 2.35% for either team (Table 6.12). 
For PU, both Cleveland and New York were found to have significant effects of 
the WinDiff measure.  However, the direction of the effect again differs across the two 




races, Knicks fans have tended to enjoy larger gaps between playoff and non-playoff 
teams.  This could indicate a propensity for New York fans to attend in years where they 
have been a sure playoff contender.  For the case of PU, the one game change in the 
playoff race did not affect either team’s revenues by more than 1.2% per game. 
Lastly, three teams were found to have significant effects of CSU: Cleveland, 
Philadelphia and Seattle.  Fans of the former Seattle Supersonics tended to avoid 
attending games when balance was better.  On the other hand, Cleveland fans tend to be 
most sensitive to overall balance changes in the league, preferring more Playoff 
Uncertainty and Consecutive Season Uncertainty.  As you can see in Table 6.12, the 
change in CSU applied here had a much larger influence on revenues than the change in 
the other two measures, increasing revenues for teams by as much as 4.45%.  All in all, 
evidence for the UOH is again mixed for franchises in the NBA. 
 
6.5 Breakpoint Regression Results 
 The following subsections of this chapter individually discuss the breakpoints 
estimated in each of the franchises considered in the NBA.  Common breaks include 
those following stadium and arena moves.  Championships have tended to have larger 
effects than attributed to just regular season success, resulting in further sustained upward 
shifts in attendance for many teams.  Not surprisingly, a number of NBA teams saw 
attendance shifts in the 1980s, which was found in the aggregate analysis as well.  
Further details of franchise breaks follow, and a time plot of each team can be found in 





6.5.1 Atlanta Hawks 
 Both of the estimated breaks—upward shifts—for the Atlanta Hawks coincide 
with the start of exciting and relatively successful teams.  In 1985, a young team starring 
Spud Webb and Dominique Wilkins won 50 or more games in four consecutive seasons, 
while in 1995 there was another run of 50-plus win seasons.  However, there may be 
more to the shift in 1985, as Ted Turner had the team play a number of games in New 
Orleans in the 1984-85 season.  Similar to the Atlanta Braves, the Hawks’ market 
encompassed much of the South.  Turner’s attempt at reaching westward seems to have 
been relatively successful given the increase in attendance during this time. 
 
6.5.2 Boston Celtics 
 The 1960-61 season began a steeper upward trend for the Celtics, which also 
marked the beginning of coach Red Auerbach and star Bill Russell’s run of 
Championships.  In addition, the Celtic fielded the first all-black starting lineup during 
this time, perhaps capturing a minority demographic in the Boston market.  The second 
break occurred in 1973 and coincides with and upward shift in attendance following a 
year in which Boston won 68 games, followed by an NBA Championship the following 
season. Lastly, the Celtics experienced another upward shift in the 1994-95 season, 
followed by a slight downward trend.  This likely has to do with moving out of the 





6.5.3 Cleveland Cavaliers 
Only a single break was found for the Cavaliers, realized as a very large upward 
shift after the 1984-85 season.  The team returned to the playoffs in 1985 after a 
somewhat dismal run of seasons, and continued its success through the early 1990s as 
well.  As can be seen in Figure 6.1, the team saw a downward trend following this 
success up until they drafted LeBron James.  However, it seems that the changes in 
attendance during this time can be chalked up to simple win percent and/or balance 
measures rather than any exogenous break in attendance trends. 
 
6.5.4 Detroit Pistons 
 Not surprisingly, the Detroit Pistons also experience a large upward shift during a 
time of high attendance and the opening of a new arena (The Palace of Auburn Hills).  
Attendance nearly tripled from this large shift.  As any astute NBA fan would note, Isiah 
Thomas was drafted in 1981 and was the spark of a run of very successful Pistons teams 
in the 1980s, culminating with back-to-back NBA Championships in 1989 and 1990.  
The combination of these two factors seemed to have vaulted the success of Detroit to a 
new level. 
 
6.5.5 New York Knicks 
 The 1968-69 season was the first time the Knicks had seen the playoffs since 
1953.  They followed this up with an NBA Championship in 1969, which coincides with 




downward after this peak, it again shifted up once the team won a division title in 1988, 
the first for the franchise in 18 years. 
 
6.5.6 Philadelphia 76ers 
The 76ers experienced an upward shift in attendance after drafting superstar Allen 
Iverson, with some ensuing success.  While the team never won a title, Iverson was 
arguably one of the most exciting players in the game at the time.  This seems to be the 
best explanation for the upward shift after the 1998-99 season for the Sixers. 
 
6.5.7 Phoenix Suns 
 The Phoenix Suns are another team that experienced a shift in attendance 
concurrent with both a move to a new arena (America West Arena, now US Airways 
Center) as well as the arrival of a team superstar.  Charles Barkley arrived in Phoenix in 
1993 and immediately won the league Most Valuable Player Award.  Consistent with 
past research on arena honeymoon effects, attendance has trended downward since the 
opening of the new arena that season. 
 
6.5.8 Portland Trailblazers 
After a steep upward trend in attendance for the Portland Trailblazers, things 
leveled off following the 1979-80 season.  The Blazers may be a team particularly 
affected by the censoring issue mentioned earlier, as their 1977 NBA Championship 




to a new, higher capacity facility.  As would be expected, the team experienced a large 
upward shift after the 1994-95 season when they moved to the 20,000 seat Rose Garden. 
 
6.5.9 Seattle Supersonics 
 Finally, the Seattle Supersonics seemed to have some devastating effects of a 
terrible 1980-81 as their start player, Gus Williams, sat out the season because of a 
contract dispute.  The team experienced a massive downward shift in attendance during 
this time—cutting attendance to nearly a third of its previous levels.  While the team saw 
an upward trend afterward, until the years just before a move to Oklahoma City, 
attendance levels never recovered to those before the 1981-82 season. 
 
6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 All in all—as with the previous two chapters—the evidence for fan interest in 
uncertainty of outcome continues to be mixed at best.  While the economic influence of 
balance measures seems to be larger on average in the NBA—namely for CSU—the 
direction of the effect varies across teams and the type of uncertainty evaluated.  This 
leaves us with an interesting picture of sports leagues and calls for further evaluation.  
While some franchises seem to have incentives to encourage balance, others have 
experienced positive attendance changes in years when balance is lower.  Cleveland and 
Philadelphia stand out as teams with fans that prefer more balance across the different 
measures of uncertainty, while Atlanta, New York and Seattle tend to have fans 
interested in less balance depending on the measure considered.  This echoes the league 




depending on the type of uncertainty realization considered.  While fans tend to like close 
game play (TL) and turnover from year to year (CSU), there seems to be some preference 
for having an overly dominant team in each season (PU).  While this of course has 
important implications for marketing to fans, it again alludes to the importance of 
understanding how decisions come about as a league.  Unlike MLB, teams in the NBA 
tend to experience shifts more related to championship wins than historical events.  
Nearly all of the upward breaks found in the franchise level data in the NBA can be 
reasonably explained by league championships or the building of new stadiums.  As 
would be expected from the league-level analysis, the 1980’s were a particularly 




TABLE 6.1: NBA Franchise TAPG and W% by Decade 
 
Team 1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's Overall 
ATL TAPG  4,597 6,889 10,450 13,481 14,740 11,066 
ATL W% 
 
0.585 0.465 0.537 0.553 0.399 0.493 
BOS TAPG 5,665 6,479 10,888 14,911 16,071 16,969 11,690 
BOS W% 0.623 0.679 0.615 0.711 0.454 0.542 0.599 
CHI TAPG 
 
4,807 9,914 12,587 21,268 20,742 15,099 
CHI W% 
 
0.410 0.523 0.479 0.644 0.416 0.506 
CLE TAPG 
  
7,895 9,568 16,928 18,063 13,113 
CLE W% 
  
0.416 0.404 0.534 0.518 0.468 
DET TAPG 3,392 3,913 6,815 16,903 19,260 20,352 12,910 
DET W% 0.416 0.390 0.448 0.568 0.503 0.588 0.495 
LAL TAPG 
 
9,014 13,665 15,962 16,299 18,953 14,778 
LAL W% 0.580 0.609 0.724 0.620 0.634 0.634 
MIL TAPG  6,988 9,930 11,856 15,743 16,155 13,115 
MIL W% 
 
0.506 0.592 0.631 0.418 0.463 0.525 
NYK TAPG 6,520 10,275 16,787 13,603 19,178 19,182 14,114 
NYK W% 0.530 0.429 0.533 0.463 0.613 0.399 0.496 
PHI TAPG 
 
5,570 9,969 13,490 14,597 17,342 12,616 
PHI W% 
 
0.627 0.490 0.645 0.390 0.493 0.523 
PHO TAPG 
 
5,395 8,970 11,836 18,076 17,535 13,690 
PHO W% 
 
0.336 0.520 0.534 0.633 0.600 0.561 
POR TAPG 
  
9,997 12,707 16,642 18,392 14,434 
POR W% 
  
0.439 0.565 0.631 0.506 0.535 
SEA TAPG 
 
5,617 13,300 12,098 15,556 15,483 13,421 
SEA W% 
 














TABLE 6.2: NBA Franchise ADF and PP Tests (Unadjusted) 
 
Team   ATL BOS CHI CLE DET LAL 
T (seasons)   42 61 44 40 53 50 
ADF (p) Constant -1.442 (1) -0.744 (1) -1.763 (1) -1.513 (1) -1.234 (1) -2.967 (1)** 
ADF (p) Trend -3.136 (1) -2.602 (1) -2.107 (1) -2.639 (1) -1.834 (1) -3.737 (1)** 
P-P (l) Constant -1.471 (3) -1.189 (3) -1.567 (3) -1.566 (3) -1.147 (3) -3.018 (3)** 
P-P (l) Trend -3.190 (3) -3.277 (3)* -2.357 (3) -2.511 (3) -1.896 (3) -3.392 (3)* 
        
Team   MIL NYK PHI PHO POR SEA 
T (seasons)   42 61 47 42 40 41 
ADF (p) Constant -1.604 (1) -1.686 (1) -2.628 (1)* -1.395 (1) -1.634 (1) -2.982 (1)** 
ADF (p) Trend -1.877 (1) -3.105 (3) -3.268 (1)* -2.035 (1) -2.635 (1) -2.753 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -2.558 (3) -1.482 (3) -2.255 (3) -2.095 (3) -1.699 (3) -2.701 (3)* 
P-P (l) Trend -3.083 (3) -2.058 (3) -2.404 (3) -2.334 (3) -2.739 (3) -2.486 (3) 















TABLE 6.3: NBA Franchise Two-Break LM Test (Unadjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
ATL 3 1984/85, 2001/02 3.815***, -3.621*** -5.940** λ = (0.40, 0.81) 
BOS 0 1959/60, 1980/81 -2.934***, -0.645 -5.941** λ = (0.18, 0.52) 
CHI 3 1978/79, 1994/95 3.055***, -1.560 -5.042 λ = (0.30, 0.66) 
CLE 6 1990/91, 1996/97 2.288**, -2.427** -5.608* λ = (0.53, 0.68) 
DET 6 1979/80, 1996/97 5.585***, -5.281*** -6.307** λ = (0.43, 0.75) 
LAL 7 1972/73, 1983/84 -5.666***, 4.761*** -5.534* λ = (0.26, 0.48) 
MIL 0 1983/84, 1990/91 -1.868*, -0.823 -4.759 λ = (0.38, 0.55) 
NYK 5 1962/63, 1979/80 4.044***, -3.653*** -5.750** λ = (0.23, 0.51) 
PHI 2 1981/82, 1998/99 -5.274***, 3.546*** -6.006** λ = (0.40, 0.77) 
PHO 8 1981/82, 1990/91 -4.804***, 5.926*** -7.419*** λ = (0.33, 0.55) 
POR 8 1987/88, 1993/94 -3.769***, 4.578*** -5.824** λ = (0.45, 0.60) 
SEA 8 1980/81, 1991/92 -7.290***, 6.968*** -7.379*** λ = (0.34, 0.61) 
Data adjusted for strikes.   𝑘� is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏 
denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.  See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  ***, **, * = 












TABLE 6.4: NBA Franchise One-Break LM Test (Unadjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
ATL 3 1993/94 -0.500 -4.9849** λ = 0.62 
BOS 0 1973/74 -0.377 -5.002** λ = 0.41 
CHI 8 1992/93 2.624*** -4.163 λ = 0.61 
CLE 7 1989/90 2.845*** -6.374*** λ = 0.50 
DET 6 1982/83 3.892*** -5.162*** λ = 0.49 
LAL 7 1982/83 -3.692*** -4.028 λ = 0.46 
MIL 0 1998/99 -1.945* -3.602 λ = 0.74 
NYK 5 1989/90 0.232 -4.941** λ = 0.67 
PHI 7 1973/74 3.209*** -4.380* λ = 0.23 
POR 7 1987/88 -2.566** -4.725** λ = 0.45 
NOTE: 𝑘�  is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct  
for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏  denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.   
See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  Data adjusted for strikes.   


















TABLE 6.5: NBA Franchise ADF and PP Tests (Adjusted) 
 
Team   ATL BOS CHI CLE DET LAL 
T (seasons)   42 61 44 40 53 50 
ADF (p) Constant -1.605 (1) -0.739 (1) -1.762 (1) -1.505 (1) -1.235 (1) -2.965 (1)** 
ADF (p) Trend -3.536 (1)* -2.579 (1) -2.090 (1) -2.633 (1) -1.837 (1) -3.727 (1)** 
P-P (l) Constant -1.466 (3) -1.188 (3) -1.566 (3) -1.562 (3) -1.147 (3) -3.012 (3)** 
P-P (l) Trend -2.945 (3) -3.281 (3)* -2.337 (3) -2.501 (3) -1.895 (3) -3.384 (3)* 
        
Team   MIL NYK PHI PHO POR SEA 
T (seasons)   42 61 47 42 40 41 
ADF (p) Constant -1.604 (1) -1.686 (1) -2.632 (1)* -1.395 (1) -1.624 (1) -3.008 (1)** 
ADF (p) Trend -1.862 (1) -3.105 (3) -3.281 (1)* -2.035 (1) -2.563 (1) -2.785 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -2.558 (3) -1.482 (3) -2.256 (3) -2.095 (3) -1.702 (3) -2.707 (3)* 
P-P (l) Trend -3.078 (3) -2.058 (3) -2.406 (3) -2.332 (3) -2.695 (3) -2.491 (3) 















TABLE 6.6: NBA Franchise Two-Break LM Test (Adjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
ATL 7 1980/81, 1986/87 3.266***, -5.317*** -6.331*** λ = (0.31, 0.45) 
BOS 0 1959/60, 1980/81 -2.969***, -0.664 -5.983** λ = (0.18, 0.52) 
CHI 8 1982/83, 1999/00 3.519***, -5.465*** -5.049 λ = (0.39, 0.77) 
CLE 6 1989/90, 2003/04 2.266**, -1.132 -5.659* λ = (0.50, 0.85) 
DET 6 1979/80, 1996/97 5.554***, -5.245*** -6.270** λ = (0.43, 0.75) 
LAL 7 1972/73, 1983/84 -5.717***, 4.846*** -5.578* λ = (0.26, 0.48) 
MIL 0 1983/84, 1990/91 -1.884*, -0.803 -4.778 λ = (0.38, 0.55) 
NYK 5 1962/63, 1979/80 4.044***, -3.653*** -5.750** λ = (0.23, 0.51) 
PHI 2 1981/82, 1998/99 -5.319***, 3.572*** -6.043** λ = (0.40, 0.77) 
PHO 8 1981/82, 1990/91 -4.783***, 5.897*** -7.382*** λ = (0.33, 0.55) 
POR 7 1985/86, 1993/94 -2.970***, 4.493*** -5.888** λ = (0.40, 0.60) 
SEA 8 1980/81, 1991/92 -7.883***, 7.551*** -7.978*** λ = (0.34, 0.61) 
Data adjusted for strikes.   𝑘� is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏 
denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.  See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  ***, **, * = 




TABLE 6.7: NBA Franchise One-Break LM Test (Adjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
BOS 0 1973/74 -0.393 -5.021** λ = 0.41 
CHI 8 1992/93 2.633** -4.176 λ = 0.61 
CLE 7 1989/90 2.908*** -6.269*** λ = 0.50 
DET 6 1982/83 3.892*** -5.155*** λ = 0.49 
LAL 7 1982/83 -3.900*** -4.247* λ = 0.49 
MIL 0 1998/99 -1.866* -3.573 λ = 0.74 
NYK 5 1989/90 0.232 -4.941** λ = 0.67 
PHI 7 1973/74 3.210*** -4.395* λ = 0.23 
POR 7 1987/88 -2.498** -4.713** λ = 0.45 
NOTE: 𝑘�  is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct  
for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏  denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.   
See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  Data adjusted for strikes.   








TABLE 6.8: NBA Franchise Model Break Point Sequential Test Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) Breaks 
         
ATL 15.02*** 20.72***  20.72*** 28.85*** 17.13***  2 
         
BOS 58.65*** 42.82*** 42.05*** 58.65*** 86.77*** 14.56** 13.26** 3 
         
CLE 32.57*** 26.36*** 32.57*** 36.70*** 10.73**   1 
         
DET 49.87*** 36.61***  49.87*** 50.97*** 7.68  1 
         
NYK 100.08*** 100.78*** 76.56*** 100.78*** 133.06*** 19.54*** 5.01 2 
         
PHI 37.19*** 23.29***  37.19*** 37.19*** 6.53  1 
         
PHO 124.07*** 74.07***  124.07*** 124.07*** 2.88  1 
         
POR 84.54*** 75.29***  84.54*** 104.82*** 144.85***  2 
         
SEA 89.50*** 46.44***  89.50*** 89.50*** 2.43  1 
“***” Significant at the 99% critical level 
“**” Significant at the 95% critical level 





TABLE 6.9: NBA Franchise Model Break Dates (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 T3 
    
ATL 1985-86 1995-96  
 [84-85, 86-87] [94-95, 98-99]  
    
BOS 1960-61 1973-74 1994-95 
 [59-60, 61-62] [70-71, 74-75] [89-90, 95-96] 
    
CLE 1984-85   
 [83-84, 85-86]   
    
DET 1982-83   
 [80-81, 83-84]   
    
NYK 1968-69 1987-88  
 [66-67, 69-70] [86-87, 90-91]  
    
PHI 1998-99   
 [97-98, 99-00]   
    
PHO 1991-92   
 [90-91, 92-93]   
    
POR 1979-80 1994-95  
 [78-79, 80-81] [93-94, 95-96]  
    
SEA 1981-82   
 [80-81, 82-83]   
    







TABLE 6.10: NBA Franchise Model Breakpoint Regression Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 
ATL 253.59 2797.64 -140.97 14249.91 14.23 13213.29   
t-value (4.10)*** (2.33)** (-1.29) (4.75)*** (0.15) (3.45)***   
BOS 27.21 1503.04 365.84 -3531.57 208.41 2998.18 -68.86 17961.97 
t-value (0.36) (2.07)** (6.14)*** (-2.49)** (6.04)*** (1.89)* (-1.28) (6.33)*** 
CLE 87.93 4492.79 152.00 9125.38     
t-value (0.88) (2.72)*** (3.50)*** (4.04)***     
DET 294.56 -1703.76 55.29 12808.46     
t-value (5.00)*** (-0.89) (1.15) (4.49)***     
NYK 436.48 -2268.58 -329.75 19554.25 139.22 6860.07   
t-value (8.07)*** (-1.35) (-5.12)*** (7.02)*** (2.79)*** (2.12)**   
PHI 395.76 157.85 -432.78 32042.24     
t-value (15.92)*** (0.11) (-3.07)*** (5.22)***     
PHO 324.41 3032.93 -113.51 18344.77     
t-value (9.75)*** (3.10)*** (-2.68)** (9.44)***     
POR 625.30 2524.33 -30.00 7716.57 -116.66 17878.52   
t-value (5.34)*** (2.26)** (-0.54) (4.85)*** (-2.01)** (7.16)***   
SEA 790.74 -364.77 296.49 -2071.08     
t-value (9.62)*** (-0.26) (8.56)*** (-0.99)     
*** Significant at the 99% critical level 
** Significant at the 95% critical level 
* Significant at the 90% critical level 




TABLE 6.11: NBA Franchise Model Balance and W% Coefficients (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team TL PU CSU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
      
ATL -4561.71 2662.63 -1964.98 6181.94 0.919 
t-value (-2.11)** (0.37) (-1.47) (3.54)*** (0.937) 
      
BOS 1385.24 3416.26 -310.26 5434.97 0.972 
t-value (1.38) (0.79) (-0.62) (5.37)*** (0.977) 
      
CLE -766.02 -20683.06 -5123.60 14837.77 0.933 
t-value (-0.28) (-2.22)** (-2.85)*** (7.31)*** (0.945) 
      
DET -5071.77 2021.47 -483.54 9426.68 0.940 
t-value (-1.61) (0.21) (-0.30) (4.02)*** (0.948) 
      
NYK 2530.10 15057.65 635.27 7278.62 0.945 
t-value (1.75)* (2.32)** (0.83) (3.92)*** (0.953) 
      
PHI 5392.75 4301.21 -3694.38 9095.13 0.919 
t-value (2.42)** (0.51) (-3.02)*** (6.73)*** (0.932) 
      
PHO -155.63 7636.85 -939.51 6010.38 0.964 
t-value (-0.10) (1.47) (-0.96) (4.91)*** (0.970) 
      
POR -2121.08 9198.59 96.64 8499.86 0.958 
t-value (-1.24) (1.63) (0.09) (6.07)*** (0.968) 
      
SEA 571.04 -10282.88 2564.20 12442.80 0.893 
t-value (0.27) (-1.35) (1.99)** (7.00)*** (0.911) 
      
*** Significant at the 99% critical level 
** Significant at the 95% critical level 







TABLE 6.12: NBA Franchise Level Economic Implications 
 
 Game Uncertainty Playoff Uncertainty Consecutive Season Uncertainty 
Team ATL PHI CLE NYK CLE PHI SEA 
2009 TAPG 16,546 14,225 20,562 19,501 20,562 14,225 13,355 (2007) 
2009 Variable 0.030 0.030 0.073 0.073 0.550 0.550 0.285 (2007) 
Coef. Est.a -4,562 5,393 -20,683 15,058 -5,124 -3,694 2,564 
Elasticity 0.008 0.011 0.073 0.056 0.137 0.143 0.055 
ΔVariableb 0.064 0.064 0.012 0.012 0.171 0.171 0.171 
Inc. Factor 213.3% 213.3% 16.4% 16.4% 31.1% 31.1% 60.0% 
ΔTAPG -2823d 334 246 -179 876 633 -441 
% ΔTAPG -1.71% 2.35% 1.20% -0.92% 4.26% 4.45% -3.30% 
Rev. Per Attendc $73.78 $67.47 $72.47 $102.79 $72.47 $67.47 $57.46 (2007$) 
Δ Game Rev. -$20,828 $22,521 $17,842 -$18,410 $63,491 $42,682 -$25,323 (2007$) 
a. Coefficient taken from model with heterogeneous errors across regimes and follow the approach of Lee and Fort (2008, pp. 291). 
b. All measure changes imply an improvement in balance. 
c. Revenue per attendee data come from Team Marketing Report Fan Cost Index (2009). 





























National Football League Franchises 
 
7.1 Introduction/Justification 
 As with the NBA, understanding the behavior of individual franchise attendance 
in the National Football League can help to understand the break locations and fan 
behaviors at the league level.  Given the lack of significant effects of competitive balance 
on attendance levels found throughout the history of the NFL, we must further evaluate 
whether this is an aggregate effect (increases for some teams, and decreases for others) or 
a result due to actual lack of interest in uncertainty as a whole.  As a preview, individual 
those franchises with statistically significant balance effects have fans with preferences 
almost exclusively for uncertainty of outcome.  Additionally, teams experienced similar 
large increases in attendance that seem to be related to structural changes in the way the 
game was played (for example, increases in use of the forward pass and offense).  These 
and other linkages will be discussed in Section 7.5 in more detail. 
 
7.2 Data and Methods 
The methods used here are identical to those used in Chapters 5 and 6 (NFL 




predictor).  Results from additional models (error variance considerations) are exhibited 
in Appendix C.  In addition to the league-level NFL data treatment in Chapter 4, there are 
various unique data considerations for a number of franchises.  First, the number of home 
games in each season changes for teams early on in league history (as in the NBA).  
Therefore, the number of home games for each team was collected individually from Pro-
Football Reference (2010) to ensure accurate calculation of TAPG.  Data for the 1992 
and 1998 seasons at the team level are imputed due to unavailability, while only 15 
games were played in 1987 and only 9 in 1982 due to labor issues.  The adjusted data 
impute the years containing work stoppages as with the league-level data; however, 
imputations for the 1992 and 1998 seasons are included in both the adjusted and 
unadjusted franchise attendance series.   
As with the NBA, rival American Football League (AFL) and All-American 
Football Conference (AAFC) team attendance numbers are excluded from this analysis.  
Those teams which merged with the NFL from the AFL or AAFC are only used for years 
in which they participated in the NFL.  For example, the Miami Dolphins’ attendance 
series spans from 1970 through 2009, despite their 10-year tenure in the 1960’s with the 
AFL.  However, in the lagged win percent models—presented in Appendix C—each of 
these teams has their previous year’s AFL or AAFC win percent as the t-1 win percent in 
the model for the first time point in the NFL series.  Similarly, for those teams whom 
played the previous season in a different location, the win percent for the team in that 
location is used as the t-1 win percent for the first year in their respective new home.  The 
first year of existence of each team is not used in the lagged win percent models, and the 




from the inaugural season as a covariate).  Finally, teams in the NFL with a history of 
temporarily leveraging the Los Angeles market are also excluded (i.e. Rams and 
Raiders).   
 Some years for specific teams are missing reported attendance numbers at each of 
the sources listed here: the Chicago Bears (1961 and 1962), Green Bay Packers (1952), 
New York Giants (1953 and 1958), Philadelphia Eagles (1938), Pittsburgh Steelers 
(1938, 1944, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1957 and 1965) and Washington Redskins (1938, 1939, 
1951, 1957, 1960, 1962 and 1965).  For those missing seasons which have a preceding 
and following year attendance number reported, a similar weighted average approach is 
taken as with the 1992 and 1998 seasons.  However, for those teams with multiple 
consecutive missing data (Bears 1961-62, Steelers 1951-53 and Redskins 1938-39), an 
alternative approach is taken in which a simple linear trend is calculated through those 
seasons. 
 The Pittsburg Steelers require additional consideration for their early years.  
Along with significant missing early attendance data, the Steelers spent two separate 
seasons merged with the Philadelphia Eagles (1943, nicknamed the “Steagles”) and the 
Chicago Cardinals (1944, nicknamed “Card-Pitt” or “Carpets”).  In these seasons—while 
the Steelers’ played home games at Forbes Field in Pittsburgh—the teams played some 
home games at Shibe Park in Philadelphia (4 games) and Wrigley Field and Comiskey 
Park in Chicago (1 and 2 home games, respectively). In 1943, only two home games were 
played at Forbes Field, while three were played there in 1944.  For the 1943 season, 
TAPG for the Steelers is calculated using only those games played at Forbes Field (and 




unavailable; therefore, the 1944 TAPG reported is the average attendance for the three 
games played in Chicago in the unadjusted data.  For the adjusted data, a weighted 
average of the years before and after the season—as well as the Chicago-based 
attendance numbers—are included for 1944. 
The NFL contains twenty (20) individual franchises with attendance series of 
sufficient length (40 years) for the breakpoint analysis.  Descriptive statistics regarding 
TAPG and win percent for each of the franchises in each league can be found in Table 
7.1. 
 
7.3 Unit Root Results 
Of the twenty NFL teams considered, fifteen were found to be stationary or 
stationary with breakpoints (Tables 7.2 through 7.7), including the Atlanta Falcons, 
Buffalo Bills, Chicago Bears, Cincinnati Bengals, Denver Broncos, Detroit Lions, Kansas 
City Chiefs, Miami Dolphins, Minnesota Vikings, New York Giants, Philadelphia 
Eagles, Pittsburg Steelers, San Diego Chargers, San Francisco 49ers, and Washington 
Redskins.  There was some discrepancy for the unit root analyses on the adjusted and 
unadjusted data, with the LM-1 unit root test indicating rejection of a unit root with a 
single break for the New York Jets.  However, given that no other test rejected the 
presence of a unit root for the Jets series (adjusted or unadjusted) I proceed as treating the 
franchise attendance series as non-stationary, and do not apply the BP procedure here. 
Finally, the BP procedure ultimately estimates no breaks in the Buffalo Bills and 
San Diego Chargers attendance series.  Therefore, no subsequent breakpoint regressions 




stationarity without breaks.  Most likely, the breaks indicated from the LM tests were too 
small in size for the BP Procedure to estimate them as significant structural changes (as 
with San Diego Padres series in Chapter 5).  Further investigation into these attendance 
series is recommended for future work in addition to those franchises for which a unit 
root is not rejected with or without breaks. 
 
7.4 Uncertainty of Outcome Results 
 Results of the influence of uncertainty of outcome were again mixed across 
franchises analyzed in the NFL as with the previously discussed leagues.  Interestingly, a 
number of teams in the NFL were found to have significant effects of outcome 
uncertainty, despite the null finding at the league level (Table 7.11).  This exhibits the 
importance of understanding the variation in fan preferences across markets in individual 
leagues in order to shed light on collective decision-making by team owners, rather than 
the net effect across teams as a whole.  While the net effects of UOH tend to be 
insignificant for the league, owners in different markets will have different incentives for 
balance based on the results of the models presented here.  For example, fans of Atlanta, 
Denver, Miami and Minnesota tend to prefer closer distributions of win percent in the 
league as implied by the franchise-level regression models.  However, the owner of the 
Washington Redskins seems to have some small incentive to avoid creating a balanced 
league in some respects (Table 7.12). 
 For PU, however, only three teams were found to have significant effects of 
Windiff: Denver, Miami and Minnesota.  The direction of the coefficient for Miami and 




indicating disagreement with Rottenberg’s UOH.  Unlike evaluation of most other effects 
of uncertainty of outcome on attendance, revenue changes for Miami do not seem to be 
trivial with a one game improvement in the playoff race, resulting in nearly a 7.5% 
decrease in revenues per game.  For Denver and Minnesota, the magnitude of the effect is 
much smaller (both below 3% of revenues in either direction). 
 Finally, CSU has statistically significant attendance effects for Kansas City, 
Philadelphia and Washington, with the coefficient estimate for Kansas City in 
disagreement with Rottenberg’s UOH.  The change in preference for Washington seems 
to indicate that while fans prefer a wider spread of win percent in season, they do enjoy 
significant turnover across seasons.  Again, the economic significance of this variable is 
relatively small for those fans that enjoy turnover; however, the change in Chiefs 
revenues is somewhat non-trivial at 3.52% (or a decrease of about $265,000 per game 
with the marginal improvement in CSU). 
 
7.5 Breakpoint Regression Results 
Similar to the aggregate NFL analysis, individual teams also saw attendance shifts 
during the rise of the quarterback during the 1980s.  Those teams which claimed a star 
quarterback their own—like the Miami Dolphins’ Dan Marino—saw large shifts.  It 
seems that the change of play style was truly exciting for fans as a whole.  Other 
attendance shifts seem to be tied to increases in stadium capacity and sustained team 
success or failure.  The following sections discuss the structural change for each of the 
NFL franchises under analysis here, and the reader is referred to Figures 7.1 through 7.4 





7.5.1 Atlanta Falcons 
Beginning discussion of NFL franchises, the Atlanta Falcons experience a single 
upward shift in 1989 followed by a positive trend, after experiencing a declining trend 
throughout most of the team’s history.  The Falcons acquired Deion Sanders in 1989 and 
moved to the Georgia Dome in 1992.  The exciting—and often mouthy—Sanders and 
new stadium seem to have attracted extra fans to the gate for the team. 
 
7.5.2 Chicago Bears 
As with the Falcons, the historic Chicago Bears franchise has only a single 
estimated attendance break throughout its history, corresponding to a change in the trend 
in 1948.  While the team experience positive trends in attendance throughout its history, 
the trend leveled off a bit after this season. This is likely due to the team’s decline in 
success after a dominating decade in the 1940s. 
 
7.5.3 Cincinnati Bengals 
 After the merger of the AFL and NFL, the Cincinnati Bengals saw a sharp 
decreasing attendance trend until their first breakpoint in 1979.  Following this season 
Bengals attendance changes course, trending upward until the next break in 1991 at 
which point it shifts down and continues its upward path.  The Bengals made two Super 
Bowl appearances in the 1980s, losing to the San Francisco 49ers both times.  However, 




seasons.  Despite this, the team—just as the NFL as a whole—experienced upward 
trending attendance through much of the 1990s and early 21st century. 
 
7.5.4 Denver Broncos 
The 1982 season marked the end of a large upswing in Broncos attendance at 
Mile High Stadium.  After a small downward shift, attendance has slowly increased 
through today for Denver.  The team likely hit a point of near sellouts during this period, 
as John Elway arrived in 1982 to lead successful Broncos teams for nearly two decades. 
 
7.5.5 Detroit Lions 
While it is rather unbelievable in this day and age, the Detroit Lions were a very 
successful team in the 1950s.  After the 1951 season the team experienced a large upward 
attendance shift likely due to back-to-back NFL Championships in 1952 and 1953.  
While Detroit’s attendance has generally trended upward following this large shift, the 
team has experienced significant volatility in gate attendance, as can be seen in Figure 
7.2. 
 
7.5.6 Kansas City Chiefs 
The Kansas City Chiefs generally experienced a negative trend in attendance after 
the AFL-NFL merge, but this seemed to change with the hiring of coach Marty 
Schottenheimer in 1988.  During this time, the team saw a large positive break in 
attendance followed by a string of sustained success on the field and 155 consecutive 




short honeymoon effect when it opened in 1972, though the BP Procedure was unable to 
estimate breakpoints so close to the ends of the attendance series. 
 
7.5.7 Miami Dolphins 
 As mentioned in the aggregate NFL analysis, pass-happy offenses seem to have 
excited fans about football.  The Miami Dolphins, led by Dan Marino beginning in 1983, 
were arguably the most prominent passing team in the NFL during the 1980s and into the 
1990s.  In 1983 the team experienced an upward shift followed by a slight positive trend 
through the next break in 1995, another positive attendance change.  Interestingly, there 
do not seem to be any large effects of the opening of Joe Robbie Stadium in 1987, though 
the team did experience a small spike near this time.  Marino broke multiple career 
passing records in 1995, including total yards, touchdowns and completions.  After the 
1995 season attendance trended downward with a string of mediocre Dolphins teams. 
 
7.5.8 Minnesota Vikings 
 With a move to the Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome in 1981, the Minnesota 
Vikings saw an increase of about 12,000 fans per game.  The Metrodome increased 
stadium capacity compared to the Vikings old home and the team saw a relatively flat 
trend following the shift.  A second shift of about the same size came after the 1996 
season.  This is best explained by a record-breaking 1998 (just outside the estimated 






7.5.9 New York Giants 
 The New York Giants are well known to have played in the “Greatest Game Ever 
Played” in 1958 against the Baltimore Colts.  This game was one of six NFL 
Championship appearances for the team from 1956 through 1963.  The 1956 
Championship was the only game won by the Giants, and the team had an enormous 
increase in attendance following this season.  The 1958 game is often credited with 
increasing interest in the NFL, as it was the first aired nationally on NBC.  It seems, 
however, that the Giants experienced substantial increased interest just before this game 
was even played. 
 
7.5.10 Philadelphia Eagles 
Just as the Giants saw a huge increase in fans after their championship win, the 
Philadelphia Eagles experienced a positive shift in attendance after their 1960 NFL 
Championship.  The team managed to sustain this level of attendance until a smaller 
downward shift in 1981 after losing to Oakland in the Super Bowl. 
 
7.5.11 Pittsburg Steelers 
With the exception of two small downward shifts in 1955 and 1986, the 
Pittsburgh Steelers have enjoyed a relatively consistent upward slope in gate attendance 
since the 1930s.  The team had significant struggles during the 1950s and mid-to-late 
1980s until the hiring of Bill Cowher in 1992.  These prolonged periods of on-field 





7.5.12 San Francisco 49ers 
 The San Francisco 49ers model indicates a very large shift downward in 1960, 
followed by a somewhat consistent upward trend through today.  The formation of the 
AFL in 1960 may have had a significant impact on the team’s interest, as it had initially 
been the only major professional football team west of Dallas.  With the formation of the 
AFL, two teams were added in California, one of which was just across the bay in 
Oakland.  This competition cut 49ers attendance nearly in half for a period up until the 
AFL-NFL merger. 
 
7.5.13 Washington Redskins 
Finally, the Washington Redskins have experienced two significant upward 
attendance shifts throughout franchise history.  The first occurred in 1962, the year just 
after the opening of RFK Stadium.  IN this same year, the federal government warned the 
ownership of the team to desegregate.  Ultimately, the team became the last NFL 
franchise to integrate in 1962.  The combination of a new stadium and attraction of 
African American consumers likely explain much of this break.  Another arena move 
sparked a large shift upward (1995) in attendance when the team left RFK for Jack Kent 
Cooke Stadium (now FedEx Field) in 1997.  Not only did attendance shift upward, but 
since this time has been followed by a very steep upward trend through the 2009 season. 
 
7.6 Summary and Conclusions 
 Unlike the league aggregate analysis regarding the NFL, I find a number of 




there is an apparent overwhelming interest in more balance (with few exceptions) for 
those fans that are found to care about the three measures used here.  Fans of the 
Washington Redskins are perhaps the most curious, as they tend to prefer more balance 
across seasons while enjoying less in-season uncertainty.  This could be a result of the 
long-standing rivalry with the Dallas Cowboys who have in the past been able to sustain 
successful dynasties.  It may be that fans generally enjoy unbalanced competition within 
the season, with the exception of their heated rival.  As with the apparent Red Sox 
preferences, more empirical research is suggested for directly assessing fan preferences 
with respect to rivalries.  
Overall, this evidence tends to point against the “canceling out” effect of 
preferences across the league, where some fans prefer more balance while others prefer 
less.  However, what this could indicate is an issue in the analysis of coefficients at the 
league level.  Given that only seven teams show any significant effect of the three 
balance measures on attendance, this aggregate effect may not be large enough to mean a 
significant effect at the league level with possible censoring issues over the long period.  
Therefore, the results here indicate that further analysis using censored regression 
techniques may be more enlightening with respect to coefficient estimates.  Nevertheless, 
the size and location of break points in attendance series found here are rather interesting, 
and seem to be associated with similar events as found in the NBA.  Finally, further 
evaluation of the occurrence of breaks and increases in trends are recommended with 





TABLE 7.1: NFL Franchise TAPG and W% by Decade 
Team 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Overall 
ATL TAPG    55,018 50,847 42,244 53,871 65,771 53,350 
ATL  W%    0.216 0.424 0.385 0.450 0.472 0.413 
BUF TAPG     55,071 64,038 73,617 68,673 65,350 
BUF  W%     0.359 0.454 0.644 0.413 0.467 
CHI TAPG 24,609 33,645 42,509 46,430 48,854 57,770 58,970 61,658 47,974 
CHI  W% 0.754 0.753 0.593 0.511 0.417 0.594 0.456 0.506 0.573 
CIN TAPG     51,886 51,709 51,212 61,985 54,198 
CIN  W%     0.521 0.542 0.325 0.428 0.454 
DAL TAPG    45,119 60,361 57,720 64,745 66,019 58,793 
DAL  W%    0.492 0.729 0.526 0.631 0.512 0.578 
DEN TAPG     58,979 73,412 72,762 75,374 70,132 
DEN  W%     0.534 0.598 0.587 0.581 0.575 
DET TAPG 20,448 21,722 48,625 51,498 59,186 59,055 67,572 62,364 50,301 
DET  W% 0.659 0.344 0.584 0.517 0.474 0.405 0.494 0.263 0.457 
GB TAPG 14,669 20,360 23,278 45,587 50,834 52,413 56,644 67,737 43,611 
GB  W% 0.711 0.599 0.327 0.719 0.411 0.445 0.581 0.594 0.548 
KC TAPG     56,304 50,000 75,831 76,430 64,641 
KC  W%     0.439 0.435 0.637 0.437 0.487 
MIA TAPG     62,002 59,463 68,698 70,674 65,209 
MIA  W%     0.730 0.628 0.594 0.494 0.611 
MIN TAPG    40,660 46,858 54,375 57,978 63,872 52,996 
MIN  W%    0.431 0.700 0.509 0.594 0.525 0.554 
NE TAPG     55,493 51,682 51,688 66,767 56,408 
NE  W%     0.453 0.515 0.425 0.700 0.523 
NO TAPG    75,125 59,901 57,963 56,748 65,612 61,107 
NO  W%    0.293 0.296 0.443 0.444 0.519 0.416 
NYG TAPG 29,741 36,322 39,996 62,320 62,387 70,009 72,747 78,620 57,923 
NYG  W% 0.668 0.545 0.651 0.519 0.350 0.531 0.519 0.550 0.541 
NYJ TAPG     52,395 56,905 63,182 77,818 62,575 
NYJ  W%     0.364 0.512 0.406 0.500 0.446 
PHI TAPG 20,100 22,424 26,966 58,267 61,012 61,426 63,990 67,579 50,369 
PHI  W% 0.251 0.555 0.442 0.429 0.394 0.499 0.500 0.647 0.473 
PIT TAPG 11,850 23,578 27,638 32,898 48,381 52,797 54,980 61,605 41,118 
PIT  W% 0.283 0.376 0.463 0.358 0.688 0.514 0.581 0.647 0.497 
SD TAPG     43,631 49,421 57,570 62,229 53,213 
SD  W%     0.409 0.482 0.462 0.531 0.471 
SF TAPG   41,774 38,674 47,391 56,438 62,755 67,409 52,407 
SF  W%   0.539 0.439 0.434 0.673 0.706 0.425 0.536 
WAS TAPG 24,191 33,398 25,027 44,140 53,002 52,322 59,704 84,655 49,247 







TABLE 7.2: NFL Franchise ADF and PP Tests (Unadjusted) 
 
Team   ATL BUF CHI CIN DAL DEN DET 
T (seasons)   44 40 76 40 50 40 76 
ADF (p) Constant -1.654 (1) -1.417 (4) -2.208 (1) -1.710 (1) -2.658 (1)* -2.486 (1) -2.428 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -2.146 (1) -3.928 (1)** -4.234 (1)*** -2.805 (1) -3.061 (1) -2.347 (1) -2.612 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -2.195 (3) -3.352 (3)** -1.977 (3) -1.842 (3) -2.452 (3) -2.328 (3) -2.371 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -2.641 (1) -3.421 (3)* -4.266 (3)*** -2.618 (3) -2.832 (3) -2.202 (3) -2.627 (3) 
Team   GB KC MIA MIN NE NO NYG 
T (seasons)   74 40 40 49 40 43 76 
ADF (p) Constant -0.826 (1) -1.207 (2) -2.022 (1) -2.186 (1) -1.681 (1) -2.946 (1)* -1.786 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -1.953 (1) -2.242 (2) -2.665 (1) -3.949 (1)** -2.331 (1) -2.833 (1) -3.446 (1)* 
P-P (l) Constant -1.078 (3) -1.956 (3) -2.581 (3) -1.763 (3) -3.024 (3)** -3.368 (3)** -1.787 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -2.797 (3) -2.583 (3) -2.998 (3) -3.344 (3)* -3.259 (3)* -3.223 (3)* -3.902 (3)** 
Team   NYJ PHI PIT SD SF WAS 
T (seasons)   40 73 76 40 60 73 
ADF (p) Constant -1.232 (1) -1.526 (1) -1.098 (2) -1.211 (1) -1.817 (1) -0.408 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -4.096 (1)** -2.034 (1) -3.284 (1)* -4.193 (1)** -2.975 (1) -1.965 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -1.585 (3) -1.758 (3) -1.174 (3) -1.239 (3) -2.164 (3) -0.583 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -4.066 (3)** -2.444 (3) -3.591 (3)** -3.229 (3)* -3.714 (3)** -2.040 (3) 











TABLE 7.3: NFL Franchise Two-Break LM Test (Unadjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
ATL 8 1985, 1997 -5.068***, 5.811*** -6.952*** λ = (0.45, 0.73) 
BUF 3 1985, 1996 -6.698***, -2.521** -8.037*** λ = (0.40, 0.68) 
CHI 0 1959, 1984 -3.307***, 0.989 -5.848** λ = (0.34, 0.67) 
CIN 6 1986, 1996 6.138***, -3.415*** -7.025*** λ = (0.43, 0.68) 
DAL 2 1972, 2003 -4.889***, -0.293 -5.617* λ = (0.26, 0.88) 
DEN 7 1985, 1994 -8.911***, 3.216*** -9.954*** λ = (0.40, 0.63) 
DET 5 1956, 1973 1.227, 3.799*** -4.949 λ = (0.30, 0.53) 
GB 0 1953, 1969 1.491, -4.260*** -4.641 λ = (0.24, 0.46) 
KC 8 1980, 1996 -8.584***, 9.357*** -11.175*** λ = (0.28, 0.68) 
MIA 7 1989, 2005 4.550***, -5.062*** -6.673*** λ = (0.50, 0.90) 
MIN 8 1971, 1980 -0.859, 5.494*** -5.653** λ = (0.22, 0.41) 
NE 8 1980, 1992 -2.814***, 4.821*** -4.590 λ = (0.28, 0.58) 
NO 7 1981, 1993 4.267***, -4.167*** -5.382* λ = (0.35, 0.63) 
NYG 6 1945, 1957 -5.635***, 6.680*** -6.912*** λ = (0.16, 0.32) 
NYJ 7 1982, 1986 4.329***, 2.610** -5.266 λ = (0.33, 0.43) 
PHI 2 1949, 1960 -5.019***, 5.045*** -7.076*** λ = (0.18, 0.33) 
PIT 0 1946, 1970 -2.396**, 4.069*** -5.351* λ = (0.17, 0.49) 
SD 2 1993, 2002 2.189**, 4.585*** -6.421*** λ = (0.60, 0.83) 
SF 6 1964, 1980 -5.463***, -2.72*** -6.642*** λ = (0.38, 0.78) 
WAS 8 1969, 1995 2.518**, 5.354*** -5.945** λ = (0.45, 0.81) 
Data unadjusted for strikes.   𝑘� is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct for serial correlation.  
𝑇�𝑏 denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.  See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  ***, **, * = 







TABLE 7.4: NFL Franchise One-Break LM Test (Unadjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
CHI 0 1945 -1.104 -5.413*** λ = 0.16 
DAL 2 1984 -3.013*** -3.478 λ = 0.50 
DET 5 1949 3.417*** -4.486** λ = 0.21 
GB 8 1972 -0.689 -3.674 λ = 0.50 
MIN 8 1995 -1.716* -5.572*** λ = 0.71 
NE 0 1991 -1.465 -3.662 λ = 0.55 
NO 7 1988 3.455*** -4.328* λ = 0.51 
NYJ 4 1981 4.274*** -4.866** λ = 0.30 
PIT 0 1969 -0.245 -4.576** λ = 0.47 
WAS 8 1977 -0.984 -4.507* λ = 0.56 
NOTE: 𝑘�  is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct  
for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏  denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.   
See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  Data adjusted for strikes.   


















TABLE 7.5: NFL Franchise ADF and PP Tests (Adjusted) 
 
Team   ATL BUF CHI CIN DAL DEN DET 
T (seasons)   44 40 76 40 50 40 76 
ADF (p) Constant -1.709 (1) -1.426 (4) -2.196 (1) -1.653 (1) -2.615 (1)* -2.575 (1) -2.384 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -2.231 (1) -4.389 (1)*** -4.053 (1)** -2.759 (1) -3.070 (1) -2.444 (1) -2.464 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -2.067 (3) -3.234 (3)** -1.965 (3) -1.715 (3) -2.437 (3) -2.294 (3) -2.326 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -2.537 (3) -3.247 (3)* -4.079 (3)** -2.495 (3) -2.794 (3) -1.986 (3) -2.460 (3) 
Team   GB KC MIA MIN NE NO NYG 
T (seasons)   74 40 40 49 40 43 76 
ADF (p) Constant -0.824 (1) -1.249 (1) -2.028 (1) -2.257 (1) -1.686 (1) -3.015 (1)** -1.760 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -1.905 (1) -2.519 (1) -2.672 (1) -4.027 (1)** -2.493 (1) -2.897 (1) -3.369 (1)* 
P-P (l) Constant -1.079 (3) -1.784 (3) -2.592 (3) -1.742 (3) -2.964 (3)** -3.311 (3)** -1.735 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -2.730 (3) -2.206 (3) -3.009 (3) -2.916 (3) -3.158 (3) -3.163 (3) -3.654 (3)** 
Team   NYJ PHI PIT SD SF WAS 
T (seasons)   40 73 76 40 60 73 
ADF (p) Constant -1.148 (1) -1.521 (1) -1.098 (2) -1.244 (1) -1.814 (1) -0.433 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -4.066 (1)** -2.008 (1) -3.268 (1)* -4.309 (1)** -2.962 (1) -2.010 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -1.321 (3) -1.755 (3) -1.175 (1) -1.190 (3) -2.161 (3) -0.580 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -3.718 (3)** -2.403 (3) -3.553 (3)** -3.122 (3) -3.701 (3)** -2.035 (3) 










TABLE 7.6: NFL Franchise Two-Break LM Test (Adjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
ATL 8 1985, 1997 -4.394***, 5.251*** -6.371** λ = (0.45, 0.73) 
BUF 2 1985, 1990 -5.174***, -2.510** -8.131*** λ = (0.40, 0.53) 
CHI 1 1945, 1987 -3.301***, 1.088 -5.841** λ = (0.16, 0.71) 
CIN 6 1986, 1996 4.892***, -1.538 -5.852** λ = (0.43, 0.68) 
DAL 2 1972, 2003 -4.911***, -0.277 -5.541* λ = (0.26, 0.88) 
DEN 5 1984, 1989 -5.966***, 1.606 -9.450*** λ = (0.38, 0.50) 
DET 8 1959, 1973 1.619, 4.317*** -5.306 λ = (0.34, 0.53) 
GB 0 1956, 1969 1.604, -4.007*** -4.581 λ = (0.28, 0.46) 
KC 8 1980, 1995 -6.674***, 6.732*** -8.229*** λ = (0.28, 0.65) 
MIA 7 1989, 2005 4.523***, -5.178*** -6.625*** λ = (0.50, 0.90) 
MIN 8 1973, 1980 -1.612, 4.877*** -5.593* λ = (0.27, 0.41) 
NE 8 1985, 1966 -3.878***, 4.503*** -4.971 λ = (0.40, 0.68) 
NO 7 1984, 1993 4.644***, -3.970*** -5.297 λ = (0.42, 0.63) 
NYG 6 1945, 1957 -5.682***, 6.625*** -6.850*** λ = (0.16, 0.32) 
NYJ 5 1983, 1995 2.732***, 5.467*** -5.374* λ = (0.35, 0.65) 
PHI 2 1949, 1960 -5.203***, 5.249*** -7.279*** λ = (0.18, 0.33) 
PIT 0 1944, 1948 -3.415***, 1.245 -6.7296*** λ = (0.14, 0.20) 
SD 2 1993, 2002 2.340**, 4.740*** -6.437*** λ = (0.60, 0.83) 
SF 6 1964, 1980 -5.403***, -2.646*** -6.577*** λ = (0.25, 0.52) 
WAS 8 1969, 1995 2.513**, 5.379*** -5.936** λ = (0.45, 0.81) 
Data adjusted for strikes.   𝑘� is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct for serial correlation.   
𝑇�𝑏 denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.  See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  ***, **, * = 







TABLE 7.7: NFL Franchise One-Break LM Test (Adjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
ATL 3 1988 2.276** -5.435*** λ = 0.52 
CHI 0 1958 -1.011 -5.252*** λ = 0.33 
CIN 6 2003 3.036*** -4.110 λ = 0.85 
DAL 0 1971 -3.462*** -3.156 λ = 0.24 
DET 5 1949 3.522*** -4.472** λ = 0.21 
GB 8 1969 -0.632 -3.799 λ = 0.50 
MIN 8 1976 -1.201 -5.644*** λ = 0.33 
NE 8 2004 0.833 -3.921 λ = 0.88 
NO 7 1988 3.346*** -4.211* λ = 0.51 
NYJ 7 1981 3.253*** -4.446* λ = 0.30 
WAS 8 1978 -1.093 -4.553** λ = 0.58 
NOTE: 𝑘�  is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct  
for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏  denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.   
See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  Data adjusted for strikes.   

















TABLE 7.8: NFL Franchise Model Break Point Sequential Test Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) Breaks 
ATL 64.92*** 37.70***   64.92*** 64.92*** 4.55   1 
         
BUF 2.79 3.36   3.36 4.68 3.35   0 
         
CHI 53.75*** 34.43*** 26.70*** 53.75*** 53.75*** 10.94* 1.61 1 
         
CIN 62.09*** 75.58***   75.58*** 105.23*** 24.86***   2 
         
DEN 27.67*** 16.18***   27.67*** 27.67*** 8.09   1 
         
DET 51.80*** 51.94*** 54.19*** 54.19*** 90.33*** 12.16* 27.80*** 1 
         
KC 32.54*** 60.17***   60.17*** 83.78*** 8.38   1 
         
MIA 31.44*** 45.08***   45.08*** 62.76*** 46.88***   2 
         
MIN 15.15*** 7.79**   15.15*** 15.15** 34.83***   2 
         
NYG 72.58*** 53.46*** 34.83*** 72.58*** 72.58*** 6.93 4.98 1 
         
PHI 312.34*** 120.09*** 78.17*** 312.34*** 312.34*** 24.80*** 0.08 2 
         
PIT 37.66*** 30.40*** 24.17*** 37.66*** 40.30*** 16.39*** 10.82 2 
         
SD 7.15 7.11   7.15 9.90 13.84**   0 
         
SF 40.89*** 20.19*** 13.23*** 40.89*** 40.89*** 3.11 6.74 1 
         
WAS 42.50*** 133.95*** 111.76*** 133.95*** 186.31*** 77.66*** 21.19*** 2 




TABLE 7.9: NFL Franchise Model Break Dates (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2  Team T1 T2 
       
ATL 1989   MIN 1981 1996 
 [88, 90]    [80, 82] [95, 97] 
       
CHI 1948   NYG 1956  
 [47, 49]    [55, 58]  
       
CIN 1979 1991  PHI 1960 1981 
 [78, 80] [90, 92]   [59, 61] [80, 84] 
       
DEN 1982   PIT 1955 1986 
 [81, 84]    [53, 57] [85, 92] 
       
DET 1951   SF 1961  
 [47, 52]    [60, 63]  
       
KC 1988   WAS 1962 1995 
 [87, 90]    [61, 63] [94, 96] 
       
MIA 1983 1995     
 [82, 85] [94, 96]     
       







TABLE 7.10: NFL Franchise Model Breakpoint Regression Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 
ATL -1245 50371 1091 8730   
t-value (-5.82)*** (7.04)*** (4.57)*** (0.87)   
CHI 1320 11225 381 28420   
t-value (6.25)*** (3.42)*** (12.81)*** (11.99)***   
CIN -1919 57851 924 31893 1130 17031.65 
t-value (-6.82)*** (17.05)*** (4.12)*** (6.11)*** (9.62)*** (3.93)*** 
DEN 2195 40331 271 58493   
t-value (7.43)*** (9.77)*** (3.65)*** (11.21)***   
DET 598 15023 275 41217   
t-value (1.56) (2.18)** (3.68)*** (6.76)***   
KC -664 59363 329 63494   
t-value (-2.61)** (8.57)*** (1.46) (6.35)***   
MIA -1385 37111 316 25701 -608 63164 
t-value (-4.70)*** (6.63)*** (1.18) (3.84)*** (-2.73)*** (8.35)*** 
MIN 236 29240 -32 44213.39 -93 55311 
t-value (1.97)** (11.91)*** (-0.21) (8.82)*** (-0.47) (6.69)*** 
NYG 92 31672 414 47848   
t-value (0.47) (6.26)*** (7.03)*** (10.10)***   
PHI 550 19724 276 54328 337 45599 
t-value (4.30)*** (7.04)*** (1.59) (9.23)*** (3.38)*** (6.63)*** 
PIT 1004 8273 1080 -2955 603 13470 
t-value (7.91)*** (3.23)*** (12.06)*** (-0.90) (5.22)*** (1.68)* 
SF 2460 20208 721 20253   
t-value (6.13)*** (5.62)*** (13.78)*** (5.21)***   
WAS 17 29837 193 46869 1950 -45982.83 
t-value (0.13) (8.77)*** (2.22)** (11.96)*** (7.30)*** (-2.62)** 
“***”, “**”, “*” Indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% critical level, respectively/ 







TABLE 7.11: NFL Franchise Model Balance and W% Coefficients (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team TL PU CSU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐)  Team TL PU CSU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
             
ATL 8275 -16767 7202 9505 0.693  MIN 4287 23728 3564 7622 0.928 
t-value (2.64)** (-0.64) (1.38) (1.74)* (0.743)  t-value (3.19)*** (2.49)** (1.61) (3.54)*** (0.942) 
             
CHI 2019 -3 -967 10241 0.922  NYG -590 -11310 -6102 8498 0.897 
t-value (1.56) (-0.00) (-0.53) (4.75)*** (0.930)  t-value (-0.26) (-0.73) (-1.94)* (2.35)** (0.907) 
             
CIN 1100 9938 -3166 7810 0.718  PHI -2074 -13182 -6577 8210 0.955 
t-value (0.81) (0.83) (-1.45) (3.14)*** (0.893)  t-value (-1.10) (-1.28) (-3.00)*** (3.30)*** (0.960) 
             
DEN 4079 -34153 2598 10534 0.897  PIT 636 4037 -2135 6942 0.952 
t-value (2.26)** (-2.56)** (0.98) (2.93)*** (0.915)  t-value (0.40) (0.44) (-1.11) (2.88)*** (0.958) 
             
DET 3662 -25454 -5232 14327 0.823  SF 2220 8711 -349 9600 0.858 
t-value (1.23) (-1.31) (-1.27) (2.84)*** (0.839)  t-value (1.18) (0.57) (-0.11) (3.20)*** (0.875) 
             
KC -2451 23286 -10075 10381 0.833  WAS -3957 453 -4891 4791 0.960 
t-value (-0.88) (0.91) (-2.12)** (1.76)* (0.863)  t-value (-2.20)** (0.04) (-2.18)** (1.60) (0.965) 
             
MIA 9652 80172 -252 20182 0.847        
t-value (4.76)*** (5.49)*** (-0.07) (5.68)*** (0.882)        
             
*** Significant at the 99% critical level 
** Significant at the 95% critical level 







TABLE 7.12: NFL Franchise Level Economic Implications 
 
 Game Uncertainty Playoff Uncertainty Consecutive Season Uncertainty 
Team ATL DEN MIA MIN WAS DEN MIA MIN KC PHI WAS 
2009 TAPG 68,174 75,116 67,543 63,775 84,794 75,116 67,543 63,775 67,514 69,144 84,794 
2009 Variable 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.695 0.695 0.695 
Coef. Est.a 8,275 4,079 9,652 4,287 -3,957d -34,153 80,172 23,728 10,381 -6,577 -4,891 
Elasticity 0.106 0.047 0.124 0.059 0.041 0.060 0.155 0.049 0.107 0.066 0.040 
ΔVariableb 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.229 0.229 0.229 
Inc. Factor 27.8% 27.8% 27.8% 27.8% 27.8% 48.1% 48.1% 48.1% 32.9% 32.9% 32.9% 
ΔTAPG 2,009 981 2,328 1,046 -966 2,168 -5,036 -1,503 -2,377 1,501 1,116 
% ΔTAPG 2.95% 1.31% 3.45% 1.64% -1.14% 2.89% -7.46% -2.36% -3.52% 2.17% 1.32% 
Rev. Per Attendc $96.45 $102.63 $91.61 $96.73 $110.36 $102.63 $91.61 $96.73 $111.44 $96.88 $110.36 
Δ Game Rev. $193,768 $100,680 $213,268 $101,180 -$106,608 $222,502 -$461,348 -$145,385 -$264,893 $145,417 $123,162 
a. Coefficients taken from model with heterogeneous errors across regimes and follow the approach of Lee and Fort (2008, pp. 291). 
b. All measure changes imply an improvement in balance. 
c. Revenue per attendee data come from Team Marketing Report Fan Cost Index (2009). 




































National Hockey League Franchises 
 
8.1 Introduction/Justification 
 The final league under evaluation here is the NHL.  The NHL has experienced 
significant rivalry with another league in its history, as exhibited in the league aggregate 
analysis.  While the AFL and NFL coexisted rather well, the NHL and its counterpart the 
WHA were in serious competition during the short period of the WHA’s existence.  
Understanding the influence this may have had on individual franchises is a natural next 
step in evaluating rival threats and league response regarding attracting fans.  The 
significant expansion and team moves in the NHL make it an interesting case to evaluate 
at a micro level; however, only a few teams are analyzed here due to constraints on time 
series length.  Because the “Original Six” teams for the NHL have remained in their 
initial locations for such a long period, they allow evaluation of the impacts of significant 
expansion, as the league doubled in size in 1967 and experienced a number of franchise 
additions later in the twentieth century.  The following sections lay out considerations for 
the data—NHL data is less reliable than that of other leagues, and therefore requires 
further explanation—the results of the analysis, and more practical implications of the 




8.2 Data and Methods 
 With the exceptions mentioned below, the NHL franchise data is identical to the 
league-level data in Chapter 4.  The reader is referred to earlier sections for a general 
description of this data.  The dependent variable in the regression models, TAPG, is 
calculated as described in the Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  Again, I estimate an ancillary model 
as before, but with an additional lagged win percent variable (NHL Model B).  Models 
with both heterogeneous and homogeneous variance are estimated; however, I continue 
with a full discussion of only the heterogeneous error variance models.  Results from the 
alternative model fits are provided in Appendix D. 
Additional sources were necessary for the collection of individual franchise 
attendance data in the NHL.  While Sports Business Data (2010) and Andrew’s Dallas 
Stars Page (almost all data from the 1991-92 through 1998-99 seasons) contained a large 
amount of the necessary attendance information, the seasons between 1967 and 1988 for 
a number of teams were curiously missing.  However, I was able to collect attendance 
reports from individual game box scores for each team for these years from The Hockey 
Summary Project (2011).  The majority of the data at the team level have been gleaned 
from this latter source, with the rest filling in missing data points in specific years (1961-
62, 1986-87 to 1989-90 and 1991-92 to 1992-93).   
 Despite the additional data sources, some seasons still had a few game-level 
attendance reports consecutively missing.  For those single missing years for each team, I 
used the average TAPG for the year before and year just following the missing data point.  
In those years that more than 15 game attendance reports are available, I take the average 




those years in which there are fewer than 15 games with attendance reported for a given 
team—most of which require consecutive imputations—I take a different approach.  
First, a linear trend is calculated between the points just before and just following the 
consecutive data points.  Then, the imputation for each year is averaged with the 
available game level data for the current season.  The process for year t with only some 
data available—and consecutive missing data—proceeds as follows: 
 





Where C is the number of consecutive data points being imputed, 𝑇𝐴𝑃𝐺𝑡∗  denotes the 
average per game attendance calculated from the limited number of box scores in the 
given season, and 𝑇𝐴𝑃𝐺𝑁 and 𝑇𝐴𝑃𝐺𝑀 denote the average per game attendance for the 
given team in the first year prior and first year following the consecutive missing (or 
limited) data, respectively.  A list of those franchises with the specific years imputed in 
the data can be found in Appendix J for all leagues. 
 Adjusted data for NHL franchises is imputed just as with the league-level data 
from Chapter 4, with both adjusted and unadjusted series including an imputation for the 
locked out 2004-05 season.  The only difference between the adjusted and unadjusted 
series is the weighted average for the 1994-95 season, during which there was a labor 
stoppage (an average of seasons just before, during, and after the labor dispute).  I treat 
ties as one half of a win, and use win percent as the team quality covariate for NHL as 
with each of the other sports included in this evaluation.  The uncertainty of outcome 




level.  The NHL contained eleven (11) individual franchises with attendance series of 
sufficient length (40 years) for the breakpoint analysis.  Descriptive statistics regarding 
TAPG and win percent for each of the franchises in each league can be found in Table 
8.1 (NHL). 
 
7.3 Unit Root Results 
Finally, seven of eleven NHL teams were found to be stationary or stationary with 
breaks (Tables 8.2 through 8.7).  Only the Philadelphia Flyers attendance series was 
found to be universally stationary without breaks (ADF and PP tests), while the LM tests 
reject the presence of a unit root for the Boston Bruins, Chicago Blackhawks, Detroit Red 
Wings, Los Angeles Kings, New York Rangers and St. Louis Blues with a single break.  I 
proceed with evaluating these teams using the BP procedure. 
 
7.4 Uncertainty of Outcome Results 
As with each of the other sports, there are some mixed results regarding the 
impact of balance in the NHL.  Only two of the teams under consideration were found to 
have statistically significant effects of any of the outcome uncertainty measures (Table 
8.11).  These include the Chicago Blackhawks and St. Louis Blues.  While the coefficient 
for GU for the Blackhawks supports the predictions of Rottenberg, other estimates are 
largely in disagreement with the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis.  Playoff 
uncertainty was found to be statistically significant for both Chicago and St. Louis in the 
opposite direction from what UOH would predict.  The same result is found for CSU in 




completely ignorable for St. Louis (Table 8.12).  For both teams, changes in these 
balance measures may result in as much as $40,000 in revenues per game. 
 
8.5 Breakpoint Regression Results 
Breaks at the franchise level in the NHL lend support for those found at the 
league aggregate.  Perhaps not surprisingly given the finding in the aggregate NHL 
analysis, some individual teams saw negative effects during the reign of the WHA.  Other 
breaks tend to occur near sustained periods of success for certain franchises, as found for 
franchises in other leagues in the previous chapters.  Plot for the time series of attendance 
for each team (with breaks exhibited) can be found in Figures 8.1 and 8.2. 
 
8.5.1 Boston Bruins 
The WHA seems to have had significant impacts on the Boston Bruins, as the first 
attendance break coincides with a large downward shift after the 1975-76 season.  Boston 
was hit particularly hard, as longtime star Bobby Orr left the team after this season for the 
Chicago Blackhawks.  While the positive attendance trend recovered following this large 
shift, it became muted in the 1996-97 season and has continued to be a somewhat mild 
slope though the 2009-10 season. 
 
8.5.2 Chicago Blackhawks 
Chicago’s NHL team has had a turbulent attendance history since the beginning 
of the series analyzed here.  While attendance generally trended upward through the 




downward trend.  This was the middle of a successful run for the Blackhawks, as they 
made the Stanley Cup Finals three times from 1961 to 1965.  There is a second large shift 
up for the team in 1981-82, ultimately recovering attendance to the levels found in the 
early 1960s.  The best explanation for this shift may be the team’s unexpected wins in 
two playoff series after inching into the postseason.  In general, Chicago seemed to see a 
large increase in attendance across all local pro sports teams during this time.  This will 
be discussed further in Section 6.6.2. 
 
8.5.3 Detroit Red Wings 
While the Detroit Red Wings had been experiencing a trend upward in 
attendance, they realized a large jump following the 1982-83 season.  The team had 
moved to Joe Louis Arena in 1979, but it seems that the requisite attendance increase was 
delayed somewhat.  The year of the estimated break also marked Little Caesar’s owner 
Mike Illitch purchase of the team.  The Wings subsequently drafted the future Detroit 
hero Steve Yzerman.  While the team had some success in the late 1980s, they did not 
win the Stanley Cup Trophy until the 1990s. 
 
8.5.4 Los Angeles Kings 
Not surprisingly, the 1988 acquisition of Wayne Gretzky seemed to have a large 
effect on Kings attendance, as the BP procedure indicates a large upward break in Kings 
attendance.  While the number of fans at each game trended downward following this 
initial hype, the team experienced a second upward jump coinciding with the move to the 





8.5.5 New York Rangers 
From the beginning of the New York Rangers attendance series through the first 
breakpoint in 1975-76, the team had experienced a very steep upward trend.  However, 
the WHA likely played a role in the downward trend following this season.  The negative 
trend continued into the early 1990s, where there was an upward shift in 1991-92 when 
the team experienced fluctuating success culminating in a Stanly Cup in 1993-94. 
 
8.5.6 Philadelphia Flyers 
The Philadelphia Flyers seem to have been the team least affected by the 
formation of the WHA, as the team experienced consistent sellouts after back-to-back 
Stanley Cup trophies in 1973-74 and 1974-75.  Before this time, the team’s attendance 
was increasing sharply before leveling off.  In the midst of this flattened trend in 
attendance, the team did experience an upward shift following the 1995-96 season 
coinciding with a Stanley Cup appearance led by Eric Lindros and expansion of seating 
capacity in the new Wells Fargo Center. 
 
8.5.7 St. Louis Blues 
 The St. Louis Blues and its owners are known to have had significant financial 
troubles during the time of the first downward attendance shift in 1976.  This drop in fan 
attendance may have been enhanced by the operation of the WHA.  Fortunately for Blues 
fans, the team was sold to Ralston Purina in 1977 and the team experienced increasing 




The 1990-91 team led by Brett Hull was particularly successful, but was unfortunately 
knocked out of the playoffs before reaching the Stanley Cup Finals. 
 
8.6 Summary and Conclusions 
 Unlike the NFL, NHL fans tend to prefer less balance as indicated both at the 
league aggregate level and at the team level to some extent.  Only fans of the Chicago 
Blackhawks show a response to balance in the direction predicted by Rottenberg, and 
even this is only for the game-level balance measure (TL).  In terms of playoff 
uncertainty, fans of Chicago, Boston and St. Louis tend to prefer a wider difference in the 
playoff race.  The reason for this is unclear using the simplistic analysis employed here.  
Again, the impacts are relatively small economically for each of these teams.  Structural 
change in the for those franchises considered here is generally related to league the 
existence of a rival league (and its downfall) and significant sustained team success not 
explained by win percent alone.  Again, the ability to evaluate demand for attendance in 




TABLE 8.1: NHL Franchise TAPG and W% by Decade 
 
Team 1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's Overall 
BOS TAPG 11,432 12,451 13,833 13,001 15,179 15,797 13,691 
BOS W% 0.488 0.412 0.689 0.583 0.545 0.524 0.546 
BUF TAPG 
  
15,457 14,639 15,790 17,274 15,790 
BUF W% 
  
0.569 0.553 0.520 0.540 0.545 
CHI TAPG 9,596 15,292 13,913 16,021 18,342 15,814 15,010 
CHI W% 0.366 0.575 0.558 0.491 0.532 0.471 0.482 
DET TAPG 11,703 12,602 12,993 16,755 19,821 19,856 15,757 
DET W% 0.595 0.511 0.410 0.414 0.625 0.650 0.528 
LAK TAPG 
 
8,394 10,947 11,997 14,661 17,127 13,314 
LAK W% 
 
0.373 0.484 0.454 0.484 0.480 0.468 
MON TAPG 13,741 15,101 16,919 16,941 18,578 20,864 17,137 
MON W% 0.609 0.623 0.724 0.606 0.528 0.507 0.580 
NYR TAPG 11,790 14,395 17,405 17,063 17,755 18,137 16,239 
NYR W% 0.443 0.466 0.564 0.503 0.525 0.486 0.497 
PHI TAPG 
 
11,431 16,350 17,084 18,105 19,491 17,316 
PHI W% 
 
0.425 0.627 0.592 0.559 0.537 0.569 
PIT TAPG 
 
6,832 10,603 12,129 15,906 15,588 13,087 
PIT W% 
 
0.403 0.469 0.412 0.586 0.477 0.469 
STL TAPG 
 
13,185 15,637 13,894 17,859 17,364 15,979 
STL W% 
 
0.539 0.445 0.500 0.568 0.494 0.504 
TOR TAPG 13,013 14,923 16,440 16,121 16,215 19,345 16,113 







TABLE 8.2: NHL Franchise ADF and PP Tests (Unadjusted) 
 
Team   BOS BUF CHI DET LAK MON 
T (seasons)   58 40 58 58 53 58 
ADF (p) Constant -1.653 (2) -2.100 (1) -2.886 (1)* -1.192 (1) -1.432 (1) -0.599 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -3.417 (1)* -2.576 (1) -3.178 (1)* -2.677 (1) -3.955 (2)** -2.648 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -1.303 (3) -4.231 (3)*** -1.807 (3) -0.997 (3) -1.578 (3) -1.432 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -3.081 (3) -4.469 (3)*** -2.439 (3) -2.457 (3) -2.965 (3) -3.022 (3) 
       
Team   NYR PHI PIT STL TOR 
T (seasons)   58 43 43 43 58 
ADF (p) Constant -2.336 (1) -3.541 (1)** -2.261 (1) -2.716 (1)* -1.013 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -1.828 (1) -4.532 (1)*** -3.098 (1) -3.042 (1)* -2.062 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -2.071 (3) -4.895 (3)*** -1.626 (3) -3.257 (3)** -1.472 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -1.752 (3) -5.067 (3)*** -2.497 (3) -3.254 (3)* -2.124 (3) 















TABLE 8.3: NHL Franchise Two-Break LM Test (Unadjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
BOS 1 1966/67, 1975/76 1.270, -3.684*** -4.944 λ = (0.26, 0.41) 
BUF 0 1981/82, 2005/06 -1.927*, 0.631 -2.611 λ = (0.30, 0.90) 
CHI 7 1984/85, 1987/88 -2.143**, -1.284 -4.200 λ = (0.57, 0.62) 
DET 1 1982/83, 1985/86 4.208***, 1.981** -4.564 λ = (0.53, 0.59) 
LAK 5 1982/83, 2000/01 -1.920*, -1.411 -4.820 λ = (0.44, 0.79) 
MON 1 1974/75, 1979/80 -1.063, -0.731 -2.963 λ = (0.40, 0.48) 
NYR 8 1967/68, 1987/88 1.917*, -0.818 -3.011 λ = (0.28, 0.62) 
PHI 4 1977/78, 1999/00 1.290, -1.906* -2.261 λ = (0.26, 0.77) 
PIT 7 1977/78, 2002/03 1.247, -3.874*** -3.832 λ = (0.26, 0.84) 
STL 7 1979/80, 2003/04 1.841*, -2.197** -4.197 λ = (0.30, 0.86) 
TOR 6 1995/96, 1999/00 -1.154, -3.743*** -2.621 λ = (0.76, 0.83) 
Data adjusted for strikes.   𝑘� is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct  
for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏 denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.  See J. Lee and Strazicich  













TABLE 8.4: NHL Franchise One-Break LM Test (Unadjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
BOS 1 1974/75 -3.497*** -4.955** λ = 0.40 
BUF 0 1982/83 -3.789*** -4.304* λ = 0.33 
CHI 7 1984/85 -2.720*** -5.182*** λ = 0.57 
DET 1 1982/83 2.799*** -4.539** λ = 0.53 
LAK 8 1983/84 -4.222*** -5.512*** λ = 0.40 
MON 1 1974/75 -1.846* -3.285 λ = 0.40 
NYR 8 1983/84 -6.347*** -6.183*** λ = 0.55 
PHI 4 1980/81 -3.771*** -3.713 λ = 0.33 
PIT 1 1995/96 -2.392** -3.747 λ = 0.67 
STL 7 2003/04 -2.048** -5.292*** λ = 0.86 
TOR 6 1983/84 -2.067** -3.400 λ = 0.55 
NOTE: 𝑘�  is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct  
for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏  denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.   
See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  Data adjusted for strikes.   

















TABLE 8.5: NHL Franchise ADF and PP Tests (Adjusted) 
 
Team   BOS BUF CHI DET LAK MON 
T (seasons)   58 40 58 58 43 58 
ADF (p) Constant -1.616 (2) -2.110 (1) -2.947 (1)** -1.193 (1) -1.421 (1) -0.568 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -3.521 (1)** -2.591 (1) -3.239 (1)* -2.679 (1) -4.018 (2)** -2.537 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -1.258 (3) -4.190 (3)*** -1.796 (3) -0.997 (3) -1.572 (3) -1.436 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -2.988 (3) -4.411 (3)*** -2.428 (3) -2.458 (3) -2.951 (3) -3.031 (3) 
       
Team   NYR PHI PIT STL TOR 
T (seasons)   58 43 43 43 58 
ADF (p) Constant -2.336 (1) -3.547 (1)** -2.261 (1) -2.694 (1) -1.013 (1) 
ADF (p) Trend -1.828 (1) -4.536 (1)*** -3.090 (1) -3.021 (1) -2.062 (1) 
P-P (l) Constant -2.072 (3) -4.898 (3)*** -1.626 (3) -3.261 (3)** -1.472 (3) 
P-P (l) Trend -1.751 (3) -5.071 (3)*** -2.488 (3) -3.258 (3)* -2.124 (3) 















TABLE 8.6: NHL Franchise Two-Break LM Test (Adjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
BOS 1 1965/66, 1975/76 0.377, -3.684*** -5.042 λ = (0.24, 0.41) 
BUF 0 1981/82, 2005/06 -1.933*, 0.649 -2.573 λ = (0.30, 0.90) 
CHI 7 1984/85, 1987/88 -2.774***, -1.519 -4.583 λ = (0.57, 0.62) 
DET 1 1982/83, 1985/86 4.209***, 1.982** -4.568 λ = (0.53, 0.59) 
LAK 5 1985/86, 2000/01 -2.107**, -1.607 -4.989 λ = (0.44, 0.79) 
MON 0 1974/75, 1994/95 -1.004, 0.732 -2.684 λ = (0.40, 0.74) 
NYR 8 1967/68, 1987/88 1.955*, -0.823 -3.003 λ = (0.28, 0.62) 
PHI 4 1977/78, 1999/00 1.289, -1.915* -2.265 λ = (0.26, 0.77) 
PIT 7 1977/78, 2002/03 1.222, -3.840*** -3.805 λ = (0.26, 0.84) 
STL 7 1979/80, 2003/04 1.662*, -2.250** -4.138 λ = (0.30, 0.86) 
TOR 6 1995/96, 1999/00 -1.148, -3.745*** -2.620 λ = (0.76, 0.83) 
Data adjusted for strikes.   𝑘� is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct  
for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏 denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.  See J. Lee and Strazicich  













TABLE 8.7: NHL Franchise One-Break LM Test (Adjusted) 
Team ?̂? 𝐓�𝐛 ?̂?𝛄𝐣 Test Statistic Critical Value Break Points 
BOS 1 1974/75 -3.514*** -5.044** λ = 0.40 
BUF 0 1982/83 -3.722*** -4.228* λ = 0.33 
CHI 7 1958/59 -2.934*** -5.556*** λ = 0.12 
DET 1 1982/83 2.800*** -4.543** λ = 0.53 
LAK 8 1983/84 -4.275*** -5.592*** λ = 0.40 
MON 1 1976/77 -1.895* -3.087 λ = 0.43 
NYR 8 1983/84 -6.339*** -6.178*** λ = 0.55 
PHI 4 1980/81 -3.772*** -3.717 λ = 0.33 
PIT 1 1995/96 -2.396** -3.752 λ = 0.67 
STL 7 2003/04 -2.128** -5.342*** λ = 0.86 
TOR 6 1983/84 -2.607** -3.400 λ = 0.55 
NOTE: 𝑘�  is the optimal number of lagged first-difference terms included in the unit root test to correct  
for serial correlation.  𝑇�𝑏  denotes the estimated break points.  ?̂?𝛾𝑗 is the value of DTjt for j = 1,2.   
See J. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 for critical values.  Data adjusted for strikes.   

















TABLE 8.8: NHL Franchise Model Break Point Sequential Test Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) Breaks 
         
BOS 55.90*** 44.71*** 28.19*** 54.90*** 59.03*** 14.45** 5.12 2 
         
CHI 13.42** 20.38*** 21.25*** 21.25*** 35.42*** 15.97*** 13.18* 2 
         
DET 127.20*** 78.98*** 60.44*** 127.20*** 127.20*** 9.38 10.32 1 
         
LAK 13.04** 19.82***  19.82*** 27.59*** 36.95***  2 
         
NYR 92.07*** 78.48*** 70.27*** 92.07*** 117.14*** 55.55*** 4.27 2 
         
PHI 16.36*** 54.70***  54.70*** 76.15*** 217.21***  2 
         
STL 36.71*** 32.03***  36.71*** 44.59*** 26.74***  2 
         
“***” Significant at the 99% critical level 
“**” Significant at the 95% critical level 




TABLE 8.9: NHL Franchise Model Break Dates (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 
   
BOS 1975-76 1996-97 
 [74-75, 76-77] [92-93, 98-99] 
   
CHI 1963-64 1981-82 
 [62-63, 64-65] [80-81, 82-83] 
   
DET 1982-83  
 [81-82, 83-84]  
   
LAK 1987-88 1998-99 
 [86-87, 88-89] [97-98, 01-02] 
   
NYR 1975-76 1991-92 
 [74-75, 76-77] [90-91, 93-94] 
   
PHI 1976-77 1995-96 
 [75-76, 77-78] [94-95, 96-97] 
   
STL 1976-77 1989-90 
 [75-76, 77-78] [87-88, 90-91] 
   







TABLE 8.10: NHL Franchise Model Breakpoint Regression Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 
BOS 156 8357 229 2755 99 8369 
t-value (5.80)*** (11.54)*** (6.43)*** (1.65) (1.65) (2.53)** 
CHI 235 2582 -238 10955 -3 8487 
t-value (1.86)* (2.06)** (-3.57)*** (5.04)*** (-0.10) (3.71)*** 
DET 120 7953 2 15752   
t-value (5.88)*** (8.14)*** (0.08) (13.45)***   
LAK 126 6967 -297 20754 119 10656 
t-value (3.36)*** (7.79)*** (-3.43)*** (7.43)*** (1.27) (2.70)*** 
NYR 305 8848 -111 18944 17 15530 
t-value (17.49)*** (16.62)*** (-3.36)*** (15.31)*** (0.72) (11.37)*** 
PHI 796 10406 31 16556 4 19537 
t-value (9.64)*** (21.18)*** (1.14) (15.66)*** (0.10) (11.70)*** 
STL 16 6385 427 -4931 106 4315 
t-value (0.07) (3.46)*** (3.10)*** (-1.59) (1.74)* (1.36) 
“***”, “**”, “*” Indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% critical level, respectively/ 




TABLE 8.11: NHL Franchise Model Balance and W% Coefficients (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team TL PU CSU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
      
BOS 137 9888 -595 3953 0.830 
t-value (0.29) (2.04)** (-1.22) (3.74)*** (0.857) 
      
CHI 2230 16762 -1483 14328 0.839 
t-value (2.93)*** (2.05)** (-1.81)* (6.50)*** (0.864) 
      
DET 233 -2814 -360 6458 0.949 
t-value (0.49) (-0.55) (-0.75) (4.84)*** (0.956) 
      
LAK -912 4281 128 4638 0.918 
t-value (-1.67)* (0.65) (0.19) (2.63)** (0.935) 
      
NYR 154 1220 -398 3563 0.954 
t-value (0.51) (0.39) (-1.29) (3.93)*** (0.961) 
      
PHI -158 -1109 626 -546 0.949 
t-value (-0.52) (-0.27) (1.55) (-0.52) (0.960) 
      
STL 526 34837 3520 11457 0.746 
t-value (0.57) (3.05)*** (3.11)*** (4.23)*** (0.800) 
      
*** Significant at the 99% critical level 
** Significant at the 95% critical level 

























TABLE 8.12: NHL Franchise Level Economic Implications 
 
 Game Uncertainty Playoff Uncertainty Consecutive Season Uncertainty 
Team CHI CHI STL STL 
2009 TAPG 21,130 21,130 18,760 18,760 
2009 Variable 0.698 0.061 0.061 0.378 
Coef. Est.a 2,230 16,762 34,837 3,520 
Elasticity 0.074 0.048 0.113 0.071 
ΔVariableb 0.222 0.012 0.012 0.184 
Inc. Factor 31.8% 19.7% 19.7% 48.7% 
ΔTAPG 497.2 -199.8d -417.6 -648.7 
% ΔTAPG 2.35% -0.95% -2.23% -3.46% 
Rev. Per Attendc $79.80 $79.80 $58.65 $58.65 
Δ Game Rev. $39,677 -$15,944 -$24,492 -$38,046 
a. Coefficient taken from model with heterogeneous errors across regimes and follow the approach of Lee and Fort (2008, pp. 291). 
b. All measure changes imply an improvement in balance. 
c. Revenue per attendee data come from Team Marketing Report Fan Cost Index (2009). 




















Summary and Conclusions 
 
9.1 Summary and Implications 
The research contained in this dissertation fills gaps in the literature on long-term 
North American professional sports attendance tracking and uncertainty of outcome.  I 
extend the literature on attendance breakpoints to the NBA, NFL and NHL at the league 
level in Chapter 4.  Chapters 5 through 8 are dedicated to evaluating the heterogeneous 
effects of uncertainty at the franchise level for these three leagues and MLB at the 
seasonal level.  This former portion is the most important contribution of this work; 
however, this latter application provide interesting differences across markets important 
for team managers and league managers implementing league policies with interest in 
maximizing interest in the league as a whole.  Past research has found changes in 
attendance at a more micro level with respect to balance, usually when individual games 
have playoff implications.  However, the analysis presented here finds that the 
implications of these changes tend to be minimal at the aggregate level.  However, it is 
important to note the limitations of the methodology here.  Because of a lack of micro-
level analysis, fan interests cannot be fully discerned as they may be in a fully specified 
demand model.  This makes the conclusions with respect to balance limited in their reach 




provide both historical context for future analyses, as well as exhibition of time series 
properties important to this future empirical work. 
Table 9.1 provides a summary of the results from each chapter within this 
dissertation regarding Rottenbeg’s UOH.  Fans of the NBA respond most to Playoff and 
Game Uncertainty and NHL fans seem to be interested in Playoff Uncertainty, while NFL 
fans—at least at the league level—tend to have little preference for any of the uncertainty 
measures included here.  The NHL case exemplifies the importance of correct 
econometric breakpoint method specifications in the shorter series analyzed in the sports 
context.  The team level analysis tells a bit of a different story, and shows the importance 
of evaluating fans across markets.  In these analyses, we see a limited view of fans in 
different markets reacting differently to the changes in uncertainty of outcome.  Why this 
would be the case is relegated to further investigation. Most likely, employing surveys of 
fans in different markets regarding their preferences for different team and league 
characteristics would provide valuable information regarding the preferences of fans for 
more or less competitive balance (uncertainty of outcome). 
Of course, the collection of empirical research here does not necessarily mean 
fans do not care about balance at its extremes.  It may be that market sizes of teams in 
each of these leagues are relatively close as to not affect fan behavior in any significant 
economic way.  If this is so, it may have important implications with respect to analysis 
of optimal league size, given the viable markets for professional teams.  League 
expansion and relocation choice has often been affected by the market rights of its 
individual owners.  Therefore, if many teams are further expanded into smaller markets—




unbalance created here could affect fan interest more than found here.  In order to assess 
this possibility, one would likely have to investigate past leagues with significantly more 
competitive balance issues than is currently found in North American leagues.  
Perhaps more important are the implications for past league policy implied here.  
First, as in Lee and Fort (2008), there tends to be very little sudden impact of league 
policy decisions.  Owners often espouse the idea that implementing rules such as free 
agency and the draft are used in order to preserve competitive balance and ultimately help 
the league to thrive through more fan interest.  However, there is little evidence of 
significant structural change in attendance near these policy changes in any league.  
Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995) inform us that this is to be expected, as 
moves such as the amateur draft and free agency tend to redistribute profits to owners 
from players, rather than change balance in any way (see Chapter 1 for details).  If 
balance is not changed, then the UOH would predict that fan interest in the league would 
also remain unchanged, ceteris paribus. 
On the other hand, the models presented here show only mixed evidence for 
Rottenberg’s UOH and its subsequent extension to dynasties, which were not initially 
mentioned by Rottenberg.  As mentioned earlier, econometric specifications could have 
some impact on these estimations.  In the analysis presented here, a number of individual 
franchises were found to have coefficients that indicated interest in imbalance in certain 
situations.  Fort and Lee (2006, 2007) inform us that there are also no structural breaks 
near these policy changes, lending further evidence to Rottenberg’s claims regarding the 
invariance principle in North American sports leagues.  Of course, addressing European 





9.2 Evidence for Substitution 
 While the direct causal effects of increases in attendance for one franchise on a 
decrease in attendance for another local franchise cannot be extracted from this sort of 
analysis, large shifts in opposite directions may provide preliminary evidence of 
substitution between sports teams within the same market.  Therefore, I briefly discuss 
this possibility here for those markets with multiple sports franchises under analysis.  
These include Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, 
New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis and the San Francisco/Oakland markets.  
Only the Boston, Chicago, New York and Pittsburgh markets have concurrent attendance 
shifts for franchises across leagues, and I limit discussion to these four in this section. 
 
9.2.1 Boston Metropolitan Area 
 As with previous work on years in which there is a labor stoppage, the Red Sox 
saw a temporary downward shift concurrent with the player strike of 1995.  However, 
both the Celtics and Bruins experienced changes in attendance near this time in the 
opposite direction of the Red Sox.  In 1994, the Celtics experienced a small upward shift 
of about 2,000 fans per game, while the Bruins saw a downward shift in 1996 following a 
short spike concurrent with the MLB player strike.  Given that Red Sox attendance had 
decreased for a short duration by about 3,000 fans, it seems that the changes in 
attendance to the other two sports could have accounted for the small dip during this 




seems to be a more plausible reason for these changes than direct fan substitution 
between sports. 
 
9.2.2 Chicago Metropolitan Area 
 In Chicago, something seems to have happened to attendance at sporting events in 
the early 1980s.  While there is little evidence of between-sport fan substitution in the 
city from this analysis alone, fans began attending both Cubs and Blackhawks games at a 
much higher rate beginning in 1983 and 1981, respectively.  Interestingly, the city’s 
population had declined by nearly 18% from 1970 to 1990, while the metro area 
population remained relatively stagnant (increasing less than 3.7% throughout the same 
period).  With the upward shift in White Sox attendance in the mid-1970s, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that interest in sport shifted substantially during this period and/or 
disposable sports income increased for residents of the Chicago area.  Even more 
perplexing is that this era marked a low point in the success of Chicago professional 
athletics teams.  Only in the mid-1980s did the Bulls and Bears begin to have relevant 
levels of success again.  Further work is suggested analyzing this shift in overall sports 
consumption in Chicago and its relationship to disposable income changes in the city. 
 
9.2.3 New York Metropolitan Area 
 While the Knicks and Giants experienced what seem to be attendance shifts 
independent from any other local franchise, the Mets and Rangers experienced two 
concurrent or very close attendance shifts.  The first occurs in 1975, in which the Mets 




attendance trend change in a negative direction.  These shifts seem to be relatively 
unrelated, though it could indicate a slow shift of Rangers fans preferring a successful 
1980s Amazing Mets team.  The next pair of estimated breaks happens in 1993 for the 
Mets (a downward shift) and 1991 for the Rangers (and upward shift).  This later shift 
likely has more to do with the move to Madison Square Garden for the Rangers.  
Whether or not this increase in fans came from those previously enamored with the 
success of 1980s Mets teams remains to be fully analyzed, as with the shifts near this 
time in Boston. 
 
9.2.4 Pittsburgh Metropolitan Area 
 Finally, the analysis presented here suggests that the Steelers and Pirates 
experienced concurrent shifts in the opposite direction near the 1986 and 1987 seasons 
when Barry Bonds and Jim Leyland arrived.  However, contrary to popular belief about 
the struggling Pirates, the shift is in the direction of more fans attending Pirates games 
and fewer heading to Steelers games.  Since this time, both teams have seen an upward 
trend in attendance, though for the Pirates this seems mostly due to the opening of a new 
stadium and subsequent honeymoon attendance spike.  Despite this, it is still generally 
assumed that Pittsburgh sports fans abandoned the Pirates for their NFL counterpart in 
recent years.  While there was no break estimated for either team in the 2000 or 2001 
season, the spike in Pirates attendance and the new stadium may have affected overall 
Steelers attendance, which experienced a very short downward spike during the same 




and NFL for sports fans in Pittsburgh, and price changes over this time may prove 
insightful with respect to changes in fan behavior during this time. 
 
As a whole, there is mixed evidence for fan substitution between sports, 
suggesting that substitution may vary depending on the market in which multiple teams 
are located.  More work is suggested with more granular data to evaluate shorter-term 
day-to-day fan substitution in a number of markets. 
 
9.3 Limitations and Suggested Future Research 
As mentioned throughout this work, there are limitations with understanding the 
full effects of coefficients on balance measures in breakpoint regressions.  Because there 
is not currently an implementation of tobit analysis in the breakpoint context, some 
coefficients—especially for those teams with consistent sellouts—will be biased toward 
zero.  This issue may be resolved in a shorter term study with heterogeneous effects of 
balance measures in a censored panel model context.  This is the next step in the 
progression of the chapters presented here, and is already under way.  However, it is 
important to note that there are always sellouts for some tickets.  If we view front row 
seats and bleacher seats as a form of product differentiation by the team (with supply 
physically limited), then accounting for sellout of each separate product would be 
necessary.  As of yet, there are very few studies that fully account for the variation in 
ticket prices and viewing products around an entire stadium.  This would be a fruitful line 
of research in understanding the determinants of fan attendance and understanding the 




While the methods in Chapter 3 are sufficient for a first look at varying 
attendance across markets within a given league, understanding the economic factors that 
affect this demand is also an important addition.  Because of data availability, this is 
more appropriate in shorter term demand studies.  For example, teams in the lower half of 
the standings may have fans who attend games to see the opponent.  An in depth analysis 
of home fan interest in visiting team quality would be a natural progression from the 
research in this paper.  Meehan et al. (2007) have taken the research in this direction with 
the National League in MLB. 
 Variability in fans could also arise with respect to the substitutability of 
professional sports leagues may differ depending on the market.  Winfree (2009b) has 
taken the fan substitution research in this direction, and the breakpoint analysis presented 
here provides some limited additional information about the total sports demand in 
specific markets such as Boston and Pittsburgh.  Finally, a further understanding this 
phenomenon would inform team mangers of their direct competitors for entertainment 
dollars and antitrust issues involved in multiple team ownership within a single market.  
Evaluating a shorter term series of attendance, while controlling for other economic 
factors, is a suggested next step.  In this analysis, the researcher could evaluate the impact 
of other teams in a given market using a difference-in-differences approach when a new 
team arrives in town from another league. 
 Of course, substitution of sport fans may not be limited to spectator sport, but also 
sport participation or other entertainment options available within a city.  Because people 
generally have a fixed allocation for entertainment purposes, this could have important 




subsidies as well as leagues and their franchises deciding to venture into new markets.  
Understanding the full scope of the sport industry and the interaction between sport 
participation and spectator sport is a topic I would like to progress toward with the 
analysis here informing structural shifts in the market.  In fact there are important public 
health considerations in this context of sport consumption, in which Sports Economics 
research can play an important role. 
 Lastly, much of the literature regarding attendance and the Uncertainty of 
Outcome Hypothesis discusses uncertainty in a one-dimensional light as directly causing 
attendance changes.  However—as Rottenberg originally states in his seminal work and 
as El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) model—while uncertainty offers excitement, it seems 
reasonable to believe that a preference for the home team reaching the playoffs would 
dominate preferences for suspense and balance for many fans.  This interactive effect 
seems to be underemphasized in the literature and explicitly separating the two will be 
important if we want to understand the influence of uncertainty itself and the excitement 
it creates.  I recommend evaluation of direct and indirect effects of balance and team 
quality in order to more fully understand the interaction of these factors.  
 All in all, the work here lays a foundation for informed time series analysis on 
professional sports attendance data.  Without accounting for breaks, coefficient standard 
errors could be biased in both aggregate and cross-sectional panel considerations.  From 
the understanding of the time series properties of North American professional sports 
league attendance presented here, researchers will be well-equipped to correctly analyze 




TABLE 9.1: Summary of Uncertainty of Outcome Results 
 Support UOH No Influence Inverse UOH 
Leagues GU PU CSU GU PU CSU GU PU CSU 
MLB*  X  X  X    
NBA X  X     X  
NFL    X X X    
NHL    X    X X 
Franchises GU PU CSU GU PU CSU GU PU CSU 
MLB 1 4 1 13 12 14 2 0 1 
NBA 1 1 2 7 7 6 1 1 1 
NFL 4 1 4 8 10 9 1 2 0 
NHL 1 0 0 6 4 6 0 3 1 









MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL FRANCHISE ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
 
 
TABLE A.1: MLB Franchise Model 1B Break Point Test Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) SupFt(4) SupFt(5) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) SupF(4/3) SupF(5/4) Breaks 
BAL 185.89a 201.47a    201.47a 280.49a 67.86a    2 
BOS 58.12a 124.03a 110.78a 94.90a 68.07a 124.03a 168.63a 113.65a 28.97a 28.97a  3 
CHC 142.02a 110.63a 104.14a 103.95a 64.64a 142.02a 184.70a 31.36a 32.33a 4.36  3 
CHW 17.63a 17.89a 23.97a 27.52a 22.61a 27.52a 49.63a 40.69a 40.69a 13.23c 2.86 3 
CIN 150.56a 98.71a 82.08a 81.93a 76.91a 150.56a 168.88a 31.06a 30.35a 30.43a 6.88 2 
CLE 47.18a 38.55a 39.78a 36.99a 35.01a 47.18a 76.87a 16.93a 15.38b 11.26 9.77 3 
DET 21.19a 21.89a 36.31a 26.58a 23.66a 36.31a 54.34a 16.09b 26.49a 14.15c  3 
HOU 22.37a 14.80a    22.37a 22.37a 6.42    1 
LAD 40.75a 41.61a    41.61a 57.94a 7.09    1 
MIL 15.72a 18.97a    18.97a 26.42a 4.60    1 
NYM 74.52a 102.41a    102.41a 142.57a 46.71a    2 
OAK 44.64a 45.67a    45.67a 63.59a 13.31b    1 
PHI 83.49a 71.02a 62.48a 55.20a 50.96a 83.49a 111.89a 48.02a 48.02a 31.65a 10.24 3 
PIT 15.13b 38.45a 47.48a 41.00a 28.79a 47.48a 72.85a 84.92a 66.40a 10.35  4 
SFG 103.30a 54.90a    103.30a 103.30a 6.13    1 
STL 129.98a 124.04a 117.59a 90.54a 69.31a 129.98a 175.98a 42.74a 14.47b 7.00  3 








TABLE A.2: MLB Franchise Model 1B Estimated Break Dates (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 T3 T4  Team T1 T2 T3 T4 
           
BAL 1974 1991    LAD 1974    
 [73, 75] [90, 92]     [73, 75]    
           
BOS 1918 1945 1986   MIL 1995    
 [17, 20] [44, 49] [84, 89]    [90, 96]    
           
CHC 1932 1955 1983   NYM 1977 1994   
 [30, 33] [54, 58] [82, 89]    [76, 78] [92, 95]   
           
CHW 1945 1965 1993   OAK 1994    
 [42, 46] [63, 66] [91, 95]    [93, 97]    
           
CIN 1945 1969    PHI 1930 1945 1970  
 [43, 46] [68, 70]     [23, 31] [44, 46] [69, 71]  
           
CLE 1946 1964 1992   PIT 1927 1946 1961 1987 
 [43, 47] [63, 66] [90, 93]    [26, 28] [44, 47] [58, 62] [84, 89] 
           
DET 1918 1945 1967 1989  SFG 1970    
 [15, 19] [44, 46] [66, 70] [85, 90]   [69, 71]    
           
HOU 1978     STL 1945 1964 1981  
 [77, 80]      [44, 46] [62, 65] [80, 83]  
           









TABLE A.3: MLB Franchise Model 1B (Heterogeneous) Breakpoint Regression Results 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 α5 β5 
BAL -288 1804 1237 -28840 -117 35178 -1396 91264   
t-value (-3.03)a (0.76) (11.32)a (-5.82)a (-0.50) (3.11)a (-5.05)a (6.16)a   
BOS -273 3039 109 -2008.78 -310 26286 447 -16389 653 -39416 
t-value (-2.50)b (1.69)c (2.35)b (-1.21) (-4.41)a (5.56)a (9.84)a (-3.97)a (6.66)a (-3.98)a 
CHC 403 -14086 487 -24063 301 -20001 611 -40652   
t-value (7.09)a (-5.19)a (5.96)a (-5.12)a (5.24)a (-4.78)a (7.84)a (-5.42)a   
CHW 49 -8267 -130 6360.87 325 -22701     
t-value (1.05) (-2.73)a (-1.71)c (1.24) (5.56)a (-3.88)a     
CIN 38 -7064 4 -1453 142 1132.60     
t-value (1.09) (-3.13)a (0.04) (-0.31) (3.59)a (0.24)     
CLE 91 -9668 -1040 58480 264 -21410 -849 104045   
t-value (2.07)b (-3.02)a (-6.36)a (5.71)a (3.17)a (-2.94)a (-4.58)a (5.27)a   
DET 382 -17136 176 -14823 -439 23042 218 -15110 976 -90325 
t-value (5.47)a (-6.64)a (1.23) (-2.51)b (-4.81)a (4.21)a (2.39)b (-1.98)c (8.52)a (-7.84)a 
HOU 1110 -4738 638 -11818       
t-value (1.74)c (-0.82) (9.81)a (-1.65)       
LAD -268 10918 1093 -4895 343 8970     
t-value (-1.91)c (2.28)b (5.28)a (-0.66) (3.96)a (1.70)c     
MIL 339 -13656 1418 -47260       
t-value (3.11)a (-2.54)b (6.15)a (-5.40)a       
NYM -554 274 52 -997 1521 -59809     
t-value (-4.76)a (0.08) (0.10) (-0.06) (7.59)a (-6.84)a     
OAK 713 -13932 -1361 41140 -170 10484     
t-value (5.63)a (-3.07)a (-4.67)a (4.27)a (-0.38) (0.55)     
PHI 144 -12260 469 -25518 -57 -830 213 -7983   
t-value (1.45) (-3.43)a (2.19)b (-2.91)a (-0.56) (-0.13) (4.05)a (-1.50)   
PIT 238 -13545 311 -20816 -183 10885 180 -15082 191 -11002 
t-value (3.15)a (-5.05)a (3.09)a (-4.68)a (-1.25) (1.41) (2.75)a (-2.73)a (1.82)c (-1.03) 
SFG -564 2185 441 -10248 -8 21689     
t-value (-4.62)a (0.42) (4.32)a (-2.03)b (-0.02) (1.15)     
STL -70 -4857 -40 3558 -100 1485 462 -20641   
t-value (-1.83)c (-2.74)a (-0.43) (0.62) (-0.92) (1.76)c (8.62)a (-4.01)a   
a. Significant at the 99% critical level. b. Significant at the 95% critical level. c. Significant at the 90% critical level. αM and βM  







TABLE A.4: MLB Franchise Model 1B (Heterogeneous) Regression Coefficients 
 
Team TL CSU PU W% L1(W%) 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) Team TL CSU PU W% L1(W%) 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
              
BAL 1479 1081 18763 15633 9987 0.966 LAD 2962 -1601 -75499 41645 22412 0.863 
t-value (0.71) (0.67) (1.21) (2.52)a (1.78)c (0.972) t-value (1.63) (-1.16) (-3.99)a (4.79)a (2.79)a (0.884) 
              
BOS -2957 -3451 97 22623 8877 0.953 MIL -2599 2649 32693 16875 42576 0.826 
t-value (-1.66) (-3.00)a (0.01) (5.76)a (2.46)b (0.958) t-value (-1.08) (0.90) (-1.09) (1.49) (4.12)a (0.862) 
              
CHC 1142 -93 -28348 24486 12886 0.952 NYM -382 2293 -21382 45052 45679 0.933 
t-value (0.83) (-0.11) (-3.25)a (6.50)a (3.40)a (0.958) t-value (-0.22) (1.70)c (-1.15) (7.12)a (7.34)a (0.948) 
              
CHW 1198 -1773 4111 25139 12123 0.854 OAK -1892 -3878 34973 38158 26774 0.882 
t-value (0.50) (-1.14) (0.39) (5.04)a (2.46)b (0.871) t-value (-0.71) (-1.71)c (1.44) (5.42)a (3.89)a (0.905) 
              
CIN -3357 308 -18876 22548 7587 0.925 PHI -158 -803 -34403 31660 8858 0.909 
t-value (-2.17)b (0.35) (-1.94)c (5.38)a (1.82)c (0.932) t-value (-0.08) (-0.67) (-2.56)b (5.46)a (1.64) (0.920) 
              
CLE 1141 1838 -6723 22518 8172 0.894 PIT 2270 852 -11139 23645 12736 0.885 
t-value (0.44) (1.02) (-0.57) (3.89)a (1.40) (0.906) t-value (1.62) (1.02) (-1.24) (6.00)a (3.18)a (0.901) 
              
DET 5367 -1182 -739 31615 108745 0.904 SFG 1623 181 -38599 48086 26936 0.881 
t-value (2.74)a (-0.90) (-0.08) (8.33)a (2.73)a (0.916) t-value (0.68) (0.10) (-1.68) (4.51)a (2.82)a (0.899) 
              
HOU 642 5758 -49973 32847 22142 0.779 STL 1583 1394 -4812 21021 499 0.971 
t-value (0.23) (2.77)a (-1.83)c (2.46)b (1.66) (0.817) t-value (1.17) (1.74)c (-0.59) (5.47)a (0.13) (0.974) 
              
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 











TABLE A.5: MLB Franchise Model 1 Break Point Test Results (Homogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) SupFt(4) SupFt(5) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) SupF(4/3) SupF(5/4) Breaks 
BAL 214.05a 179.72a 330.31a 248.04a 243.31a 330.31a 534.24a 80.80a 41.36a 12.60 6.55 3 
BOS 61.22a 131.84a 96.00a 105.81a 75.32a 131.84a 188.02a 117.74a 29.84a 29.84a  4 
CHC 156.74a 138.53a 106.57a 114.65a 86.77a 156.74a 203.72a 27.39a 31.20a 9.41  3 
CHW 17.26a 15.83a 21.54a 26.52a 23.81a 26.52a 52.29a 43.92a 43.92a 13.38c  2 
CIN 157.01a 102.66a 84.40a 82.63a 70.28a 157.01a 157.01a 32.19a 31.04a 31.06a 5.36 2 
CLE 56.08a 44.08a 47.56a 44.56a 39.10a 56.08a 85.86a 15.78b 35.29a 12.22 7.81 3 
DET 21.76a 20.58a 30.89a 27.69a 24.29a 30.89a 53.33a 14.52b 28.64a 16.26b  4 
HOU 21.67a 12.80a 16.26a 19.96a 16.37a 21.67a 35.94a 9.25 6.61 6.66 34.66a 1 
LAD 38.44a 34.90a 34.87a 37.55a 47.09a 47.09a 103.40a 20.36a 7.68 11.47 3.69 2 
MIL 12.08b 17.15a 18.92a 22.71a 13.35a 22.71a 40.35a 17.85a 25.09a 1.72 1.33 2 
NYM 34.32a 54.72a 50.03a 60.10a 46.45a 60.10a 106.79a 40.54a 9.60 4.76  2 
OAK 35.31a 21.95a 26.89a 25.12a 78.69a 78.69a 172.78a 16.80b 16.80b 20.28a 15.75b 2 
PHI 86.27a 72.57a 57.35a 50.96a 45.75a 86.27a 100.45a 51.10a 51.10a 34.97a 10.78 3 
PIT 15.95a 38.05a 30.98a 32.45a 24.67a 38.05a 57.67a 62.30a 51.30a 45.76a  4 
SDN 8.96 10.98b 10.16b 11.28a 9.01a 11.28 20.44a 13.33b 12.95c 29.40a 0.34 0 
SFG 68.12a 72.52a 74.19a 63.98a 50.12a 74.19a 113.68a 37.60a 10.68 3.38 1.47 2 
STL 160.13a 151.07a 137.00a 108.22a 83.68a 160.13a 205.03a 47.16a 17.05b 6.02  3 
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 











TABLE A.6: MLB Franchise Model 1 Estimated Break Dates (Homogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 T3 T4  Team T1 T2 T3 T4 
           
BAL 1974 1991 2001   LAD 1973 1986   
 [73, 75] [90, 92] [00, 02]    [72, 75] [85, 88]   
           
BOS 1918 1945 1966 1993  MIL 1983 1993   
 [17, 20] [44, 46] [65, 67] [92, 95]   [82, 85] [90, 94]   
           
CHC 1932 1955 1983   NYM 1984 1993   
 [30, 33] [54, 58] [82, 90]    [83. 86] [91, 94]   
           
CHW 1945 1975    OAK 1988 2000   
 [42, 46] [73, 76]     [86, 89] [99, 04]   
           
CIN 1945 1969    PHI 1930 1945 1970  
 [43, 46] [68, 70]     [24, 31] [44, 46] [69, 71]  
           
CLE 1946 1964 1992   PIT 1927 1946 1961 1987 
 [44, 47] [63, 66] [90, 93]    [25, 28] [43, 47] [56, 63] [84, 89] 
           
DET 1929 1945 1967 1989  SFG 1977 1999   
 [27, 40] [43, 46] [66, 69] [84, 90]   [76, 78] [98, 00]   
           
HOU 1970     STL 1945 1964 1981  
 [69, 72]      [44, 46] [62, 65] [80, 83]  
           









TABLE A.7: MLB Franchise Model 1 (Homogeneous) Breakpoint Regression Results 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 α5 β5 
BAL -288 1804 1237 -28840 -117 35178 -1396 91264   
t-value (-3.03)a (0.76) (11.32)a (-5.82)a (-0.50) (3.11)a (-5.05)a (6.16)a   
BOS -273 3039 109 -2009 -310 26286 447 -16389 653 -39416 
t-value (-2.50)b (1.69)c (2.35)b (-1.21) (-4.41)a (5.56)a (9.84)a (-3.97)a (6.66)a (-3.98)a 
CHC 403 -14086 487 -24063 301 -20001 611 -40652   
t-value (7.09)a (-5.19)a (5.96)a (-5.12)a (5.24)a (-4.78)a (7.84)a (-5.42)a   
CHW 49 -8267 -130 6361 325 -22701     
t-value (1.05) (-2.73)a (-1.71)c (1.24) (5.56)a (-3.88)a     
CIN 38 -7064 4 -1453 142 1133     
t-value (1.09) (-3.13)a (0.04) (-0.31) (3.59)a (0.24)     
CLE 91 -9668 -1040 58480 264 -21410 -849 104045   
t-value (2.07)b (-3.02)a (-6.36)a (5.71)a (3.17)a (-2.94)a (-4.58)a (5.27)a   
DET 382 -17136 176 -14823 -439 23042 218 -15110 976 -90325 
t-value (5.47)a (-6.64)a (1.23) (-2.51)b (-4.81)a (4.21)a (2.39)b (-1.98)c (8.52)a (-7.84)a 
HOU 1110 -4738 638 -11818       
t-value (1.74)c (-0.82) (9.81)a (-1.65)       
LAD -268 10918 1093 -4895 343 8970     
t-value (-1.91)c (2.28)b (5.28)a (-0.66) (3.96)a (1.70)c     
MIL 1138 -1390 167 7335 1346 -27724     
t-value (4.18)a (-0.23) (0.44) (0.81) (6.55)a (-3.30)a     
NYM -554 274 52 -997 1521 -59809     
t-value (-4.76)a (0.08) (0.10) (-0.06) (7.59)a (-6.84)a     
OAK 713 -13932 -1361 41140 -170 10484     
t-value (5.63)a (-3.07)a (-4.67)a (4.27)a (-0.38) (0.55)     
PHI 144 -12260 469 -25518 -57 -830 213 -7983   
t-value (1.45) (-3.43)a (2.19)b (-2.91)a (-0.56) (-0.13) (4.05)a (-1.50)   
PIT 238 -13545 311 -20816 -183 10885 180 -15082 191 -11002 
t-value (3.15)a (-5.05)a (3.09)a (-4.68)a (-1.25) (1.41) (2.75)a (-2.73)a (1.82)c (-1.03) 
SFG -564 2185 441 -10248 -8 21689     
t-value (-4.62)a (0.42) (4.32)a (-2.03)b (-0.02) (1.15)     
STL -70 -4857 -40 3558 -100 1485 462 -20641   
t-value (-1.83)c (-2.74)a (-0.43) (0.62) (-0.92) (1.76)c (8.62)a (-4.01)a   
a. Significant at the 99% critical level. b. Significant at the 95% critical level. c. Significant at the 90% critical level. αM and βM  







TABLE A.8: MLB Franchise Model 1 (Homogeneous) Regression Coefficients 
 
Team TL CSU PU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) Team TL CSU PU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
            
BAL 2674 -531 7837 24243 0.978 LAD 2388 416 -67546 34837 0.886 
t-value (1.56) (-0.39) (0.61) (4.94)a (0.982) t-value (1.39) (0.31) (-3.92)a (4.25)a (0.906) 
            
BOS -2959 -1949 -1592 13481 0.974 MIL -2038 -3176 6475 24473 0.794 
t-value (-2.22)b (-2.22)b (-0.27) (4.59)a (0.977) t-value (-0.73) (-1.19) (0.20) (2.04)b (0.841) 
            
CHC 1008 321 -30218 29134 0.941 NYM 2779 1369 -24272 58223 0.871 
t-value (0.68) (0.36) (-3.26)a (7.52)a (0.947) t-value (1.08) (0.77) (-0.96) (7.11)a (0.895) 
            
CHW 3699 -1422 3095 29418 0.831 OAK 652 -2554 -10990 40565 0.856 
t-value (1.54) (-0.91) (0.27) (6.13)a (0.845) t-value (0.20) (-0.97) (-0.43) (5.07)a (0.888) 
            
CIN -3465 376 -19632 25238 0.923 PHI -151 -925 -36253 36026 0.908 
t-value (-2.21)b (0.42) (-1.99)b (6.36)a (0.930) t-value (-0.07) (-0.77) (-2.68)a (6.94)a (0.917) 
            
CLE 1069 2622 -8773 24129 0.893 PIT 1717 1102 -17650 28571 0.872 
t-value (0.41) (1.52) (-0.75) (4.23)a (0.904) t-value (1.16) (1.26) (-1.91)c (7.43)a (0.888) 
            
DET 5386 -1034 -701 35046 0.894 SFG -2292 -464 -32040 37221 0.921 
t-value (2.62)b (-0.78) (-0.08) (9.21)a (0.907) t-value (-1.15) (-0.30) (-1.62) (4.29)a (0.935) 
            
HOU -447 6826 -62461 33088 0.781 STL 1622 1405 -4703 21090 0.971 
t-value (-0.15) (3.62)a (-2.23)a (2.45)a (0.814) t-value (1.24) (1.77)c (-0.58) (5.57)a (0.974) 
            
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 









NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION FRANCHISE ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
 
 
TABLE B.1: NBA Franchise Model B Break Point Sequential Test Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) Breaks 
         
ATL 12.46** 16.45***  16.45*** 22.91*** 11.37*  1 
         
BOS 64.48*** 50.61*** 50.80*** 64.48*** 84.69*** 10.87* 11.53* 2 
         
CLE 30.19*** 25.96***  30.19*** 36.15*** 11.31**  1 
         
DET 44.79*** 53.67***  53.67*** 74.72*** 7.36  1 
         
NYK 143.17*** 133.33*** 123.09*** 143.17*** 205.19*** 13.93** 1.27 2 
         
PHI 65.38*** 53.01***  65.38*** 72.41*** 9.54*  1 
         
PHO 143.63*** 83.26***  143.63*** 143.63*** 2.40  1 
         
POR 96.56*** 70.16***  96.56*** 97.69*** 122.51***  2 
         
SEA 97.39*** 95.98***  97.39*** 133.63*** 12.92**  2 
“***” Significant at the 99% critical level 
“**” Significant at the 95% critical level 




TABLE B.2: NBA Franchise Model B Break Dates (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 
   
ATL 1985-86  
 [82-83, 86-87]  
   
BOS 1960-61 1973-74 
 [58-59, 61-62] [71-72, 74-75] 
   
CLE 1984-85  
 [83-84, 85-86]  
   
DET 1982-83  
 [80-81, 83-84]  
   
NYK 1976-77 1995-96 
 [75-76, 77-78] [92-93, 08-09] 
   
PHI 1995-96  
 [94-95, 96-97]  
   
PHO 1989-90  
 [88-89, 90-91]  
   
POR 1979-80 1994-95 
 [78-79, 80-81] [93-94, 95-96] 
   
SEA 9181-82 1992-93 
 [80-81, 82-83] [91-92, 93-94] 
   







TABLE B.3: NBA Franchise Model B Breakpoint Regression Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 
ATL 276 669 181 5252   
t-value (3.93)*** (0.38) (4.01)*** (2.13)**   
BOS 85 2633 344 -1388 163 6370 
t-value (0.98) (3.25)*** (5.00)*** (-0.85) (9.60)*** (5.34)*** 
CLE 56 4237 156 8140   
t-value (0.53) (2.31)** (3.74)*** (3.57)***   
DET 301 -3965 51 9835   
t-value (5.46)*** (-2.03)** (1.14) (3.43)***   
NYK 567 -5754 328 -5168 248 -1371 
t-value (18.84)*** (-3.64)*** (5.53)*** (-2.67)** (2.58)** (-0.24) 
PHI 400 -1457 -302 24843   
t-value (17.52)*** (-1.18) (-3.69)*** (7.32)***   
PHO 312 3686 -111 18583   
t-value (10.53)*** (3.51)*** (-3.02)*** (10.58)***   
POR 536 2847 -41 7578 -108 17282 
t-value (3.45)*** (2.04)** (-0.71) (4.38)*** (-1.79)* (6.22)*** 
SEA 566 -4593 281 -8566 719 -24258 
t-value (7.53)*** (-3.42)*** (3.10)*** (-3.28)*** (7.57)*** (-5.09)*** 
*** Significant at the 99% critical level 
** Significant at the 95% critical level 
* Significant at the 90% critical level 







TABLE B.4: NBA Franchise Model B Balance and W% Coefficients (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team TL PU CSU W% L1(W%) 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
ATL -1453 10130 -1659 2748 5039 0.901 
t-value (-0.61) (1.21) (-1.18) (1.27) (1.98)* (0.920) 
       
BOS 1458 5074 669 3773 -1886 0.963 
t-value (1.32) (1.05) (1.13) (3.44)*** (-1.67)* (0.969) 
       
CLE -1643 -18551 -5106 11742 4703 0.934 
t-value (-0.62) (-2.03)** (-2.95)*** (4.85)*** (2.07)** (0.948) 
       
DET -4976 -1798 822 6946 7044 0.948 
t-value (-1.70)* (-0.19) (0.52) (2.94)*** (2.78)*** (0.956) 
       
NYK 680 12358 -946 8370 6490 0.942 
t-value (0.47) (1.84)* (-1.21) (4.32)*** (3.64)*** (0.952) 
       
PHI 6377 2152 -3737 4532 7430 0.944 
t-value (3.43)*** (0.31) (-3.68)*** (2.87)*** (4.76)*** (0.953) 
       
PHO -1739 3918 -2179 3496 3710 0.970 
t-value (-1.22) (0.83) (-2.39)** (2.68)** (3.37)*** (0.976) 
       
POR -1997 8658 39 8169 1026 0.953 
t-value (-1.13) (1.40) (0.03) (4.97)*** (0.58) (0.965) 
       
SEA 91 -12423 3825 15403 9367 0.937 
t-value (0.06) (-2.16)** (3.53)*** (7.93)*** (5.26)*** (0.953) 








TABLE B.5: NBA Franchise Break Point Sequential Test Results (Homogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) SupFt(4) SupFt(5) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) SupF(4/3) SupF(5/4) Breaks 
             
ATL 15.13b 16.45a 19.20a 28.89a 28.72a 28.89a 52.59a 34.51a 132.32a 132.32a 19.60b 5 
             
BOS 58.66a 40.17a 51.61a 54.27a 44.52a 58.66a 89.02a 24.08a 19.26a 21.10a 4.46 4 
             
CLE 30.87a 28.30a 21.22a 23.22a 25.89a 30.87a 47.42a 15.15b 15.99b 142.04a 15.15c 2 
             
DET 55.30a 47.83a 72.94a 63.03a 62.38a 72.94a 114.24a 19.52a 47.91a 15.71b  10.97 2 
             
NYK 92.07a 119.66a 94.59a 94.50a 100.44a 119.66a 183.94a 44.91a 9.81 29.11a 8.47 3 
             
PHI 62.77a 41.17a 29.75a 27.83a 30.68a 62.77a 62.77a 9.03 3.42 63.16a 7.64 1 
             
PHO 103.96a 93.00a 78.87a 78.72a 82.36a 103.96a 150.83a 37.82a 37.82a 44.30a 44.30a 4 
             
POR 72.47a 80.98a 184.78a 141.85a 143.92a 184.78a 269.03a 195.59a 229.70a 392.61a 338.75a 4 
             
SEA 106.49a 108.95a 95.70a 73.30a 76.41a 108.95a 139.94a 19.40a 11.36 8.98 8.98 2 
             
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 















TABLE B.6: NBA Franchise Break Dates (Homogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
ATL 1981-82 1985-86 1990-91 1996-97 2001-02 
 [80-81, 82-83] [84-85, 86-87] [89-90, 92-93] [95-96, 97-98] [00-01, 02-03]  
      
BOS 1958-59 1973-74 1994-95 2000-01  
 [55-56, 59-60] [71-72, 74-75] [93-94, 95-96] [99-00, 01-02]  
      
CLE 1976-77 1995-96    
 [75-76 ,77-78] [94-95, 96-97]    
      
DET 1977-78 1987-88    
 [76-77, 78-79] [86-87, 88-89]    
      
NYK 1968-69 1974-75 1983-84   
 [67-68, 69-70] [73-74, 75-76] [82-83, 84-85]   
      
PHI 2003-04     
 [02-03, 04-05]     
      
PHO 1975-76 1991-92 2000-01 2005-06  
 [74-75, 76-77] [90-91, 92-93] [99-00, 02-03] [03-04, 08-09]  
      
POR 1979-80 1987-88 1994-95 2002-03  
 [78-79, 80-81] [70-71, 88-89] [93-94, 95-96] [00-01, 03-04]  
      
SEA 1980-81 1986-87    
 [79-80, 81-82] [85-86, 88-89]    







TABLE B.7: NBA Franchise Breakpoint Regression Results (Homogeneous) 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 α5 β5 α6 β6 
ATL 446 3048 453 -682 -26 12832 161 6714 -975 45158 286 3553 
t-value (7.24)a (2.89 a (1.78) (-0.17) (-0.10) (2.19)b (0.84) (1.36) (-3.62)a (5.03)a (1.86)c (0.62) 
BOS 159 1007 347 -3112 199 3307 -498 39399 219 1445   
t-value (1.99)b (1.65) (8.31)a (-2.89)a (6.89)a (2.49)b (-3.02)a (4.82)a (2.40)b (0.28)   
CLE 735 4253 791 -1013 120 13033       
t-value (2.24)b (2.63)b (10.46)a (-0.62) (1.22) (3.83)a       
DET 100 450 1659 -32845 -10 16385       
t-value (1.41) (0.26) (7.75)a (-6.40)a (-0.18) (5.74)a       
NYK 468 -2839 313 4408 -761 31133 251 337     
t-value (12.08)a (-2.38)b (1.40) (0.83) (-5.92)a (7.54)a (10.32)a (0.21)     
PHI 411 -270 -132 17899         
t-value (21.15)a (-0.22) (-0.47) (1.42)         
PHO 111 3608 199 5499 7 15198 -47 15557 -42 15875   
t-value (0.91) (4.53)a (4.38)a (4.46)a (0.09) (5.50)a (-0.21) (1.93) c (-0.14) (1.29)   
POR 675 4830 -44 11681 58 9637 -185 23923 686 -9064   
t-value (8.81)a (5.79)a (-0.50) (8.33)a (0.57) (3.84)a (-2.02)b (8.24)a (5.53)a (-2.13)b   
SEA 903 -1215 -1419 28544 302 -2412       
t-value (10.91)a (-0.97) (-5.00)a (5.45)a (6.46)a (-1.04)       
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 
c. Significant at the 90% critical level 
















TABLE B.8: NBA Franchise Balance and W% Coefficients (Homogeneous) 
 
Team TL PU CSU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
ATL -5570 -4630 36 3688 0.963 
t-value (-3.66)*** (-0.86) (0.04) (2.47)** (0.977) 
      
BOS 1199 386 -121 5675 0.981 
t-value (1.41) (0.10) (-0.29) (6.60)*** (0.985) 
      
CLE -2724 -9804 -8236 11017 0.948 
t-value (-0.96) (-1.12) (-5.12)*** (4.99)*** (0.960) 
      
DET 342 5859 -2071 8439 0.959 
t-value (0.12) (0.66) (-1.50) (4.10)*** (0.966) 
      
NYK 1579 4023 483 10300 0.971 
t-value (1.46) (0.83) (0.84) (8.75)*** (0.977) 
      
PHI 4095 10863 -4759 9764 0.937 
t-value (2.06)b (1.42) (-4.20)*** (8.28)*** (0.946) 
      
PHO -419 9100 -625 5339 0.979 
t-value (-0.28) (1.98)** (-0.81) (5.10)*** (0.986) 
      
POR -1247 3630 -1294 4094 0.983 
t-value (-1.08) (0.85) (-1.70) (3.64)*** (0.989) 
      
SEA -717 -4012 2869 12049 0.915 
t-value (-0.36) (-0.54) (2.43)** (6.94)*** (0.934) 









NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE FRANCHISE ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
 
 
TABLE C.1: NFL Franchise Model B Break Point Sequential Test Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) Breaks 
ATL 49.84*** 35.37***  49.84*** 49.84*** 2.99  1 
BUF 2.86 6.12  6.12 8.52 5.26  0 
CHI 51.70*** 33.61*** 26.25*** 51.70*** 51.70*** 7.30 2.57 1 
CIN 40.57*** 34.41***  40.57*** 47.91*** 13.12**  2 
DEN 8.93 12.98***  12.98** 18.07*** 11.76**  1 
DET 46.64*** 35.59*** 45.44*** 46.64*** 75.75*** 13.14** 95.25*** 2 
KC 27.47*** 43.83***  43.83*** 61.02*** 4.17  1 
MIA 38.04*** 44.08***  44.08*** 61.38*** 33.13***  2 
MIN 21.98*** 29.40***  29.40*** 40.93*** 33.84***  2 
NYG 72.10*** 58.35*** 39.40*** 72.10*** 77.04*** 7.07 3.58 1 
PHI 289.47*** 159.05*** 112.36*** 289.47*** 289.47*** 22.04*** 6.48 2 
PIT 28.63*** 36.17*** 22.54*** 36.17*** 47.75*** 22.28*** 12.35* 3 
SD 7.97 7.02  7.97 9.77 5.67  0 
SF 39.08*** 20.88*** 14.84*** 39.08*** 39.08*** 3.13 10.66 1 
WAS 47.77*** 106.41*** 101.79*** 106.41*** 169.69*** 69.80*** 11.78* 2 




TABLE C.2: NFL Franchise Model B Break Dates (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 T3  Team T1 T2 T3 
         
ATL 1989    MIN 1981 1996  
 [88, 90]     [80, 82] [95, 97]  
         
CHI 1948    NYG 1956   
 [47, 50]     [55, 58]   
         
CIN 1979 1991   PHI 1958 1981  
 [78, 80] [89, 92]    [57, 59] [80, 86]  
         
DEN 1982    PIT 1948 1969 1986 
 [81, 84]     [47, 54] [68, 70] [81, 88] 
         
DET 1950 1985   SF 1961   
 [48, 52] [82, 87]    [60, 63]   
         
KC 1988    WAS 1962 1995  
 [87, 90]     [61, 63] [94, 96]  
         
MIA 1983 1995       
 [82, 84] [94, 96]       
         







TABLE C.3: NFL Franchise Model B Breakpoint Regression Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 
ATL -1245 47746 1025 8002     
t-value (-5.43)a (6.20)a (4.17)a (0.79)     
CHI 1348 9449 385 27134     
t-value (6.36)a (2.60)b (12.88)a (10.35)a     
CIN -1988 57462 900 31429 1098 17764   
t-value (-7.30)a (17.08)a (4.05)a (6.09)a (9.27)a (4.12)a   
DEN 2008 38260 276 54612     
t-value (6.23)a (8.80)a (3.76)a (9.27)a     
DET 735 10232 755 23201 659 14554   
t-value (1.78)c (1.38) (4.75)a (3.26)a (2.99)a (0.90)   
KC -624 56467 389 58921     
t-value (-2.46)b (7.80)a (1.71) (5.59)a     
MIA -1479 37315 422 23183 -430 57292   
t-value (-5.24)a (7.04)a (1.63) (3.60)a (-1.89)c (7.47)a   
MIN 114 30080 -83 45217 -9 51087   
t-value (0.98) (13.10)a (-0.62) (9.96)a (-0.05) (6.61)a   
NYG 113 30098 413 46612     
t-value (0.56) (5.02)a (6.98)a (8.67)a     
PHI 245 20116 612 38720 371 40557   
t-value (1.68) (6.88)a (3.97)a (7.55)a (3.74)a (5.85)a   
PIT 1584 3853 523 12574 404 26510 605 11705 
t-value (7.61)a (1.35) (4.05)a (3.26)a (2.27)b (3.21)a (5.58)a (1.58) 
SF 2492 18553 713 19297     
t-value (6.30)a (5.03)a (13.77)a (4.98)a     
WAS 66 27867 180 45667 1938 -46730   
t-value (0.50) (7.33)a (2.07)b (11.39)a (7.29)a (-2.68)b   
“a”, “b”, “c” Indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% critical level, respectively/ 







TABLE C.4: NFL Franchise Model B Balance and W% Coefficients (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team TL PU CSU W% L1(W%) 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐)  Team TL PU CSU W% L1(W%) 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
               
ATL 7494 -15450 8327 9455 7454 0.697  MIN 3768 18140 3652 4491 6339 0.937 
t-value (2.31)b (-0.58) (1.53) (1.69) (1.29) (0.755)  t-value (3.04)a (2.07)b (1.80)c (2.07)b (2.86)a (0.950) 
               
CHI 2026 697 -810 9674 2397 0.923  NYG -381 -9898 -5786 8261 1790 0.896 
t-value (1.57) (0.08) (-0.44) (4.38)a (1.14) (0.931)  t-value (-0.16) (-0.63) (-1.79)c (2.25)b (0.50) (0.907) 
               
CIN 941 4458 -3528 7755 3387 0.864  PHI -826 -16685 -2912 -2736 12314 0.955 
t-value (0.70) (0.36) (-1.62) (3.16)a (1.32) (0.899)  t-value (-0.43) (-1.62) (-1.31) (-0.97) (4.36)a (0.961) 
               
DEN 4799 -33064 2388 11212 4262 0.900  PIT 2283 11241 -2276 1277 4299 0.959 
t-value (2.58)b (-2.50)b (0.91) (3.13)a (1.36) (0.920)  t-value (1.53) (1.25) (-1.23) (0.48) (1.70) (0.966) 
               
DET 853 -32680 -5136 14406 9638 0.848  SF 2087 7860 -879 7708 5033 0.862 
t-value (0.27) (-1.79)c (-1.34) (2.95)a (1.95)c (0.868)  t-value (1.12) (0.52) (-0.28) (2.42)b (1.61) (0.881) 
               
KC -1891 14505 -9238 8288 7397 0.836  WAS -3835 3351 -5362 3386 4033 0.960 
t-value (-0.68) (0.55) (-1.94)c (1.37) (1.26) (0.869)  t-value (-2.14)b (0.32) (-2.37)a (1.07) (1.28) (0.966) 
               
MIA 9026 63819 -1910 18935 6793 0.863         
t-value (4.65)a (4.04)a (-0.59) (5.55)a (2.13)b (0.898)         
               
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 











TABLE C.5: NFL Franchise Break Point Sequential Test Results (Homogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) SupFt(4) SupFt(5) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) SupF(4/3) SupF(5/4) Breaks 
             
ATL 66.32a 46.79a 38.95a 33.95a 41.14a 66.32a 75.34a 12.98c 14.03c 14.03c 5.61 1 
             
BUF 10.09 7.19 10.99 12.36 7.99 12.36c 20.28a 11.82 35.40a 5.69 5.69 0 
             
CHI 85.84a 54.22a 45.09a 38.52a 35.21a 85.84a 85.84a 9.52 8.70 13.01 13.01 1 
             
CIN 37.74a 53.46a 43.34a 37.45a 32.44a 53.46a 67.09a 21.50a 46.78a 46.78a 46.78a 2 
             
DEN 94.93a 60.06a 61.24a 49.83a 43.13a 94.93a 94.93a 8.38 6.41 3838.7a 3838.7a 1 
             
DET 50.07a 40.29a 55.72a 58.61a 58.25a 58.61a 106.68a 11.74c 49.44a 49.44a 27.96a 1 
             
KC 40.14a 41.31a 32.52a 38.26a 37.83a 41.31a 69.28a 46.73a 63.25a 33.77a 183.29a 3 
             
MIA 24.71a 34.97a 28.63a 28.77a 25.24a 34.97a 47.20a 37.34a 6.16 23.27a 3.08 3 
             
MIN 15.31b 28.67a 41.35a 51.99a 57.82a 57.82a 105.90a 36.90a 41.68a 41.68a 27.00a 5 
             
NYG 73.54a 84.17a 52.23a 56.80a 47.98a 84.17a 105.63a 28.76a 6.72 12.85 11.85 2 
             
PHI 285.39a 193.49a 141.98a 115.13a 98.68a 285.39a 285.39a 18.26a 18.26b 4.98 4.98 2 
             
PIT 25.92a 40.11a 39.64a 39.85a 34.59a 40.11a 65.37a 17.29a 22.80a 28.56a 4.33 2 
             
SD 23.47a 16.64a 20.08a 19.47a 16.96a 23.47a 31.93a 7.41 13.74c 7.34 4.34 1 
             
SF 51.10a 50.41a 53.78a 55.16a 47.17a 55.16a 90.48a 20.32a 8.34 9.53 15.04c 2 
             
WAS 51.67a 152.51a 204.61a 278.70a 250.63a 278.70a 459.02a 133.37a 33.21a 20.80a 20.80a 4 
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 










TABLE C.6: NFL Franchise Break Dates (Homogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 T3 T4 T5  Team T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
             
ATL 1989      MIN 1964 1981 1986 1996 2000 
 [88, 90]       [63, 65] [80, 82] [85, 89] [95, 98] [99, 01] 
             
CHI 1945      NYG 1946 1956    
 [42, 46]       [45, 47] [55, 57]    
             
CIN 1979 1991     PHI 1960 1981    
 [78, 80] [90, 92]      [59, 61] [80, 84]    
             
DEN 1975      PIT 1954 1969    
 [74, 76]       [53, 55] [68, 70]    
             
DET 1951      SD 1973     
 [47, 52]       [72, 74]     
             
KC 1981 1992 2005    SF 1956 1969    
 [80, 82] [91, 93] [03, 06]     [55, 57] [68, 70]    
             
MIA 1983 1989 1995    WAS 1949 1962 1979 1996  
 [82, 84] [88, 90] [94, 96]     [48, 50] [61, 63] [78, 85] [95, 97]  
             












TABLE C.7: NFL Franchise Breakpoint Regression Results (Homogeneous) 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 α5 β5 α6 β6 
ATL -1245 50371 1091 8730         
t-value (-5.82)a (7.04)a (4.57)a (0.87)         
CHI 676 15070 384 29191         
t-value (2.54)b (4.68)a (14.48)a (13.52)a         
CIN -1919 57851 924 31893 1130 17032       
t-value (-6.82)a (17.05)a (4.12)a (6.12)a (9.62)a (3.93)a       
DEN -305 46621 167 61718         
t-value (-0.56) (14.61)a (4.10)a (17.30)a         
DET 598 15023 275 41217         
t-value (1.56) (2.18)b (3.68)a (6.76)a         
KC -412 56030 3534 -12607 -246 78090 --963 109381     
t-value (-0.89) (8.31)a (7.28)a (-1.17) (-0.67) (5.75)\a (-0.45) (1.31)     
MIA -1548 42760 -1226 56659 1438 3444 -586 65925     
t-value (-5.34)a (7.56)a (-1.53) (3.63)a (1.99)b (0.21) (-2.81)a (9.21)a     
MIN 415 29508 -187 40584 1547 11300 57 45857 872 21181 -287 68974 
t-value (0.59) (12.24)a (-2.26)b (19.88)a (3.07)a (0.90) (0.39) (9.54)a (1.42) (0.89) (-1.53) (8.40)a 
NYG 1949 23051 1101 10642 409 49055       
t-value (5.66)a (4.93)a (2.10)b (1.13) (8.91)a (12.82)a       
PHI 550 19724 276 54328 337 45599       
t-value (4.30)a (7.04)a (1.59) (9.23)a (3.38)a (6.63)a       
PIT 1049 9576 1125 -3326 380 29819       
t-value (8.07)a (3.81)a (5.06)a (-0.50) (8.03)a (7.36)a       
SD 1452 44667 691 36154         
t-value (0.92) (8.26)a (11.97)a (9.33)a         
SF 2322 18684 -2280 66132 640 22822       
t-value (2.96)a (5.13)a (-7.39)a (14.34)a (11.92)a (5.57)a       
WAS 767 26154 947 9420 389 39777 123 48198 1336 -4432   
t-value (3.81)a (9.43)a (5.24)a (2.43)b (2.83)a (9.20)a (1.02) (6.72)a (7.43)a (-0.38)   
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 
c. Significant at the 90% critical level 








TABLE C.8: NFL Franchise Balance and W% Coefficients (Homogeneous) 
 
Team TL PU CSU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) Team TL PU CSU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
            
ATL 8275 -16767 7202 9505 0.693 MIN 3366 8211 25 6647 0.978 
t-value (2.64)** (-0.64) (1.38) (1.74) (0.743) t-value (4.01)*** (1.37) (0.02) (4.63)*** (0.985) 
            
CHI 1636 -4752 425 9096 0.935 NYG -198 -15351 -5566 6315 0.938 
t-value (1.38) (-0.57) (0.26) (4.66)*** (0.941) t-value (-0.11) (-1.25) (-2.25)** (2.16)** (0.945) 
            
CIN 1100 9938 -3166 7810 0.860 PHI -2074 -13182 -6577 8210 0.955 
t-value (0.81) (0.83) (-1.45) (3.14)*** (0.893) t-value (-1.10) (-1.28) (-3.00)*** (3.30)*** (0.960) 
            
DEN 4239 -2027 -758 6191 0.944 PIT 1265 4641 -4189 4852 0.956 
t-value (3.35)*** (-0.18) (-0.41) (2.23)** (0.954) t-value (0.88) (0.51) (-2.24)** (1.89)* (0.961) 
            
DET 3662 -25454 -5232 14327 0.823 SD -893 -22352 -3290 13895 0.847 
t-value (1.23) (-1.31) (-1.27) (2.84)*** (0.839) t-value (-0.44) (-1.39) (-1.05) (3.89)*** (0.874) 
            
KC 19 50978 -15610 10047 0.884 SF 1954 26203 -937 9257 0.903 
t-value (0.01) (2.24)** (-3.34)*** (1.88)* (0.917) t-value (1.13) (1.93)* (-0.36) (3.71)*** (0.918) 
            
MIA 9588 72620 -2808 16792 0.869 WAS -2294 -13878 -2682 5200 0.986 
t-value (4.78)*** (5.22)*** (-0.86) (4.49)*** (0.906) t-value (-1.96)* (-2.13)** (-1.80)* (2.56)** (0.988) 
            
*** Significant at the 99% critical level 
** Significant at the 95% critical level 















NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE FRANCHISE ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
 
 
TABLE D.1: NHL Franchise Model B Break Point Sequential Test Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) Breaks 
         
BOS 61.21*** 49.54*** 55.73*** 61.21*** 92.91*** 17.00*** 7.39 2 
         
CHI 18.16*** 26.16*** 20.82*** 26.16*** 34.70*** 14.54** 15.50** 2 
         
DET 139.43*** 64.50*** 41.79*** 139.43*** 139.43*** 6.52 6.52 1 
         
LAK 9.79* 19.99***  19.99*** 27.83*** 17.45***  2 
         
NYR 75.19*** 63.49*** 49.74*** 75.19*** 83.82*** 50.90*** 5.18 2 
         
PHI 7.17 35.77***  35.77*** 49.81*** 156.23***  0 
         
STL 27.41*** 19.41***  27.41*** 27.41*** 9.25*  1 
         
“***” Significant at the 99% critical level 
“**” Significant at the 95% critical level 







TABLE D.2: NHL Franchise Model B Break Dates (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 
   
BOS 1975-1976 1998-1999 
 [74-75, 76-77] [95-96, 01-02] 
   
CHI 1967-1968 1981-1982 
 [66-67, 68-69] [80-81, 82-83] 
   
DET 1982-1983  
 [81-82, 83-84]  
   
LAK 1986-1987 1997-1998 
 [85-86, 87-88] [96-97, 01-02] 
   
NYR 1976-1977 1991-1992 
 [75-76, 77-78] [90-91, 94-95] 
   
STL 1985-86  
 [84-85, 89-90]  
   















TABLE D.3: NHL Franchise Model B Breakpoint Regression Results (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 
BOS 148 7957 223 2238 103 7467 
t-value (5.60)*** (11.00)*** (7.51)*** (1.45) (1.35) (1.79)* 
CHI 187 566 -350 10628 26 4482 
t-value (2.06)** (0.47) (-3.45)*** (3.52)*** (0.79) (1.88)* 
DET 143 6726 -28 15966   
t-value (6.35)*** (6.06)*** (-1.01) (14.03)***   
LAK 94 5788 -265 17833 170 6605 
t-value (2.44)** (5.45)*** (-3.20)*** (6.14)*** (1.84)* (1.58) 
NYR 295 8545 -111 18531 21 14898 
t-value (17.25)*** (13.33)*** (-3.04)*** (12.57)*** (0.88) (9.77)*** 
STL -353 8094 141 1487   
t-value (-4.98)*** (4.10)*** (2.86)*** (0.51)   
“***”, “**”, “*” Indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% critical level, respectively/ 







TABLE D.4: NHL Franchise Model B Balance and W% Coefficients (Heterogeneous) 
 
Team TL PU CSU W% L1(W%) 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
       
BOS 320 9438 -644 2377 2693 0.842 
t-value (0.70) (1.98)** (-1.34) (1.92)* (2.18)** (0.870) 
       
CHI 2534 26078 -1210 11814 6347 0.865 
t-value (3.47)*** (3.34)*** (-1.57) (5.58)*** (2.87)*** (0.888) 
       
DET 267 -5121 -368 5633 2954 0.953 
t-value (0.58) (-1.01) (-0.80) (4.17)*** (2.11)** (0.959) 
       
LAK -420 -526 81 5164 3659 0.923 
t-value (-0.75) (-0.08) (0.12) (3.00)*** (2.16)** (0.942) 
       
NYR 167 1657 -366 3406 892 0.953 
t-value (0.55) (0.51) (-1.16) (3.60)*** (0.88) (0.961) 
       
STL 1112 9454 1831 9273 8268 0.688 
t-value (1.20) (0.89) (1.67) (3.18)*** (2.93)*** (0.749) 
       
*** Significant at the 99% critical level 
** Significant at the 95% critical level 













TABLE D.5: NHL Franchise Break Point Sequential Test Results (Homogeneous) 
 
Team SupFt(1) SupFt(2) SupFt(3) SupFt(4) SupFt(5) UDmax WDmax SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) SupF(4/3) SupF(5/4) Breaks 
             
BOS 53.99a 36.71a 27.98a 27.41a 25.84a 53.99a 53.99a 22.74a 9.06 7.38 7.38 2 
             
CHI 12.52b 17.99a 24.67a 28.57a 29.67a 29.67a 54.34a 10.99c 17.36b 63.00a 39.29a 3 
             
DET 87.78a 56.57a 65.21a 69.92a 69.99a 87.78a 128.17a 74.34a 74.34a 11.79 13.17 2 
             
LAK 9.81 24.22a 30.46a 34.53a 36.81a 36.81a 67.42a 41.24a 124.09a 124.09a 124.09a 0 
             
NYR 101.43a 87.35a 73.25a 62.13a 52.95a 101.43a 109.63a 57.64a 15.06b 16.22b 17.43b 3 
             
PHI 33.76a 128.13a 91.90a 74.79a 81.11a 128.13a 160.81a 220.58a 5.90 76.95a 5.76 3 
             
STL 58.09a 76.20a 87.51a 52.74a 50.42a 87.51a 127.42a 15.34b 27.26a 15.61b 17.52b 2 
             
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 




















TABLE D.6: NHL Franchise Break Dates (Homogeneous) 
 
Team T1 T2 T3 
    
BOS 1975-76 1999-00  
 [74-75, 76-77] [97-98, 02-03]  
    
CHI 1963-64 1976-77 1982-83 
 [59-60, 64-65] [75-76, 77-78] [81-82, 83-84] 
    
DET 1982-83 1987-88  
 [81-82, 83-84] [86-87, 88-89]  
    
NYR 1975-76 1990-91 1997-98 
 [74-75, 76-77] [89-90, 91-92] [96-97, 98-99] 
     
PHI 1970-71 1974-75 1995-96 
 [69-70, 71-72] [73-74, 75-76] [94-95, 96-97] 
    
STL 1975-76 1989-90  
 [74-75, 76-77] [85-86, 90-91]  
    















TABLE D.7: NHL Franchise Breakpoint Regression Results (Homogeneous) 
 
Team α1 β1 α2 β2 α3 β3 α4 β4 
BOS 156 8322 236 2506 216 1962   
t-value (a6.05)a (12.05)a (8.40)a (1.71) (2.48)b (0.41)   
CHI 213 1973 -104 7743 685 -16394 -8 8124 
t-value (1.80)c (1.68) (-1.09) (3.20)a (2.26)b (-1.88)c (-0.25) (3.81)a 
DET 110 8711 502 -959 -27 18252   
t-value (5.56)a (8.92)a (1.82)c (-0.10) (-0.99) (11.57)a   
NYR 300 8897 106 18806 306 2790 -44 18852 
t-value (16.85)a (16.67)a (-2.94)a (14.02)a (3.01)a (0.62) (-1.00) (7.96)a 
PHI 1757 7783 899 10542 -1 17380 -2 19681 
t-value (11.05)a (15.12)a (5.83)a (11.04)a (-0.06) (30.12)a (-0.12) (21.39)a 
STL 421 5197 -730 93 4815    
t-value (1.81)c (2.89)a (1.92)c (-0.26) (1.59) (1.58)   
a. Significant at the 99% critical level 
b. Significant at the 95% critical level 
c. Significant at the 90% critical level 



















TABLE D.8: NHL Franchise Balance and W% Coefficients (Homogeneous) 
 
Team TL PU CSU W% 𝑹�𝟐 (𝑹𝟐) 
      
BOS -22 8678 -493 4115 0.845 
t-value (-0.05) (1.85)* (-1.06) (4.06)*** (0.869) 
      
CHI 2111 22530 -1476 15176 0.859 
t-value (2.87)*** (2.87)*** (-1.93)* (7.38)*** (0.887) 
      
DET -166 -2642 -318 5238 0.954 
t-value (-0.35) (-0.52) (-0.69) (3.87)*** (0.962) 
      
NYR -2 1950 -629 3829 0.954 
t-value (-0.01) (0.62) (-1.97)** (4.06)*** (0.963) 
      
PHI 49 -4257 -240 311 0.985 
t-value (0.29) (-1.82)* (-0.83) (0.49) (0.989) 
      
STL 1004 25782 3189 11852 0.765 
t-value (1.14) (2.36)** (2.93)*** (4.56)*** (0.816) 
      
*** Significant at the 99% critical level 
** Significant at the 95% critical level 






CALCULATION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
• LAPG: League Average Attendance Per Game is calculated by the following 
formula: 
 








In this representation, T indicates the total number of teams and N the 
number of games for the given season.  Because there are two teams participating 
in each game, this total number of games must be divided by two for the total 
number of home games played for the league in the given year.  𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡 represents 
the total attendance for team t for the given season, and aggregate league 
attendance is simply the sum of all these team totals. 
 
 
• TAPG: Team Average Attendance Per Game is calculated similarly to LAPG, but 
must account for possible variation in the number of home games for each team 
(which differs in some seasons).  Therefore, TAPG is calculated from the using, 
 








With i indexing each home game for the given team in a given season and 
H representing the total number of home games for the team under consideration. 
 
 
• Win Percent: Win percent is calculated in the usual way, dividing the total 
number of wins by the total number of games played for each team in each 
season.  However, it is important to note the treatment of ties.  In any league, ties 
are considered half a win for each team participating in the contest that ended in 







In this representation, W and D are the number of wins and ties (draws) by 
a given team in a given season.  The length of the season (total number of games) 







• Game Uncertainty: Tail Likelihood is defined as in Lee (2004), and consists of 
the sum of the likelihood of the winning percentages of the top and bottom 20% 
of teams that occurred in the idealized normal distribution from: 
 




where 𝑟 indexes the rank number of top and bottom teams as a percentage of  
teams in the league (i.e. 20% of a 10 team league would result in using the First 
and Second and Ninth and Tenth ranked teams’ winning percentages in the league 
as each ‘tail’), and the function, 𝑓(∙) is the standard normal probability density 
function.  𝑍𝑟 represents the z-score of each team’s winning percentage compared 







And 𝜎 represents the idealized standard deviation under a perfectly 






With N representing the season length for the given season.  The index, 𝑟, 
is not always an integer, as 20% of the total number of teams in a league may not 
be an integer.  For example, if there are 14 teams in a given league, the top and 
bottom tails would be represented by ranks 1, 2, and 2.8 and 14, 13 and 12.2, 
respectively.  Therefore, for ranks such as 2.8 and 12.2, 𝑊𝑃𝑖 is calculated using a 
weighted average of the win percent of teams ranked 2nd and 3rd, and 12th and 13th, 
respectively.  TL and all other balance measures are calculated separately for the 
AL and NL in Major League Baseball, and use the entire league for NBA, NFL 
and NHL, respectively. 
 
 
• Playoff Uncertainty: WinDiff is defined differently depending on the league 
playoff structure and season in question.  For a league without wild cards in 










Where 𝑊𝑃1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑊𝑃2 represent the respective 1st and 2nd ranked teams in 




given league.  With wild  cards, the above equation is adjusted to include an 
additional difference in win percent of  the first team out and the last team in 
the playoffs.  Additionally, if multiple wild cards  are required to come from 
each division, then additional win percent differences are  included in the 
calculation.  For a full description of the changes in playoff structures  across 
leagues and time, see Appendices 2 through 5. 
 
• Consecutive Season Uncertainty: Corr3 is calculated by correlating the current 
year’s team win percents with the average win percent for each team in the 3 years 
prior to the current season.  In other words, it is the correlation of two paired 
vectors containing the 𝑊𝑃𝑡𝑖and 𝑊3𝑡𝑖described by: 
 








Here, 𝑡 indexes the current year and 𝑛 = 3.  The subscript 𝑖 indexes the team for 
which each calculation is made.  For each year under analysis, Corr3 is described 
by, 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑟(𝑊𝑃,𝑊3) 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟(𝑊𝑃,𝑊3) =  
𝑛 ∑𝑊𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝜇(𝑊3𝑖,𝑡) − ∑𝑊𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ∑ 𝜇(𝑊3𝑖,𝑡)
�𝑛∑𝑊𝑃𝑖,𝑡2 − �∑𝑊𝑃𝑖,𝑡�
2
 �𝑛∑𝜇(𝑊3𝑖,𝑡2 ) − (∑𝜇(𝑊3𝑖,𝑡))2
, 
 
Where here n is the number of teams in year t for the league. 
 
• Competitive Balance Ratio: CBR (2002) is taken directly from Humphreys 
(2002) description as a ratio of within and across season balance for a given 
league.  Beginning with the across season standard deviation, 
 
𝜎𝑇,𝑖 = �




where the second term in the numerator is each team’s average won-loss 
percentage during T seasons (from 1 to T).  As Humphreys describes, there will 
be a vector of 𝜎𝑇,𝑖, one for each team in the league, and the smaller the value of 
𝜎𝑇,𝑖, the less the variation in team i’s winning percentage during the seasons under 
analysis. 
 
Following with the within-season variation in win-loss percentage, 










Here, 𝜎𝑁,𝑡 is a vector with one value for each season.  Each of these 
























NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (NBA) PLAYOFF UNCERTAINTY CALCULATION 
 
 
Season Calculation Details 
2006/07 to 2009/10: Average Difference between Top 2 in each Division (3 Divs) for East and West 
 
Average Difference between 8 and 9 seed (Last Playoff Spot) for East and West 
2004/05 to 2005/06: Average Difference between Top 2 in each Division (3 Divs) for East and West 
 
Average Difference between 8 and 9 seed (Last Playoff Spot) for East and West 
1983/84 to 2003/04: Average Difference between Top 2 in each Division (2 Divs) for East and West 
 
Average Difference between 8 and 9 seed (Last Playoff Spot) for East and West 
1976/77 to 1982/83: Average Difference between Top 2 in each Division (2 Divs) for East and West 
 
Average Difference between 6 and 7 seed (Last Playoff Spot) for East and West 
1974/75 to 1975/76: Average Difference between Top 2 in each Division (2 Divs) for East and West 
 
Average Difference between Last 2 in contention for Playoff Spot for East and West 
1970/71 to 1973/74: Average Difference between Top 2 in each Division (2 Divs) for East and West 
 
Average Difference between 2nd and 3rd in each Division (2 Teams from each Div) for East and West 
1966/67 to 1969/70: Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place (Conference Reg. Season Champ) for East and West 
 
Average Difference between 4 and 5 seed (Last Playoff Spot) for East and West 
1955/56 to 1965/66: Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place (Conference Reg. Season Champ) for East and West 
 















NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (NFL) PLAYOFF UNCERTAINTY CALCULATION 
 
 
Season Calculation Details 
2002 to 2009: 
Average of difference between Each 8 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last WC Berth (6th) 
and Runner-Up (7th) for NFC and AFC 
1990 to 2001: 
Average of difference between Each 6 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last WC Berth (6th) 
and Runner-Up (7th) for NFC and AFC 
1983 to 1989: 
Average of difference between Each 6 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last WC Berth (5th) 
and Runner-Up (6th) for NFC and AFC 
1982: 
Average of difference between Each 6 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last WC Berth (8th) 
and Runner-Up (9th) for NFC and AFC 
1978 to 1981: 
Average of difference between Each 6 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last WC Berth (5th) 
and Runner-Up (6th) for NFC and AFC 
1970 to 1977: 
Average of difference between Each 6 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference of WC Team (4th) and WC 
Runner-Up (5th) for NFC and AFC 
1967 to 1969: Average of difference between Each 4 Division Winners (Capital, Century, Coastal, Central) and Runner-Up in NFL 
1953 to 1966: Average of difference between Each 2 Division Winners (East, West) and Runner-Up in NFL 
1950 to 1952 Average of difference between Each 2 Division Winners (American, National) and Runner-Up in NFL 
1933 to 1949 Average of difference between Each 2 Division Winners (East, West) and Runner-Up in NFL 
















NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE (NHL) PLAYOFF UNCERTAINTY CALCULATION 
 
 
Season Calculation Details 
1998/99 to 2009/10: 
Average of difference between Each 6 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last Playoff 
Slot (8th) and Runner-Up (9th) for East and West Conferences 
1993/94 to 1997/98: 
Average of difference between Each 4 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last Playoff 
Slot (8th) and Runner-Up (9th) for East and West Conferences 
1981/82 to 1992/93: 
Average of difference between Each 4 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last 
Divisional Playoff Slot (4th in Div.) and Runner-Up (5th in Div.) in Each Division for Clarence-Campbell and 
Prince of Wales Conferences 
1979/80 to 1980/81 
Average of difference between Each 4 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last Playoff 
Slot (8th) and Runner-Up (9th) for Clarence-Campbell and Prince of Wales Conferences 
1977/78 to 1978/79: 
Average of difference between Each 4 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last Playoff 
Slot (6th) and Runner-Up (7th) for Clarence-Campbell and Prince of Wales Conferences 
1974/75 to 1976/77: 
Average of difference between Each 4 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last 
Divisional Playoff Slot (3rd in Div.) and Runner-Up (4th in Div.) in Each Division for Clarence-Campbell and 
Prince of Wales Conferences 
1967/68 to 1973/74: 
Average of difference between Each 4 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last 
Divisional Playoff Slot (4th in Div.) and Runner-Up (5th in Div.) in Each Division for East and West 
Conferences 
1942/43 to 1966/67: 
Average of difference between Regular Season Champion and Runner-Up and difference between Last Playoff 
Slot (4th) and Runner-Up (5th)  
1938/39 to 1941/42 
Average of difference between Regular Season Champion and Runner-Up and difference between Last Playoff 
Slot (6th) and Runner-Up (7th) 
1926/27 to 1937/38 
Average of difference between Each 2 Division Winners and Runner-Up and difference between Last 











MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (MLB) PLAYOFF UNCERTAINTY CALCULATION 
 
 
Season Calculation Details 
1995 to 2009: Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place for East, Central and West Divisions in NL & 
 
Average Difference between 4th and 5th seed (Last Playoff Spot) in the NL 
 
Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place for East, Central and West Divisions in AL & 
 
Average Difference between 4th and 5th seed (Last Playoff Spot) in the AL 
1994 (no playoffs): Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place for East, Central and West Divisions in NL & 
 
Average Difference between 4th and 5th seed (Last Playoff Spot) in the NL (at strike) 
 
Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place for East, Central and West Divisions in AL & 
 
Average Difference between 4th and 5th seed (Last Playoff Spot) in the AL (at strike) 
1981 to 1993: Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place for East and West Divisions in NL 
 
Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place for East and West Divisions in AL 
1980: 
Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place for East and West Divisions in NL for both season 
halves 
 
Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place for East and West Divisions in AL for both season 
halves 
1969 to 1980: Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place for East and West Divisions in NL 
 
Average Difference between 1st and 2nd place for East and West Divisions in AL 
1901 to 1968: Difference between 1st and 2nd place in NL 
 





















All Teams (NFL): 1992 & 1998 
Chicago Bears (CHI): 1961 & 1962 
Green Bay Packers (GB): 1952 
New York Giants (NYG): 1953 & 1958 
Philadelphia Eagles (PHI): 1938 
Pittsburgh Steelers (PIT): 1938, 1944, 1951-1953, 1957 & 1965 




Boston Bruins (BOS): 1961/62 
Chicago Blackhawks (CHI): 1956/57-1961/62, 1970/71-1972/73 & 1975/76-1976/77 
Montreal Canadiens (MON): 1958/59-1961/62 & 1986/87-1988/89 
New York Rangers (NYR): 1961/62 & 1986/87-1988/89 
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